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MOZAMBIQUE AND UNITED STATES POLICY

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AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

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MOZAMBIQUE AND UNITED STATES POLICY

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 9:46 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Simon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Simon, Helms, Kassebaum, and Murkowski.

Senator SIMON [presiding]. The subcommittee on African affairs will come to order. This morning we are conducting a hearing on the situation in Mozambique, and United States policy in that area.

I have a full statement I will enter into the record. I happen to be one of those who is supporting the administration policy in Mozambique. There are those on this committee who feel differently.

But all of us have to take a look at what the facts are, and specifically the issues that we want to address are, first, the status of the war waged by RENAMO and its impact on Mozambique, including the cost to the economy there.

Second, the origins, character, and activities of RENAMO, including the nature and level of South African support for it.

Third, the Mozambican Government's efforts to move toward the West and to distance itself from the Soviet Union.

And fourth, the causes of the famine, the severity of the refugee crisis, which has resulted in hundreds of thousands of displaced Mozambicans, and the problems of food distribution.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SIMON

This morning we are conducting a hearing on the situation in Mozambique and United States Policy toward that war-torn country. After a lengthy debate on United States policy toward South Africa. Some of my colleagues in the Senate—including some on this committee—have expressed strong opposition to the administration's policy toward Mozambique and raised questions about the wisdom of that policy.

The purpose of this hearing is to gain as accurate and complete a picture as possible of the situation in Mozambique and to consider how United States interests may be best served.

Some of the issues we want to address are:

One, the status of the war waged by RENAMO and its impact on Mozambique, including costs to the economy;

Two, the origins, character, and activities of RENAMO, including the nature and level of South African support for RENAMO;

Three, the Mozambican Government's efforts to move toward the West and to distance itself from the Soviet Union; and

Four, the causes of the famine, the severity of the refugee crisis which has resulted in hundreds of thousands of displaced Mozambicans, and problems of foof distribution.

I believe that the administration's policy toward Mozambique promotes peace and stability in the region and promotes U.S. interests. Many of our Western European allies—including Great Britain—have adopted similar policies.

Mozambique is an important frontline state and is central to the efforts by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to rehabilitate the region's critical transportation links to the Indian Ocean.

Mozambique, although a Marxist state, is moving in the right direction. The government is developing more ties with Western nations, implementing positive economic reforms, working in earnest with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and adhering to the Nkomati accord.

But the Government of Mozambique's efforts to revitalize its economy continue to be thwarted by South African aggression, and the ongoing conflict with RENAMO.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Our first panel this morning represents the administration: The Honorable Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs; and Mr. Edward L. Saiers, Deputy Assistant Administrator for East and Southern Africa. And our second panel of public witnesses: Mr. Terry Jeggle, former CARE Director, CARE—Mozambique; Mr. Thomas Brennan, consultant, U.S. Committee for Refugees; Mr. Steven Metz, visiting professor of political science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Mr. Thomas H. Henriksen, senior fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; and Mr. Jose Francisco, adviser to the Mozambique Information Agency and former FRELIMO party member.

There are among the things that we will be looking at. We appreciate the witnesses being here. We are particularly pleased to welcome to our first panel the Hon. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State with the Bureau of African Affairs, and Dr. E.L. Saiers, Deputy Assistant Administrator for AID for the Southern African Region.

We will ask all witnesses to limit their initial comments to 5 minutes, and we will enter the full statements in the record. And we will proceed from there. Mr. Crocker.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here to have a chance to address the important subject of the situation in Mozambique and our policy there this morning.

As we would look at the situation in Mozambique, I think the place to start is to look at a bit of the history. In a nutshell, Mr.

Chairman, I think it is fair to say that Mozambique was one of the worst prepared former colonies for independence that the African experience has ever shown.

Very few people trained, very little effective central government presence, even under Portuguese rule in many parts of the country, and conditions of the transition to independence, which meant that most of the Portuguese, who held many of the top jobs and the technical skills fled during the circumstances of the transition to independence.

So there was a frightful legacy at the time of independence in 1975. The new government of Mozambique in the early postindependence years, that is to say in the late 1970's, compounded these problems, made them worse, by trying to implement a socialist economic model, by nationalizing land and agriculture and industry, by the creation of a bureaucracy which only stifled production and output.

So the combination of these factors, the colonial legacy and the early experimentation by the Mozambique leadership, with a failed model, as it soon came to be, and associating itself closely with the Soviets in those early years, account for a great deal of what we are still facing today, that early experience.

Mr. Chairman, by 1983, faced with all the problems created by their own decisions, as well as this historical legacy, the Mozambican leadership began a fundamental shift away from its earlier approach, in terms of economic policies, in terms of reducing dependence and reliance on Moscow, in terms of becoming for the first time a genuinely independent, nonaligned African country, and in terms of reaching out to the West.

This realignment, which we would date to 1983, was paralleled by our own bilateral relationship with that country. When I first went to Mozambique in April of 1981, relations were at a very low ebb.

The government was harshly confrontational and critical of virtually everything we did and stood for. It had just expelled a number of our diplomats from our mission in Mozambique.

We began to see in mid to late 1982 and early 1983 signals and messages being sent our way indicating a desire to move toward, or at least to explore, a more constructive relationship with us.

And so we saw more effort on their side toward cooperation, sharply reduced public criticism, and a productive dialog which got underway. It was in this context in 1983, and then 1984, that we began working closely with the Mozambique Government on a series of regional issues.

First of all, to try to engage them in the effort to work with the Angolan leadership on the issue of Namibia's independence and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, in which they played a very constructive part and still are to this day.

Second, we also undertook to open channels of communication between Mozambique and the government of South Africa, a process that led ultimately to a series of very constructive decisions that were taken in favor of regional coexistence, and against a policy of regional confrontation.

It was against this backdrop, Mr. Chairman, that President Reagan received the late President Samora Machel in the White

House in September of 1985. That meeting provided fresh impetus for what we have been trying to do; that is to work on a reciprocal basis with the leadership of Mozambique toward a constructive relationship that serves our interests and serves the interests of the region, and serves their interests.

Despite the death of President Machel in October 1986 the positive momentum of United States-Mozambican relations has continued and even accelerated under his successor, President Chissano. So this is some of the brief background in terms of our bilateral relationship.

It is interesting, perhaps ironic, that the success of what we have been accomplishing, both in the region and in our bilateral relationship with Mozambique has been accompanied by debate and by the development of what you might call some myths in terms of our relationship there and our interests there and the situation in that country.

I would like to briefly touch upon some of these myths as we see them. There is a myth, Mr. Chairman, that Mozambique remains a compliant client of the Soviet Union.

The facts are that although Mozambique remains a recipient of Soviet hardware and the Soviets are the largest supplier of such hardware, the trend line of Soviet hardware deliveries has declined in sharp contrast to the experience across Africa and Angola, where Soviet arms deliveries continue to increase.

In sharp contrast to the Angolan experience, Mozambique has never given the Soviets military access rights on its territory, nor have Soviet or Cuban troops ever been deployed to Mozambique. Today the number of advisors in all categories from Western countries outnumber those from East bloc countries in Mozambique.

In foreign policy terms as well, Mozambique has pursued a course which clearly distinguishes it from Angola and other Soviet clients in southern Africa. That is simply not the way it is approaching the situation there today.

In 1984, despite active Soviet opposition, Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord, under which Mozambique and South Africa agreed not to support insurgent movements on their territory.

Mozambique has complied with the commitments of the Nkomati Accord, that is principally by expelling guerrillas of the exiled African National Congress from its territory and taking continuing steps to prevent the use of its territory by the ANC against South Africa.

Despite clear evidence of South African violation of some of the provisions of Nkomati, the government of Mozambique has continued to affirm its commitment to that agreement, even in most recent months, trying to find a way to maintain constructive relations with its large and powerful neighbor.

I would not confine this judgment, Mr. Chairman, to the relationship with South Africa. Mozambique has worked, as I said, with us on the question of Angola. Mozambique has been a clear and steady voice for commonsense on the question of tensions, of confrontation, of sanctions and countersanctions, as these issues have developed in 1985 and 1986.

It has been a moderating force in the councils of the frontline states and the SADCC countries. It has reached out to cultivate im-

proved relations with all of its neighbors. That includes countries that are seen as progressive or radical, if you will, in their foreign policy. It also includes countries such as Malawi and Zaire, which are seen as staunch moderates and friends of the West.

So, to sum that up, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that there is no country in southern Africa that has worked more consistently than Mozambique with the United States to further the cause of peace and stability on a regional basis in southern Africa.

Further afield, Mozambique no longer votes automatically with the Soviets in the United Nations. There has been some progress. We would like to see more, in terms of the way Mozambique expresses its independence and its nonalignment in international forums such as the U.N. In short, Mozambique has evolved a far more nonaligned policy over the past 5 years than was the case heretofore.

A second myth, which is often acclaimed, is that Mozambique is seeking Western aid merely to bail out its failed experiment in Socialism. I would say that that is an incorrect statement.

What Mozambique has done is to scrap its failed experiment in socialism and taken an economic U-turn. Its policies, as recognized by the international financial institutions, that is the World Bank and the IMF, represent one of the most far-reaching programs of economic restructuring undertaken by any African country.

My colleague, Mr. Saiers, will have an occasion to comment on this. But in a recent impressive vote of confidence by these organizations in Mozambique's new economic course, I would note that the Paris Club has just granted Mozambique most favorable terms for debt rescheduling, which is a clear recognition of the perceived progress on that front.

Another myth that is sometimes discussed or alleged, Mr. Chairman, is that the United States has allowed its political or diplomatic considerations to overwhelm its humanitarian and human rights considerations in Mozambique.

Again, in our view, the contrary is true. The United States has pledged over 194,000 tons of food, a total commitment for relief and food that approximates $75 million this year, making us the largest donor to help meet Mozambique's very severe humanitarian crisis.

We are, I think, in sharp contrast with our global adversary, responding in a relevant way, and getting food to those who are at risk through all available means, working closely with an international donor framework, which we helped to create. And I would stress this point.

It was this Government, our Government, which appealed to the United Nations to set up a coordinating context for relief to be provided in Mozambique, and that is now in place.

Similarly, we do not downplay the importance of human rights in Mozambique. Mozambique's record is far from perfect. There have been improvements and we will continue to press for improvements.

I would cite in particular the growing pattern of improvement in Mozambique's relationship with the Catholic Church, which is of course a key institution in Mozambique, and that process is underway.

It was signaled or highlighted, in a way, by the recent visit of President Chissano to the Vatican, where he met with Pope John Paul II.

Another myth that I think should be taken directly at this occasion, Mr. Chairman, is that somehow if we support and work with the government of Mozambique, we are out of step with what might be called the forces of freedom, our democratic allies around the world.

The reality is that our NATO and Asian allies and friends continue to expand and deepen their support for the government of Mozambique. No Western democracy supports RENAMO. No country in the world has relations or official contacts with it.

Even South Africa, which converted RENAMO from a nuisance into a well-armed rebel group, recognizes the Mozambique Government and conducts its dealings with RENAMO on a clandestine basis.

Western economic assistance to Mozambique dwarfs that of the Soviet bloc, and our allies are assisting Mozambique in the security as well as the economic field.

I would note that in 1986 the British began training Mozambican army personnel on a unit basis, and have conducted a successful naval ship visit to Mozambique. Other NATO governments are developing such relationships as well.

I think it is fair to say from the recent visit to Europe of President Chissano that both the British and the Italians—the Italians are Mozambique's largest aid donor—have been impressed by the moderate stance that President Chissano has taken.

They and our other allies are committed to a policy of encouraging Mozambique's turn toward the West, eroding Soviet influence there. And they look to us to continue our own approach.

Another myth, Mr. Chairman, that I would cite is the question of whether or not RENAMO represents a democratic alternative to the government of Mozambique.

As is well known, RENAMO was created by the Rhodesian security services on the late 1970's as a way to bring pressure to bear on Mozambique for that country's assistance to the Zimbabwean guerrilla groups, liberation groups.

With Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the sponsorship of RENAMO was taken over by the South African defense forces. South African support for RENAMO directly declined somewhat after the Nkomati Accord. But there clearly is a pattern of continuing support and contact and communication between the government of South Africa and RENAMO.

In late 1984 the government of Mozambique made an effort to negotiate with RENAMO, with South Africa as the intermediary. At a critical moment in those talks, for reasons we have never learned, the RENAMO representatives walked out of those negotiations, and since then the guerrilla conflict has ebbed and flowed in Mozambique.

RENAMO scored some successes on the battlefield in the fall of 1986. In the early months of 1987 Mozambican forces, with help from the Zimbabwean forces that are stationed there, regained the initiative in the first few months of this year.

We are not making a prediction as to any near-term outcome of this conflict. It could ebb and flow for some time to come. RENAMO, Mr. Chairman, in our view has little capability to expand its political influence in areas of the country beyond the central regions where the Shona tribal group predominates.

There are a number of reasons why that is the case, as my written testimony indicates. It has to do both with RENAMO's practices, as well as its relative lack of attention to a civil or political program, as opposed to a purely military program.

RENAMO activities that have affected civilians in areas where it operates have clearly been a factor as well, in what we see to be a very limited appeal of that organization. We think it is instructive to note what the attitude is of Mozambicans who are not part of the government of Mozambique, who care about their country, who want to see peace, and who do not have any axe to grind from the stangovernment.

I would cite the Archbishop of Mozambique, Archbishop of Maputo, Jose Maria Dos Santos, who recently said the following when asked about whether or not there should be a way to work out a peaceful settlement there, which of course he wants.

He said, "We do not know who the leaders of RENAMO are. We do not know how to contact them. We have no relationship with these people." We think that is an interesting observation, coming from someone who wants to see an end to the conflict, suggesting to us that RENAMO lacks a credible, political identity where it counts, which is in Mozambique itself.

I would note again that all of our Western allies and democratic partners pursue the same policy in this regard as we do. They do not have official relations with RENAMO, and they would find it rather strange, I think, and unsettling, were we to do so.

A final myth that I would touch on very briefly, Mr. Chairman, has to do with whether or not the United States is indeed, as we think, seeking a political solution and seeking peace in Mozambique.

It is sometimes said that we are not. I would disagree with that. I would refute that notion. We have a consistent conviction in Mozambique, as elsewhere in southern Africa, that military conflict cannot solve political problems.

Mozambique's pressing human and economic problems will be difficult to resolve as long as the civil strife continues. It is the policy of the U.S. Government to use whatever influence is available to us, as we do elsewhere in the region, to encourage an end to hostilities and peaceful solutions to these conflicts.

We have in the past, and when circumstances were propitious to do so, encouraged contact between the government of Mozambique and RENAMO's leaders. We did that in reference to the discussions that were underway in October 1984, as I have indicated before.

Should further opportunities arise for us to play a similar role in ending hostilities in Mozambique, we will not hesitate to do so.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot close without saying just a word or two about our view of the urgency to achieve the confirmation of our nominee as Ambassador to Mozambique. Ambassador-designate Wells has been before the Congress for some 8 months now. She is

superbly qualified for a tough job. We obviously hope that she will receive early confirmation.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe our policy in Mozambique has been a success. We believe it is working. We believe the issues at stake are important, not just because of Mozambique, in itself a huge country, a country facing tragic humanitarian problems.

But also because of what Mozambique represents in southern Africa. A quick look at the map of the region indicates why this is so. Virtually all the landlocked countries of southern Africa look to Mozambique as the only transport access for them to the oceans that is not dominated or controlled by South Africa.

Virtually all of the countries, the independent countries of black Africa in southern Africa look at our relationship with Mozambique as a key litmus test, if you will, of our desire to work alongside African aspirations in that part of the world.

So we believe it is a key country, and that our policies are the right ones. We intend to persevere in them because they are good for the United States, they are good for the region and they are good for the people of Mozambique. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crocker appears in the appendix.]

Senator SIMON. We thank you, Mr. Secretary. Before we hear Dr. Saiers, I have been joined by two of our colleagues, who may wish to have a statement before we proceed. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I certainly do want to have a statement a little later on. I think I will defer for the moment, because we have just heard Chet Crocker, I like him, we are friends. Right?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. With the most astounding contradictions in his own testimony. Here we are in the position that the U.S. Government, or you can read that, State Department, refuses to talk to RENAMO. Yet much of his statement is a scathing indictment of RENAMO.

He does not know what he is talking about. I have on my desk a letter that came in this morning from a distinguished American who has just returned from Mozambique, and he met with RENAMO. He knows who they are and what they are.

And we have the anomaly of the U.S. State Department, Mr. Chairman, in the person of the Secretary of State sitting one morning not long ago, saying, we will meet with anybody.

And that was in response to my question about whether he was going to meet with that violent group in South Africa, the African National Congress, the crowd that is fighting for freedom by hanging tires around the necks of people who disagree with them, filling them with gasoline, setting them afire, including children.

Now, there are pictures of that. But Mr. Crocker said, there are reports that, there are reports that. He does not document it. And I say, sir, that you do not know what you are talking about, or otherwise you have come up here to defend an indefensible policy of the U.S. State Department.

Now as for Mrs. Wells, she is a charming, likable lady. I have met with her for 1½ hours, and I have written John Whitehead,

the No. 2 man at the State Department, that all he has got to do to get that nomination through, in my judgment, there are 27 other Senators who oppose this nomination until something is done, but in my judgment and certainly as far as I am concerned, all the State Department has to do is say, "We are going to do the same thing with RENAMO that we do with the ANC."

But no, the State Department is stonewalling it. The ANC is unquestionably Marxist related. Many of its leaders are acknowledged Marxists. But we move over to Mozambique, and this is an anti-Communist crowd, and we will not talk with them.

Now my message to you, Mr. Crocker, is to tell Mr. Whitehead to respond to my letter, in which I said "All I need is a letter of one word, 'Yes.'" Yes, we will at least sit down with RENAMO as a group and find out something about them.

Now you are operating in the shadows, you are not operating in good faith. And I may get rolled on this nomination of Mrs. Wells. But I will tell you that unless and until the State Department backs up and agrees to treat freedom fighters in all countries the same way, then you are going to have a problem with me.

But I am astounded by your statement. I am astounded by it and we will have some specifics in just a minute.

Senator SIMON. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I will wait for further questions.

Senator SIMON. Dr. Saiers.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD L. SAIERS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. SAIERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to address the subcommittee on the situation in Mozambique, the progress it is making in rehabilitating and reorienting its economy, and the problems it still faces, especially the acute food shortage.

Assistant Secretary Crocker outlined the Mozambique situation at independence. After independence, Mozambique's new leaders exacerbated the country's poverty and problems by adopting a Soviet-style economic strategy that was a prescription for disaster.

This strategy emphasized state farms, government controls, fixed prices, and the stifling of private initiative. In a few short years, Mozambique was in ruins. The currency was nearly worthless, its foreign debt in arrears, its exports declining, and productive capacity sitting idle. Most important, Mozambique faced an acute food shortage exacerbated by drought and war.

In 1983, Mozambique's leaders publicly and candidly admitted that their experiment in statist economics had failed. Since then Mozambique has turned increasingly toward the West for economic advice and assistance, and to the private sector to manage and operate production entities.

It has joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, signed the Lome Convention with the European Economic Community, and welcomed Western donors, advisors, and investors.

More importantly, it has adopted a new economic strategy emphasizing private agriculture, more participation by private firms, both domestic and foreign, more realistic prices and more disciplined monetary and budget policies.

This new policy has been implemented gradually through a series of key reforms. The most important of these reforms have been in agriculture.

They have included breaking up of some state farms to create private family and commercial farms, lifting price controls on many agricultural products, and significantly increasing the prices of other agricultural products.

In addition, the government has begun to provide private farmers with technical services and inputs that were once reserved for only state farms. The impact of these reforms has been substantial.

In 1984, prior to these reforms, there were virtually no fruits or vegetables for sale in Maputo's deserted central market. Now that market is full. Prices initially shot up with the price liberalization, causing short-term difficulty for urban consumers.

However, they are now coming down as production catches up with demand. The increase in production was aided by AID's Commodity Import Program, which supplied much of the equipment, fertilizer, and other inputs used by the private farmers in and around Maputo.

The government's liberalization program has also allowed more freedom to local, private companies. More than 30 state-run manufacturing companies have been turned over to private hands.

Private firms now supply agricultural inputs in some areas, directly competing with government parastatals. The government has surrendered its monopoly on foreign trade, and private exporters today automatically retain some of their foreign exchange earnings to meet their own hard currency operating costs.

The government of Mozambique has welcomed foreign firms. Foreign investment regulations have been liberalized, and the government has negotiated investment agreements on very liberal terms for repatriation of profits.

Western multinationals, including some American firms, are now involved in plantation agriculture, light industry, mining concessions, and hotels. American companies doing business in Mozambique include Caltex Oil, Johnson & Johnson, General Tire, and Caterpillar.

Mozambique has also undertaken important reforms in budget and finance. Most important of these steps was the devaluation of the Metical, the national currency, by 425 percent in January of this year.

The government of Mozambique has just completed negotiation of an agreement with the IMF and the IBRD for an economic stabilization and recovery program, which will extend and speed these reform measures.

The recovery package has four basic objectives: To reduce central administration of the economy through more private sector participation; to base resource allocations on market oriented prices and credit policies; to provide better incentives by linking income to economic performance; and to improve planning, policymaking, and budgeting.

Features of the program include a review of 40 parastatal firms for possible closure or divestiture, further devaluation of the Metical, further reduction of foreign trade controls, the reduction by 20 percent in 1987 of the number of products for which prices are fixed, and by another 15 percent by the middle of 1988, and increases in taxes and reductions in subsidies.

The IMF's proposed program provides $36 million of financing to assist Mozambique during the 3-year reform period. According to the government of Mozambique, the IBRD plans to provide a further $90 million, including technical assistance and budget planning and reforming parastatals.

The IBRD and IMF programs will be complemented by bilateral aid from Western countries, which have now become Mozambique's principal source for economic aid. More than a dozen Western and Asian governments provided approximately $345 million in development aid to Mozambique in 1985, compared to $54 million provided by the Soviet Union and its allies.

AID has been providing $10 million a year since fiscal year 1984 in commodities and technical assistance to rehabilitate Mozambique's private sector. This year's commodity import program is providing agricultural inputs to private commercial and cooperative farmers in the Maputo area and other imported goods to small, private manufacturing operations.

Most AID assistance this year, however, is for emergency relief. AID is providing 194,000 tons of food aid, valued at $63 million, and an additional $7 million in disaster relief grants, making the United States the largest contributor to Mozambique's emergency relief effort. The country's emergency and the insurgent war, which is a major cause of the food problem, pose the greatest threats to the government's reform program.

The relief effort in Mozambique differs greatly from those in some other African countries where AID has been involved recently. In Mozambique, about two-thirds of the 630,000 metric tons of food aid required this year is being sold rather than distributed free by relief agencies.

Most of this food being sold goes to urban populations, which have the ability to pay for the food. It is the policy of the Mozambique Government to provide free food only to those who are truly destitute.

Another contrasting point between the Mozambique and other recent food emergencies in Africa is the cause of the food shortages. In Mozambique, climatic events are no longer the major factor.

In 1986, the weather was generally good for agriculture in most of the country. Rather, the disruption and displacement caused by the insurgency, coupled with the cumulative effect of years of poor economic policies and inadequate internal transport, have caused the collapse of food production and marketing in many areas of the country.

Our AID office in Mozambique estimates that 3.8 million rural people are in need, excluding some 400,000 refugees who have fled into neighboring countries, and some 2.2 million urban people who also rely on imported food.

This 3.8 million people includes some 1.5 million people who have been displaced within Mozambique and 2.3 million people still in the countryside, who are believed to be at risk. The overwhelming number of displaced persons have fled the war.

The picture in the countryside is less clear. The government attributes the cause for most rural people being in need to the war, but it has little concrete information on the extent of the need. A new survey is being implemented to reassess the current numbers at risk.

Access is a major obstacle to the relief effort. Of course, insurgency is only part of the problem. Many areas are isolated, simply by virtue of the terrain and lack of roads.

Over large areas, however, the insurgency has also impeded access. Delineating these areas is difficult because of the fluid nature of the war. Transport routes alternate between being safe for transport or highly dangerous, depending on the presence of the armed insurgents.

Only a handful of areas have been completely inaccessible because of war. One such area has been in Tete Province, north of the Cabora Bassa Lake. Some half dozen government relief trucks were destroyed in 1986 in northern Tete in attempts to reach this area.

More often, however, the insurgency isolates areas for limited amounts of time. In some districts fighting may be so intense and widespread that these areas become "no-go" zones until the fighting subsides.

Many areas in southern Mozambique that were unreachable because of war in 1984–85 are freely accessible now because the fighting has shifted to the north-central provinces. More recently, large areas of Tete and Zambezia were cut off in 1986 and early 1987.

Access to much of these two provinces has been restored in the last month. It is impossible, however, to predict where a new flareup in the fighting will cut off access.

The most serious effect of the insurgency on access has been hit-and-run interdiction of roads with mines, ambushes, or sniper attacks. These tactics lead to uncertainty about the safety of roads, and force the use of armed convoys, even when the combatants have long since moved on to other areas.

The government relief agency, CARE, and other relief agencies are making a concerted effort to deliver food further into rural areas. The government relief arm has a fleet of more than 300 trucks, and by the end of the year will add 30 tractors from the United Kingdom and 16 from the Netherlands that can penetrate far into the bush where there are no roads.

The U.S. Government is also working through other organizations such as the International Committee for the Red Cross and UNICEF to deliver food and medical supplies to areas presently inaccessible because of the war.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer any questions you and the members of the subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saiers appears in the appendix.]

Senator SIMON. I thank both of you. If I may summarize your testimony, kind of pull it together, both of you, what you are saying is we have a very severe economic problem there, and we

have a country that is moving away from the Soviet Union, it has an improved relationship, and it is in our best interests to continue that improvement, and if possible, accelerate it. Is that a reasonable summation?

Mr. CROCKER. I would say it is, Mr. Chairman. We would emphasize that the economic turnaround situation is the one that needs support, because it has the prospect to end this hideous economic crisis that the country has faced.

In addition, I would stress the regional aspect. We see Mozambique as a key country for a region that goes well beyond its borders, and where it has cooperated with us on a number of key regional diplomatic issues.

Senator SIMON. How much does RENAMO now control in Mozambique?

Mr. CROCKER. It is a question which is difficult to address in specific terms. They have had military events in probably every province at one time or another.

At present their activity is concentrated in the central provinces of the country, Mr. Chairman, three or four central provinces, Sofala and Manique and Zambezia provinces, particularly Tete Province.

To talk about the word "control," I think, is a little misleading in this context because it has not been, as we understand it, the purpose or the intention of RENAMO to actually hold territory.

Its units move around, leaving behind no civilian or political structure to speak of. When they arrive in a place, they tend to work through traditional authorities, if there are any there. But there is not a permanent presence of a governmental or quasigovernmental nature.

Senator SIMON. Are they a decreasing or increasing factor in Mozambique at this point?

Mr. CROCKER. As I tried to suggest in my opening comments, Mr. Chairman, it is an ebb and flow situation. There were some RENAMO gains in terms of taking towns last fall.

Most of those have been reversed this spring by the government forces and their allies. So you cannot say there is a really clear trend. I think we will have a better indication at the end of the coming wet season as to whether or not the government's ability to recoup some of these things that were taken earlier by RENAMO, whether that will be an indication of a trend or not.

But I would think that there are broader trends that are worth noting that affect this conflict, Mr. Chairman. We have a new government, in effect. President Chissano's leadership only dates back to last October.

It is clearly distinctive in style. It appears to be quite coherent. A number of changes are being put in place in terms of reorganizing the army and the government, in terms of new portfolios being given to different people, in terms of economic policy.

And in addition we are seeing this year, for the first time, a significant major flow of external resources into Mozambique that is creating facts on the ground, in terms of projects, in terms of transport and so forth. So this could begin to have some momentum.

Senator SIMON. And when you say that no Western democracy supports RENAMO, is their sole support from South Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, it is the principal source of support historically, until you go back to the Ian Smith period in Rhodesia, before Rhodesia's independence and it became Zimbabwe. But certainly in the 1980's it has been the primary source.

There have been others that we have come across who have been financial backers of RENAMO, private individuals in some cases, in other cases people with political connections in their governments. But South Africa is clearly the most important.

Senator SIMON. When you also say in your statement, "No Western democracy supports RENAMO," could we not also say that of Savimbi, with the exception of the United States?

Mr. CROCKER. I would not say that. I think it is clear by the presence of UNITA offices and representatives in a number of African and Western countries that there is a very strong distinction there.

UNITA is perceived widely internationally, whether people give press conferences about it or not, Mr. Chairman, as a legitimate nationalist movement with a strong and deep history that goes back to the 1960's. A movement which helped to chuck the Portuguese out of Angola, which fought that struggle.

So there is a lot of credibility there. In addition, UNITA is seen as having a grassroots base inside the country and we have every reason to say that UNITA would survive, that UNITA would carry on, that UNITA has a political future based on its grassroots support, without regard to support that it may receive from South Africa. We do not see the two movements at all alike.

Senator SIMON. Dr. Saiers, congressional restrictions on aid to Mozambique, are they a problem for you?

If you could just do what you wanted in terms of really being of assistance to the problems in Mozambique, are we creating barriers to your effective work?

Mr. SAIERS. On the relief side, the relief, food aid program, and so forth, there are no restrictions. So that is not a problem.

With development, for the economic support funds that have been going into Mozambique since 1985, there is a restriction that says, "To the maximum extent practicable we should use the private sector directly."

Now, there have been a few instances in which we thought we could have helped the government to move faster in privatization, to understand better the issues regarding the economic changes they were about to undertake, where it would have been very helpful for us to have that restriction removed.

The problems in Mozambique are great enough that it is not difficult to find very important and useful things to do with the private sector. But a major part of our effort is to help the government eliminate its undue influence on the private sector.

We have at times felt some limitations on being able to work with them on that particular area. Our own policies within the Agency would keep us from moving strongly into development of parastatal sectors or strenthening those parts of the national economy that are dominated by the public sector where they should not be. AID policy is not to support those anywhere. But in terms of helping the government get out of running these economic entities, we have found the restriction to be somewhat of a problem.

Senator SIMON. And Mr. Secretary, if I could just ask one last question, in response to the statement by Senator Helms just a few minutes ago.

Do I infer that the State Department, that no one is officially meeting with RENAMO simply because we do not want to give added credibility to RENAMO? Or what is the status?

Mr. CROCKER. It is correct, that we have no official contact with RENAMO. There are a series of reasons, and I will be happy to get into it now if you would like. I do not know if you want to do it now, or whether the Senator wants to pursue that line of questions. But I would be happy to do it now if you like.

We, first of all, are working within a context of a consensus of all of our allies, and our African partners in the region, and would note, as I said in my testimony, the South Africans themselves conduct their dealings with RENAMO in effect in the closet, which we think is significant. So that is the first point.

As I said in my testimony, the Soviets have been pushed aside in many respects in Mozambique by recent developments. They have angered and upset by Mozambican decisions. And I can think of frankly no single issue which would give greater delight to the Soviet Union than to be able to say that this country had developed a relationship with RENAMO.

So much so in fact that they have gone to great pains to try and spread disinformation around the region in southern Africa, suggesting that we are. They would use that, they would use that powerfully and effectively to try and discredit our diplomacy and our policies in the region.

I think it depends a bit on the question of what is the goal, what are we trying to achieve. As we have said, we will take information from all sources, when it comes to getting food into the country.

So that is not the issue, and we are working with the established organizations that have the most capability in that area.

We have on occasion had a specific instance, for example, an American hostage has been taken by RENAMO. And is in RENAMO hands this morning as we sit here. There have been people purporting to speak for RENAMO who have come to us with information about that situation, and we have listened to that information and have asked what was desired in order to get our hostage released.

So that is a practical example. We are not trying to be theological about this. But when it comes to official contact or relations, that is our position.

Senator SIMON. My time is up. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. Just to show, and I say this with as much respect as possible, how flimsy Mr. Crocker's statement is, Jane's Defense Weekly, a pretty credible organization, says that RENAMO has substantial popular support. Have you seen that? You have not seen that, have you?

Mr. CROCKER. I think I have seen it, actually, in a recent issue.

Senator HELMS. You say that is wrong? The London Times on April 5 of this year had an extensive story, and part of it was an interview with a Zimbabwean army sergeant, who said, "As far as we are concerned they have already won the war." "They" being RENAMO.

These RENAMO are good. They control the countryside. Now, you are talking about the American missionary, I suppose, Kindra Bryan, is that the one you are talking about?

You could get her out in 5 minutes, in 5 minutes, because the International Red Cross and RENAMO both have agreed to transport her out of the battle zone if the Zimbabwean forces would cooperate.

It is a matter of record, Mr. Secretary. And yet the State Department is sitting on its duff. This reminds me of Cuba and all of the assurances we had prior to the takeover of Cuba by Fidel Castro.

Oh, he is just an agrarian reformer and he is going to be with us. He is not like Batista, so forth and so on. But my pain is that you will not even sit down and talk to RENAMO as an organization.

What have you got to lose? If they are wrong you could walk away and say they are wrong. But to stonewall this thing just baffles me.

Now, you talk about all of the lovely movement toward the West, and away from the Soviet Union. Do you know Mr. Marcelino dos Santos? Who is he?

Mr. CROCKER. I know who he is. I think he is now the——

Senator HELMS. He is the No. 2 man in Mozambique. Right?

Mr. CROCKER. That is not our impression, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Yes, he is. Yes, he is. He has said, let me see if I can get the quote, he emphasized that FRELIMO wants to see the ties with the Soviet Union strengthened.

The No. 1 man, he wants the money. The No. 2 man is saying, "Well, we want to move toward strengthening the ties with the Soviet Union." Now, you say that nobody likes RENAMO over there.

Are you familiar with the recent pastoral letter from Catholic bishops of Mozambique urging the government to negotiate a plan for national reconciliation with RENAMO?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. How has the government of Mozambique, the Marxist government of Mozambique, responded to the bishops' proposal? The truth is, they have not responded at all. Right?

Mr. CROCKER. I think we have seen a number of statements of response from the government of Mozambique.

Senator HELMS. What did they say?

Mr. CROCKER. They have said some things very similar to what I said in my submitted testimony, which was a quotation from the Archbishop of Maputo, to the effect that it is kind of hard to know who to talk to.

Senator HELMS. Oh, come on. How did RENAMO respond to this proposal by the Catholic bishops that there be a reconciliation?

Mr. CROCKER. RENAMO's position on the terms for peace are, I think, longstanding, Senator, which have to do with preconditions about the removal of all foreign forces and——

Senator HELMS. You are talking too fast.

Mr. CROCKER. Which have to do with the preconditions about the removal of all foreign forces. This is what RENAMO has said for some time.

And also the need for the conduct of an election before there could be a cease-fire.

Senator HELMS. That is a terrible thing for them to request. Is it not? To get the foreign, Soviet Marxist people out of there, and to have elections. Oh, that is terrible. I can see why you do not like RENAMO.

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, with respect——

Senator HELMS. By your own statement you are contradicting yourself.

Well, let me ask you this. Does the United States advocate a reconciliation between the government of Mozambique and RENAMO?

Mr. CROCKER. As I indicated in my testimony, Senator, we have said consistently that we believe that there are likely to be military solutions to this conflict, that political solutions are what we support.

We have played a role in the past. We did play a role in October 1984 in trying to encourage an end to hostilities that could lead to dialog and reconciliation in Mozambique.

It was RENAMO which broke off those talks. And since that time there has not been a practical way for us to pursue that goal.

Senator HELMS. Oh, yes there is.

Mr. CROCKER. But we are quite prepared to pursue it when opportunities arise.

Senator HELMS. Without sitting down with RENAMO.

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I think the point that we need to get at here is really, what are we dealing with in terms of a movement.

Senator HELMS. In terms of what?

Mr. CROCKER. Where is its leadership? Who are they, and what do they respond to? It was an overseas telephone call that broke up the last efforts to get a ceasefire negotiated in Mozambique.

With your permission, Senator Helms, I would like to make a point on the question of the American who is hostage in Mozambique. We are in touch with the ICRC on her release and we are working with them, and we hope that she will be released very soon.

We did have people come to us, speaking for RENAMO directly at various places, suggesting that perhaps something could be worked out. And we asked a question or two as to what that might be, and we were asked for money.

But we are dealing with the ICRC on this and we will persevere in working with the ICRC. We think that is the right way to go.

I would also like to comment, if I could, Senator, on your statement about Marcelino dos Santos. We believe that his current role in the FRELIMO party is a very good indication of what is happening in Mozambique.

He is in the politburo. He is the president of the national assembly. The recent changes, since President Chissano took over, would indicate that other people, who are widely seen as being the black nationalist members of that movement, are coming into the leadership positions in that party and in that government.

Senator HELMS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I just showed you and Mrs. Kassebaum, Senator Kassebaum a letter I have that was on my desk and I left to go get it.

It came in this morning from James U. Blanchard III. Now, Jim Blanchard is a distinguished economist. He is in a wheelchair. He

has a brilliant mind, he is a dedicated American. And he does a lot of traveling. Now, he does not have any difficulty identifying and visiting with the leadership of RENAMO.

I start with the second paragraph. "I have talked with the RENAMO leadership personally, and I am extremely impressed and convinced that they are not only a successful indigenous anti-Communist political and military organization, but they are explicitly pro-West and pro-United States."

That may be the difficulty we have here. "They even have a fairly articulate free market oriented economic program planned. As I have told many others, when you see the director of information for the anti-Communist freedom fighters, RENAMO, reading a book on the American revolution and pro-free market literature, such as Milton Friedman's Free to Choose, and on the other hand you hear about FRELIMO burning people to death, you know something has got to be wrong with our State Department."

Now that is Mr. Blanchard. In case anybody wants to contact him he is president of James U. Blanchard, Inc., 2400 Jefferson Highway, Jefferson, LA. The telephone number is 504-837-3010. You might want to give him a ring if you are having all that much difficulty finding out who is the leadership.

I think I will stop at this point, because the next question would involve more time than I want to take.

Senator SIMON. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I think Dr. Crocker gave a very accurate portrayal of the situation in Mozambique. I visited there last August.

I think we should seize the opportunity which we have at this point to be a positive and constructive force for change in Mozambique.

Is it not right, Dr. Crocker, that our assistance to Mozambique is far less than that provided by Great Britain and our Western allies?

Mr. CROCKER. That is correct, Senator. The largest Western donor, the largest economic donor of any kind to Mozambique is Italy.

If you were to add together all the efforts being made by the Japanese, the Canadians and the European community members, it would far outshadow our own level of effort in Mozambique, which is an important effort.

But it is part of a much bigger, overall effort by Western countries and by the World Bank and the IMF.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Is it not correct that Prime Minister Thatcher has made a very concerted effort to be of assistance to President Chissano at this time, and is providing military training to the Mozambican armed services?

Mr. CROCKER. That is correct, Senator. The recent visit to London by President Chissano, I think, helped to consolidate and expand an important British relationship with the Mozambicans that goes back a number of years.

The British decided as a result of that visit that they were firmly convinced that this government, the government of President Chissano, was moving in the right direction toward what was termed Western-oriented nonalignment, major economic policy reform.

And the British announced an additional $25 million of assistance of their own for economic infrastructure in Mozambique, as well as announcing that they are going to be training whole companies of the Mozambican army, upward of 300 or so people a year, in that effort, which is stationed in Zimbabwe next door.

They have also decided to assign a permanent resident defense attache in Maputo, as we have done, as a result of that. The British have signaled to us, on a government-to-government basis, that they feel that this is the way to go and they are very hopeful that we will stick with it ourselves.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I understand that the Mozambican armed services have taken off the Soviet insignia that they had worn on their uniforms, and those that have been trained by the British are using a different insignia. Is that correct?

Mr. CROCKER. That is our understanding. I would have to look into the details as to precisely how far it has gotten through the units. But that is our understanding, Senator.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I think anybody who is looking at Mozambique recognizes that RENAMO has some significant support in areas. I think it is also important to understand the historic context of how RENAMO came into being, and the shambles the country was in after Portugal left.

The question that is posed by Senator Helms as to whether we would sit down and meet with RENAMO is an interesting one. As a matter of information, do we ask our Ambassadors in other countries to meet internally with the opposition?

For instance, do we ask our Ambassador in South Korea to meet with the opposition? Do we ask our Ambassador in Nicaragua to meet with the internal opposition? It has been my understanding that we have requested that our Ambassador in Nicaragua not meet with the internal opposition.

Senator HELMS. Did you ask me a question?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I am asking anybody who can answer.

Senator HELMS. Well, if they do not meet with the freedom fighters of Nicaragua, it is a stupid U.S. State Department policy.

Senator KASSEBAUM. What about South Korea?

Senator HELMS. Well, South Korea is an anti-Communist country which is our ally, and I do not know that they are not meeting. Ask Chester Crocker whether they meet with them or not.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I do not know.

Senator HELMS. They are probably directing them.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I think that it does pose a question that is a sensitive one, because there are insurgencies in every developing country.

And we can hardly go down the list and say, "Well, this week we are going to meet and next week we are not, depending on our litmus test of whether they are with us or against us."

I really feel that it is not so much a question of whether we are going to demand that the Ambassador meet with opposition. It is a recognition that just from a commonsense point of view, there is going to be contact.

And certainly there is unofficial contact right now with all parties concerned, between FRELIMO and RENAMO and various people who go in between. But to make that a requirement of our

Ambassadors seems to me to be putting us in a difficult position, because we would have to ask a number of our nominees that same question.

Senator HELMS. Well, if the Senator will yield.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would be happy to.

Senator HELMS. And please give her all the time she wants to make up——

Senator KASSEBAUM. Because I think it is an interesting question.

Senator HELMS. Well, George Shultz, Senator Kassebaum, answered your question sitting right there. He said we will meet with anybody.

That was in response to my question about whether he was going to meet——

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, we do. I have met with RENAMO.

Senator HELMS. Well, you are not the U.S. State Department.

Senator KASSEBAUM. No, but I am a U.S. Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, that is fine. And you are a dandy one. But I am talking about the U.S. State Department as a policy, saying "We are going to meet with everybody," the Secretary of State, as long as, if you take the events and put them together like a railroad train, as long as they are opposed to South Africa.

But we are not going to meet with anybody who is opposed to what has been going on in terms of repression and murder and violence and terrorism in Mozambique. Now, there have been all sorts of things going on there that the Secretary, your friend and mine, Chet Crocker, has not alluded to with respect to that government.

What he is saying and what the State Department is saying is precisely what was said about Fidel Castro. "Oh, when he gets in there he is going to fix things up." Well, by golly, he sure fixed things up.

Now, I say again, will the State Department sit down and meet with RENAMO as an organization? Mr. Secretary?

Mr. CROCKER. I do not know whose time we are on here, Senator, but I am happy to answer the question again.

Senator SIMON. Senator Kassebaum has the time.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would be happy to yield a moment or two, but I think this was a question asked before.

Senator HELMS. Well, it will take a moment for him to say yes or no, and then I am through.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I think from a diplomatic standpoint, and I know you do not have much patience with diplomacy. [Laughter.]

I do think that——

Senator HELMS. Depends on how you define it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, it depends on who is making the case. I think that, if we have some confidence in our Government and in our State Department, which I do have, we have to work within a diplomatic framework.

And I will leave it to Dr. Crocker to answer this. But I personally believe that to somehow make this a litmus test for Ambassador Wells' nomination is putting us on a slippery slope where we ought to be making this same judgmental test on every nomination. I do not think that should be the criteria for our nominees.

Mr. CROCKER. I wonder if I could just make one comment on this issue of contact and relations with movements. In countries where it is possible, our ambassadors, as a rule are instructed to have an open door. And our Ambassador in Mozambique would have an open door as well.

It is, of course, a country which is facing a civil war. And in practical terms, it is not all that obvious that an opposition movement that is an insurgent rebellion that has taken up arms could walk in that open door, or that there is any way that physically an Ambassador could find them without crossing a hostile line of some sort.

But I want to make it very clear to all concerned that we are here this morning to assert American national interests. We are not here this morning to try and sell either the government of Mozambique of anybody else.

We are trying to assert American national interests. We think that it is evident from all the information available to us that the Soviets have been dealt a severe setback in Mozambique because of what we and other Western countries have been doing.

And I have to believe that that is what President Reagan believes in. That is what he is appointing us to do, is to try and assert American influence and American initiative and values we believe in concerning market forces and increasing tolerance inside that country.

These are goals that we all share. So I guess I wonder why we are arguing with ourselves, when we have a case study of success in action on the ground, and a government of Margaret Thatcher—which I do not think it is soft on such as that and solidly behind it.

Senator SIMON. We can give you another couple minutes here, in view of the little dialog we had.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a moment about the transportation quarters and investment there.

First I would like to say that, in all of sub-Sahara Africa, I believe that the success of the continent is going to depend on strong transportation systems.

And with Mozambique having three deep harbors of significant importance, there are already many other countries, Japan and others, who are looking at investments there.

Again, this is an opportunity for us to be a major player in a constructive manner. How much investment from Europe and elsewhere is going into the development of transportation and harbor development?

Mr. SAIERS. Senator, on the Beira Corridor, which is the central rail line that leads into Zimbabwe, the overall assistance levels that have been committed to that right now are something on the order of $215 million.

Of that, there is $5.4 million that was from U.S. sources from our 1985 program. There is a consortium of 13 donors that are currently working in there that make up this $215 million total.

For the time being, we believe that is quite sufficient in terms of the absorptive capacity to rehabilitate and maintain that line and the port facilities around it.

In the longer run, up through a roughly 10-year time horizon, the transportation arm of SADCC has estimated that it will cost

something on the order of $650 million to put the Beira Corridor up to a maximum carrying capacity, around 2.5 million tons a year.

It is now handling something like half of that. But for the time being, I believe the $215 million is adequate for what can be accomplished. There are certain things that have to come in sequence, and you cannot be starting 600 million dollars' worth of activities——

Senator KASSEBAUM. Does that include investment for the Limpopo line as well?

Mr. SAIERS. No. That is only Beira.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Aren't the British putting in money for the Limpopo.

Mr. SAIERS. The British have committed some money to the Limpopo line. It is a much longer line.

The British have committed 12 million pounds, roughly $20 million, and Zimbabwe Railways is also working on that. But that is at a very early stage of rehabilitation. And the Mozambican Government is interested in moving into that.

The third line is the Nacala line, which basically services Malawi. There is a consortium of four donors working there. The commitment to Nacala has been fully subscribed to.

I believe it is something on the order of $200 million that will be going into that line as well over the next few years, largely with Canadians, the French, Portuguese, the British, and the EEC.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

Senator SIMON. Just one question, if I may direct this at you, Mr. Crocker.

And in response to comment by Senator Kassebaum, I tried to get the American Ambassador in South Korea to visit with Kim Dae-jung, and had a very difficult time finally getting that achieved.

I think it is one thing to maintain contact with opposition forces where there is no civil war, and another where there is a civil war. Here we have a civil war situation.

It does seem to me that the rational policy is, No. 1, from the humanitarian point of view, to try and help people who are in need, No. 2, from the national point of view, to encourage Mozambique to be as independent as possible from Soviet influence.

And Mozambique is moving in that direction, so that there ought to be assistance to Mozambique to encourage that, as well as to encourage independence from South Africa.

At the same time, since the internal conflict is not going to be resolved militarily, that we maintain some kind of informal contact with RENAMO, maybe not at the Ambassadorial level, to see if we can move things in the direction of getting the situation resolved diplomatically.

Does that sweeping series of generalizations make sense, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I think we understand and agree with where you are coming from on all of those things, Senator.

We are doing a lot on the humanitarian side. We are doing what we can, given our overall budget restraints, in terms of regular eco-

nomic assistance. We are providing a limited but a credible and important program of direct support for their effort to get more energy and initiative in private hands in Mozambique.

We work very hard through our post in Maputo to encourage the nonalignment and independence that you are talking about. We think that is right on. We are also encouraging, and I come back to this point again and again, the constructive pattern of behavior and policy that Mozambique has in the region as a whole, which we think warrants our support.

It is not too many countries in that region that you can point to and say that they have good relations with every one of their neighbors, or at least they have it as their established policy to seek good relations with every one of their neighbors.

And that is what southern Africa needs a lot more of. So we are trying to encourage that. We have encouraged the continued adherence to the Nkomati Agreement by the Mozambicans, even in the face of events such as recent ones in which questions can be raised about South African adherence to Nkomati.

As concerns the internal conflict, we agree with you. It is important that we do all we can to try and open up a political process. We cannot dictate it. I think we have to recognize that Mozambicans have to shape that agenda.

They are the ones who have to shape it, not us. But we have repeatedly made it clear to the leadership in Maputo that we would like to see them find a political opening. We would like to see progress on this.

And they know that if there were an opening, that we would be prepared to play a role in terms of facilitating movement in that direction. Whether it is done as it was done in 1984 with a South African role or not.

So there is no question, there is no difference between us there. What we do not want to do is to have our good name, our credibility, our symbolism, if you will, used simply for a photo opportunity.

We do not want to have a situation arise in which people are simply trying to get, if you will, political credibility by being able to say they met with so and so. So we are practical about it.

As I said when we had this American hostage, we have taken information, we have asked questions of people who say that, yes, they are with RENAMO, to try and find a practical handle to a solution to get her out.

So we are not hard over on this. But I think we are talking about it in a very practical situation.

Senator SIMON. If I may follow through with just one question. You talked before negotiations taking place, and then RENAMO, if I understood correctly, getting an overseas telephone call. You did not identify the call further.

Do we know where that call came from, what it was?

Mr. CROCKER. The story that has been widely shared with us and others is that the call came from Lisbon.

Senator SIMON. And that brings up all kinds of questions. But I think I will leave it there. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Let me be as diplomatic as possible.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You always are, Senator.

Senator HELMS. I want to make you a proposition you cannot refuse.

When you get back to the State Department today, would you be willing to call Red Cross in New York, and Mr. Francois Musey, M-u-s-e-y, and say, "Look here, we want to get Ms. Kindra Bryan, the American missionary, out of Mozambique?" That is one call.

The second call is to call a man I have never met, his name is L-u-i-s, Luis, I guess you pronounce it, S-e-r-a-p-i-a-o, who represents RENAMO in Washington. Two calls, you get the lady out, I am told.

Would you make those calls?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, if somebody has information, we are ready to take the information. As I said, Senator, we have been in touch with the ICRC. I will be happy to contact anybody in the ICRC. That is what we are here for.

Senator HELMS. Fair enough. Fair enough. If you do not want to make the additional call, you can have your secretary say, "Look, that guy up there on the Hill said for Chet Crocker to make these calls, would you help us get Ms. Kindra Bryan, the American missionary, out of there."

If they say, "Yes," then you can go on the phone. And if they say, "No," then you have no culpability at all. Have you?

Mr. CROCKER. Sounds reasonable, Senator.

Senator HELMS. OK. Now, let me say to my dear friend and splendid colleague, Mrs. Kassebaum, that I have proposed no litmus test for any Ambassador nominee.

Meeting with RENAMO is my position in retreat. I have got plenty that I question about the lady. And I have already said that she is charming, likable, lovely, all the rest of it.

I enjoyed meeting with her for about 90 minutes, and I hope she enjoyed it at least half as much as I did. By the way, we had witnesses. But the fact is that she made some statements in an interview with staff that just absolutely gave me some heartburn.

But at one of the written responses, she made the following statement. And I do not find any fault with the statement, I just want to point out a contradiction.

She said, "Meetings by the State Department with various groups do not confer legitimacy on or imply the U.S. Government's approval of a particular organization's or individual's goals or strategy."

OK. Now, if I accept the State Department's rationale on that, as enunciated by Ms. Wells, with respect to the African National Congress, you know, the sweet little guys over there in South Africa who are hanging the tires around with the gasoline and, you know, that is good sport.

Now, you and Secretary Shultz have met with the ANC. Right?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, Senator.

Senator HELMS. That did not confer any legitimacy or imply any approval. Is that right?

Mr. CROCKER. We did every thing in our power to make it clear that in our view that was not what we were doing. We were asking some very tough questions.

Senator HELMS. Yes. Fine. Well, do you not see why I am saying, why can you not do the same thing with RENAMO?

They may have b.o. and halitosis and all the rest of it, but can you not at least sit down with them when you yourself this morning have said there is not going to be any resolution of this civil war until people get together?

Now, we had a little revolution in this country a couple hundred years ago, give or take. There are a lot of people who see in the freedom fighters in Angola, in the freedom fighters in Nicaragua, in the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, and the freedom fighters in Mozambique the same sort of quality.

Now, you may be right or you may be wrong about this tilting, this shifting toward the West, toward the United States, away from the Soviet Union. But Mr. Secretary, I think you ought to play all your cards.

What if you are wrong? What if you are being played for a sucker, then what? And I think you are. Then what? Why do you not hedge your bet and treat all of these freedom fighters that same way, and say, "Sure, we will meet with you"?

Now, I do not suggest that you have any cameras there. I do not like these photo opportunities, as you describe them. And you do not say we are going to confer any respectability.

You can make an announcement in marble preceding it. But you will not even listen to them. And that is my heartburn about the thing.

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we have tried to make it clear how we see our interests being served by what we are doing, how we see in fact that a lot has been accomplished that could be at stake if we do not play our cards, as you would say, with great care.

And that is what we are trying to do. As I indicated, it is not by accident that we have seen very sophisticated efforts at disinformation from our global adversary, trying to imply that we have a consistent policy that is superficially consistent, of backing every movement around the world which proclaims certain nominal objectives.

We frankly see the situation in Angola and Mozambique as diametrically different. And that is based on the behavior of the governments as well as the essence of the movements that are involved.

You have met, as I have met, with Jonah Savimbi of UNITA, by any standard a man, a world-class political leader, with credibility in his own continent, in his own country.

We have dealt, I have particularly, with the government of Angola. We hope they will come across with some concessions that will get us to the negotiating table and get us a settlement there, Senator.

But I must tell you, up to now, their behavior, when contrasted with that of the FRELIMO government in Mozambique, is like night and day. Up to now. With very few exceptions.

So we see a contrast. We are conducting the President's policy in southern Africa. It is his policy. He is the one who invited President Machel to come here.

Senator HELMS. The State Department did not have anything to do with that. The President just said, called up Shultz and said, "Get that guy over here. I am dying to see him."

The State Department did not have anything to do with that. Right?

Mr. CROCKER. The State Department supported the invitation, Senator.

Senator HELMS. OK. That is a dodge that you always use. This is the President's policy, and how many times have I gone down there about nominees and policies, and he said, "Well, you know, I think I met that man."

But actually, the policy is the State Department's. The policy, the nominations are the State Department's. You know that as well as I do. And the President has got a few other things on his mind. Any President does.

So, do not give me that dodge about, this is the President's policy. You know, it is the State Department's policy. Just like Eisenhower did not know a thing in the world about what was really going on in Cuba.

And I could give you a long dissertation on that. Or give you some reading material on it. And the State Department orchestrated the takeover of Cuba by Fidel Castro.

Now, maybe it was swapping the Devil for the witch. Everybody makes his own judgment on that. But the fact is that the U.S. State Department orchestrated the takeover of Cuba by Fidel Castro.

And I just do not want this kind of thing to happen anywhere in the world. And I am going to fight it. I am undiplomatic. But I am going to fight it as long as I am here.

Mr. CROCKER. We do not want to see that happen in any African country, Senator.

Senator HELMS. I know you do not.

Mr. CROCKER. We do not think it is in this case.

Senator HELMS. But you ought not to stonewall 28 Senators, I will tell you that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMON. Thank you, Senator. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I have no further questions.

Senator SIMON. We thank both of you very, very much for your testimony.

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you.

Mr. SAIERS. Thank you.

Senator SIMON. We also would like to keep the record open for additional questions for both of you. And that would apply to our next witnesses also.

Now we have a panel composed of Mr. Terry Jeggle, Mr. Thomas Brennan, Mr. Steven Metz, Mr. Thomas Henriksen, and Jose Francisco.

If we may have order here, we are going to have to be strict in our 5-minute limitation here to witnesses. We will hear all the witnesses before we have questions. I would like first to call Mr. Jose Francisco, the advisor to the Mozambique Information Agency, former FRELIMO member. Mr. Francisco.

STATEMENT OF JOSE A. FRANCISCO, ADVISOR, MOZAMBIQUE INFORMATION AGENCY, AND FORMER FRELIMO MEMBER

Mr. FRANCISCO. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, you have to forgive me because of my accent. This is my seventh language in my life that I am speaking.

Senator SIMON. I can understand you much better than Senator Helms, I want you to know. [Laughter.]

Senator HELMS. Mr. Francisco, I am living hard here this morning.

Senator MURKOWSKI. The Senator simply has a slight southern accent.

Senator HELMS. I have been accused of having a Yankee accent.

Mr. FRANCISCO. As a Mozambican-American, this is a rare opportunity to speak to the Free World about what is happening to the people of Mozambique, people who are captives in their own land.

Fourteen million Mozambicans live under one of the most hardline Marxist-Leninist regimes in Africa. They cannot speak for themselves about the same things I am going to tell you without risking certain death.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Did you say, sudden death?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Certain death, yes.

Senator HELMS. Certain.

Mr. FRANCISCO. Even now, I have family in Mozambique who may suffer consequences. But silence, the alternative, means that many thousands more will die unless the truth is told. On behalf of my Mozambican countrymen, I thank you for the freedom I have received on these shores.

I was a former member of FRELIMO. I fought against Portuguese colonialism for the independence of Mozambique. Originally, FRELIMO was the nationalist movement. But Communist infiltration from abroad culminated with the murder of moderate, American-educated founder of FRELIMO, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane.

During this period I witnesses unbelievable atrocities committed by the very leaders whom Mr. Chester Crocker presently calls "moderate." The FRELIMO defense chief to Samora Machel, now Minister of Defense Alberto Chipande, personally executed his own father in the presence of 1,000 FRELIMO cadres as an example for establishing "the new order."

This public murder was committed by stabbing his father in the stomach and ripping upward until his viscera spilled to the ground.

Joaquim Chissano, who was then the chief of security, personally approved the execution as a teaching method, as he did all atrocities I witnessed. Later as foreign minister, Chissano was the de facto head of the state secret police, SNASP, which implemented the system of concentration camps and political torture once FRELIMO came to power.

His deputy, Jorge daCosta, defected from Mozambique in 1983, and revealed the files of FRELIMO's state-sponsored terror network, which included extensive input from the KGB, East German intelligence and the Cubans.

As an example, I have a picture from a brother as he appeared in 1975. And no one knows his fate. I have written a letter to the State Department. Until now, I have no response.

Mariano Matsinhe, now security minister, became a member of the International Socialist Party while a student in Portugal. When he returned to Mozambique, he gave instructions to soldiers in my unit to carry out a gang torture-execution of another moderate FRELIMO leader, Silveiro Nungo.

I saw my officers take diabolic glee in flogging Nungo repeatedly for 12 hours. He was left overnight tied to a tree. The next day he was beaten again until unconscious. The third day, after he regained consciousness, the most gruesome part followed.

Nungo was dismembered, joint by joint, starting with his fingers going up to the shoulders. Using crude machetes to do the hacking, Nungo died by midday.

I also witnessed mass executions. Young FRELIMO cadres returning from indoctrination in Russia and other East bloc countries were secretly identified by their instructors as being either converted Communists or unconverted.

The unconverted were met at the airport in Dar es Salaam with orders for special missions. They were transported into the operational area of Cabo Delgado, only to find themselves in a detention center.

Here they were executed by bayonet, first being sexually dismembered. This was a regular occurrence. The largest single massacre I witnessed involved 120 individuals. I have the pictures.

The purge that followed FRELIMO's installation in 1975 saw the establishment of Samora Machel's infamous concentration camps, nationalization of property, and gross abuse of all human rights.

Hunger and unemployment followed almost immediately. Soviet and other East bloc neocolonials proceeded to rape Mozambique's natural resources, including human resources. Children were sent overseas for indoctrination, including my nephews, to the Eastern bloc today.

Slave labor was exported. Ten thousand to East Germany for instance. This process continues today. This was the last straw for many FRELIMO members who considered that their independence had been betrayed. FRELIMO had merely exchanged Portuguese colonialism for an even worse form of Soviet colonialism.

Senator SIMON. We will enter your full statement in the record, and we will get to questions.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if you could allow the witness to summarize his remaining remarks.

Senator SIMON. If you could, summarize your remaining remarks.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I am fascinated with the extent of this testimony, and I think it is so powerful.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Francisco, these are the moderates that the State Department has been talking about. Is that correct? Sir?

Mr. FRANCISCO. I did not understand your question, sir.

Senator HELMS. I said, the people committing these atrocities——

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes.

Senator HELMS [continuing]. That you have described, they are the people described as moderates by the U.S. State Department.

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. I thank you.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I would hate to see an extremist.

Senator HELMS. At least they are not diplomatic, you know.

Senator SIMON. If you can, in 1 minute, summarize the balance of your statement, Mr. Francisco, and then we can move on to the other witnesses.

Mr. FRANCISCO. Unfortunately for Mozambique, Chester Crocker has not taken into account the extent of Mozambicans contempt for foreign meddling in their affairs.

His knowledge of Mozambique seems more influenced by his brief visits to the only functional hotel in Maputo and his client relationship with the Algerian gang. Crocker has never contacted RENAMO. Yet Crocker advocates increased foreign involvement in Mozambique, which can only be meant to increase foreign profits at the cost of Mozambican blood.

What is behind Crocker's behavior? I do not exactly know. But his Zimbabwean wife and family political connections do not give me optimism about his ability to conduct policy from an impartial position.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Francisco appears in the appendix.]

Senator SIMON. I think we will have to cut it off there, Mr. Francisco.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Francisco, I will put this in the record and try to make it available.

Senator SIMON. We will put all full statements in the record. Mr. Terry Jeggle, the former CARE director for CARE in Mozambique. Mr. Jeggle.

STATEMENT OF TERRY JEGGLE, FORMER DIRECTOR, CARE, MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. JEGGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators, guests. For the past 16 years I have worked in overseas emergency relief and development assistance work for CARE.

During that period I have had 10 assignments—6 have been in Africa, 4 have been related to international emergency disasters, and 5 have reflected some measure of conflict-induced disruption.

Mozambique was my most recent assignment, where, as director of CARE—Mozambique, I was responsible for the initial negotiation, design, and introduction of CARE's program from December 1983, and its subsequent direction and operational management from mid-1984 to February 1987. I am presently on a leave of absence from CARE.

In Mozambique, CARE was provided a unique opportunity from early 1984 to participate in a joint effort with the government of Mozambique to create a new structure to assist the country in dealing with its numerous problems.

Specifically, with the financial support of donors, including the U.S. Government through the U.S. AID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, we were able to provide operational material and technical assistance to respond more effectively to the immediate humanitarian assistance needs of the country.

My limited time prevents me from going into more detail on the formation of the unit, a logistic support unit of the Government relief Department. But suffice it to say that during 1986, this devel-

opmental process resulted in the logistical support unit handling 125,000 tons of emergency relief valued at more than $30 million. That is 320 consignments from 44 donors. The project itself received in the area of 9 million dollars' worth of material support. No small activity in a country sometimes reputed to be having extreme difficulties in transport and logistics.

Such a project could not have been initiated, much less achieved, without the serious intention and forthcoming responsiveness on the part of the Mozambican Government and its officials.

Representatives with whom we worked in the delivery of relief materials and supplies we found to be forthright, disciplined, and supportive in the joint effort. Furthermore, there was evidence during the 3 years of my working there of fair, impartial aspects of relief management with goods transported and distributed on the basis of need throughout the country.

The current conditions of need facing the country characterize this emergency relief assistance most immediately engendered by climactic and conflict-induced conditions must be viewed from the twin perspectives of time and geographical distribution of effects.

First of all, during the period 1984–85, the emergency response, the affected population was concentrated in the rural, interior areas of Gaza, Inhambane, and southern Tete, and food shortages were predominantly induced by climactic conditions. There were indeed hit-and-run insurgent attacks interdicting transportation in that southern region.

The government of Mozambique was limited at that time in both its resources and abilities to respond quickly and effectively to the emergency. But in recognition of that fact it encouraged increased external assistance from a wider range of bilateral donors, U.N. agencies, and private voluntary organizations.

In fact, the conditions engendered by drought in mid-1985 began to stabilize, albeit at a moderate level, but there was a stability which was being established by mid-1985.

However, a second and distinctly different phase of emergency conditions emerged in later 1985 with the recognition of intensified conflict and civil disturbance in Mozambique's central productive heartland.

This conflict and related disruption, initiated in Zambezia province, was not only to define but in fact to create the focus of the Mozambican emergency disaster that we have been faced with from late 1985 to the present.

Rural and productive life were significantly disrupted. Populations were fleeing from the areas of conflict to the areas where relief was available. Increasingly, a focus of attention was shifted to the central region of the country and the areas previously unaffected or affected to a lesser extent by the drought during 1984 and 1985.

To pose a question in the manner of whether perpetrators of armed conflict have impeded an effective response to the emergency is to obscure the point that the perpetuation and the extension of the emergency condition beyond the drought conditions in southern provinces of the country until late 1985 has been precisely because of deliberate, destructive, and disruptive actions.

Specifically, incidents that I or my office had become aware of——

Senator SIMON. If you could give us a 1-minute summary of the balance of your statement?

Mr. JEGGLE. OK. There certainly have been incidents we are familiar with—of deaths, houses being burned, relief trucks for which we were entrusted the responsibility being blown up, government relief workers being killed on the way to work.

There is a consensus among agencies working in Mozambique, the destruction by insurgent elements is wanton. Schools, health centers, cooperative stores, and so forth are targeted. Any influence that can be exerted by groups in the United States to stop this wanton destruction would be a major contribution to alleviating the suffering of the Mozambican people.

Humanitarian concerns, as well as the considerations for the longer term well-being of the Mozambican people can really only be contemplated through the constructive endeavor such as that with which CARE has been pleased to have been associated during these past 3½ years. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jeggle appears in the appendix.]

Senator SIMON. We thank you. The next witness, Mr. Thomas Brennan, consultant for the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Mr. Brennan.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. BRENNAN, CONSULTANT, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of brevity I will just submit my prepared testimony and use just 2 or 3 minutes to make three very brief points.

Senator SIMON. Great.

Mr. BRENNAN. The first relates to the magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy that is taking place in Mozambique.

In absolute terms, more than 2 million people have been uprooted in that country. Nearly 500,000 of these have fled to neighboring countries. In total, nearly 6 million have been seriously affected by the disaster.

These are very large numbers by any standard. In relative terms, uprooted Mozambicans represent nearly 15 percent of the entire Mozambican population. Those seriously affected represent 42 percent.

These percentages are 2½ times greater than those relating to Ethiopia at the height of the African drought crisis in 1984 and 1985. I know some people, like my friend, Mr. Jeggle here, do not like comparisons between Ethiopia and Mozambique.

The situations indeed are very different. But I think they are important to give some understanding of the scale, of the sheer enormity of the problems that are facing that country.

Having said that, however, let me make my second point and that is that the emergency in Mozambique does differ very significantly in two important ways from that in Ethiopia. One difference is that the situation in Ethiopia was largely a natural calamity. That in Mozambique is predominantly a manmade disaster.

We deplore what have been repeated human rights abuses by both sides. Everything that has been said that has been attributed to RENAMO is true. There have been executions, tortures, brutalities inflicted by both sides.

The second important way in which the Ethiopian and the Mozambican crisis differ is that in Ethiopia the government largely hindered relief efforts, whereas in Mozambique the government is working wholeheartedly with organizations such as CARE to assist the maximum number of people possible. RENAMO, on the other hand, has repeatedly interdicted food distributions.

My third point, Mr. Chairman, is that U.S. policy toward Mozambique during the past several years has saved literally hundreds of thousands of lives. By virtue of this policy, U.S. status among the masses of Mozambicans, millions of people who have witnessed the relief effort that the United States has carried out, has been significantly enhanced.

This is an accomplishment that cannot easily be forgotten. However immoderate, or radical, or Communist, or anti-Communist the forces in Mozambique may be, the U.S. program of relief directly to Mozambican people is something that will be remembered for a long time and will serve our interests well for the next decade or two.

That concludes my brief points.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brennan appears in the appendix.]

Senator SIMON. We thank you very, very much for your testimony. Mr. Steven Metz, visiting professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Mr. Metz.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN METZ, PH.D., VISITING PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY

Mr. METZ. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to participate in this hearing. I am especially pleased to see that the topic of American relations with Mozambique is now receiving the attention of the Congress as well as the public.

I am convinced that the outcome of the current debate on this issue has important implications, not only for that beleaguered nation but also for the more general development of American policy in the Third World.

Specifically, the central question of whether to support guerrillas attempting to overthrow the current government of Mozambique must be seen within the broader context of what is widely known today as the Reagan doctrine.

As we all know, this is the program of American assistance for a range of insurgent movements struggling with Marxist regimes in the Third World.

As such, it represents a new and important dimension of our national security policy, one that is intended to be dynamic and aggressive rather than passive, and to respond to the new realities of politics and cold war competition in the Third World.

But at the present time the Reagan doctrine is badly in need of conceptual development and fine tuning. The ambiguities and lack

of clarity which currently characterize it diminish the chances for building a consensus among the American public and our allies.

Without this consensus, this policy cannot succeed. Any policy which calls for American support for any and all insurgent movements struggling with radical Third World regimes would be dangerous and counterproductive.

An unequivocal belief that the enemy of my enemy is my friend not only fails to reflect the complexities of the world, but also stands little chance of leading to the development of a domestic consensus.

There are situations where insurgents fighting against a radical regime do not warrant American support. Specifically, when the nation concerned is not geostrategically vital to the United States, it is ruled by a regime which is not aggressively expansionistic or militaristic, and the opposition to the regime is not genuinely popular, broadbased or democratic.

Mozambique fits into this category. Militarily, the FRELIMO government poses no threat to its neighbors, and is, in fact, as we have seen today, locked in a struggle for survival with RENAMO.

RENAMO was created by Rhodesian security forces during the long guerrilla war in that nation. It then became the proxy of South Africa. This fact continues to influence it today.

The war between RENAMO and the FRELIMO government has reached a stalemate. RENAMO remains unable to penetrate the cities, create and administer liberated zones, or build a base of popular support, while the government is unable to fully defeat the insurgents.

While widespread popular discontent with FRELIMO economic policies has created potential support for RENAMO, rebel atrocities have caused the peasants to fear the group but not to actively back it.

The atrocities, the lack of a political program, the clear linkage between RENAMO and South Africa's policy of regional destabilization, and confusion over exactly who speaks for RENAMO have all combined to deter international support for the group.

Today it is clear that FRELIMO wants to avoid total reliance on the Soviets, along with the supplication this would entail. But at the same time, the war with RENAMO may force the regime to make concessions to the Soviets concerning bases and other issues in exchange for the level of military support which would guarantee its survival.

While it can easily be argued that the FRELIMO regime does not warrant active U.S. assistance, it is also true that support for RENAMO would in no way safeguard our interests or strengthen our position in southern Africa.

This support would prolong the conflict in Mozambique, contribute to further instability in the region, assist South Africa in its policy of coercive destabilization, and provide opportunities for the Soviets to reverse their declining influence in the region. Thus the damage to American interests, which would result from support for RENAMO, extend well beyond southern Africa.

As a great power, the United States must occasionally associate with unsavory and even reprehensible allies. But as a symbol of a

set of values and ideas, we must do this only when absolutely necessary.

And, Mr. Chairman, it is my belief that at the present time, Mozambique does not represent such a situation. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Metz appears in the appendix.]

Senator SIMON. I thank you. Mr. Henriksen, we have not heard from you. Thomas Henriksen, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. Mr. Henriksen.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN, SENIOR FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Mr. HENRIKSEN. Thank you. I welcome this opportunity to speak to this committee today about the situation in the People's Republic of Mozambique, and American policy and aid toward that country.

Our policy objectives for the People's Republic of Mozambique should be to restore and advance U.S. influence, deny the Soviet Union the use of that country's ports and airfields to expand its influence in southern Africa, the Indian Ocean, and even reaching into the continent of Antarctica.

Our goal should also be to further the development of democracy in Mozambique, as we did in such countries as the Philippines, and Haiti, by withdrawing support for the antidemocratic regime in power.

It is apparent that these objectives and goals are not furthered by the present U.S. support for the current government of the People's Republic of Mozambique, FRELIMO.

FRELIMO, by its own declaration, is a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, which has, in 1977, entered into a party-to-party treaty, not a state-to-state, but a party-to-party treaty of 20 years of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. This treaty remains in force.

In addition to acting as a staging area for Soviet objectives in the region, Mozambique has a long history of antidemocratic policies and oppression of its own citizens. Following the growth of an opposition party espousing a platform of free and fair elections, such as the Mozambique National Resistance, or RENAMO, FRELIMO has repeatedly seen the light.

But despite FRELIMO's assumed conversion to pragmatism and neutralism, the FRELIMO leopard has not changed its spots. And there are several quotes from high-ranking FRELIMO officials pointing to the fact that it has not backed away.

I think a very important distinction needs to be made, particularly for American audiences who do not understand this. The FRELIMO government, as Chester Crocker has pointed out, has made some changes.

The FRELIMO party remains unswerving. And it is a great distinction that American followers normally miss. That the party remains unswerving to Marxist-Leninism, and that the government can make tactical changes, which it has done.

One of these quotes recently was in fact from Joaquim Chissano, and he said the following: "We have been holding talks with the IMF and the World Bank. One might feel we are having doubts

about the Socialist option. No, this is not the case." And this is taken from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service on February 3 of this year.

In the last analysis, it was FRELIMO's domestic policies which caused its greatest problems. FRELIMO is the only legal party in the country. It controls the media. Soon after independence it set up reeducation camps where thousands for Mozambicans deemed guilty of political offenses.

It was indeed FRELIMO Communist schemes of collectivization, confiscation of private property and oppression of individual rights of citizens that planted the seeds of the formidable internal challenge now posed by RENAMO.

Policies helped to destabilize traditions and customs of the rural Africans who little understood and greatly feared the changes in their daily lives. The government had moved them from traditionally held lands, communal villages, by promises of readily accessible water, schooling, medical care, and farming assistance, all of which proved very upsetting.

When the promised amenities failed to appear, Mozambicans who had experienced rising expectations expressed discontent, and some turned to opposition. RENAMO's message and actions gained new converts.

Former FRELIMO members, as well as urban dwellers and rural folks became increasingly disenchanted with the Marxist regime, which strove to impose its vision of a reordered society on an economically backward land. RENAMO has indeed much popular support, or in fact it would not be able to operate so widely in the countryside.

I have three recommendations, or four recommendations. The U.S. Department of State and other agencies of the Government should open contact with RENAMO.

The United States, for my second recommendation, whenever possible, should provide moral and material support to people striving against Communist-inspired governments.

And if we as a Nation can back democracy in authoritarian regimes friendly to the United States, such as in the Marcos Philippines or Papa Doc's Haiti, then we can and should support democratic forces, such as RENAMO, in countries such as Mozambique.

Specifically, we should provide military assistance to RENAMO to the same extent that we provide UNITA. That is about $15 million a year. Additionally, the United States should match its humanitarian aid, such as food relief, which it give to FRELIMO, also to RENAMO.

Third, if I can just summarize this, the United States should not participate in aid programs to FRELIMO. They can have very unintended consequences. They can, in fact, unwittingly encourage individual Mozambicans to pursue private enterprise.

And once the FRELIMO regime feels secure from foreign pressure, FRELIMO might well again change the party line, and purge the new but unwelcomed class of entrepeneurs. Speaking in more general terms, the West has never as yet succeeded in converting any Communist regime into a democracy through the provision of foreign aid. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Henriksen appears in the appendix.]

Senator SIMON. Mr. Henriksen, if I may ask you this question first, and then one question to everybody.

I guess there is kind of a basic question whether we ought to be involved in trying to overthrow governments, whether they happen to be Communist governments or any kind of governments.

Have you reflected on that at all as a general policy? Should the United States be involved in trying to overthrow governments we do not happen to like?

If we want to overthrow governments we do not agree with completely, that is about two-thirds of the governments on the face of the Earth. We will have our hands full. Where do you draw the line?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I generally agree, we should not be involved in overthrowing foreign governments. The problem is, we selectively do it to governments who are many times friendly to the United States, but have authoritarian standards.

For example, the Marcos government, we withdrew support for it. We have done it elsewhere, in Haiti. It now appears we are going to also withdraw support from the South African Government. We have for South Africa, very definitely. Perhaps even South Korea.

So it appears to me that there is a double standard. Probably to be a little bit facetious, if Mozambique makes all the changes that were recommended here today, in fact becomes an ally of ours, becomes just a plain authoritarian government, then the United States will in fact probably move against overthrowing.

As long as it remains a Marxist government, we do not move against it. And I think there is a double standard, to answer your question.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Jeggle, I said I was going to have one sweeping statement, but you say, in your statement, unfortunately, this positive and realistic process has been impeded by a military campaign of terror, destruction, and destabilization.

Are you talking about the government or are you talking about RENAMO there?

Mr. JEGGLE. I made the distinction from 1985, when there was a shift from the primarily climatically induced conditions in the southern regions to the central areas.

Now the regions of Zambezia, Tete, and the Zambezi River Valley were areas that were in fact very productive, and the grain heartland of the country, were not affected provinces during the drought period.

It was only after later 1985, when insurgent elements moved into the areas, that disruption resulted. And I must say, from our working standpoint, and the access of getting trucks into the areas, it is influenced by external elements, whereas we had been receiving tremendous support from the existing government and its authorities.

I am hesitant to put a nametag on it, but it is certainly opposition rebellious insurgent forces that have created a problem. We have received considerable support from the government in our activities.

Senator SIMON. You heard Mr. Francisco's testimony earlier. Is your impression that the government of Mozambique is gradually improving from a humanitarian point of view? Was what he described typical of the government today, from your observation?

Mr. JEGGLE. Well, quite clearly I noted the observation he was making in referring to 1975, 1976, 1974, and 1977 periods, a period I cannot speak to.

I can emphatically disagree with his observation, based on my 3½ years there most recently. As I indicated in my testimony, we received forthright positive support, without indication of such malevolent or maledictory activities as were being reflected in the other gentleman's testimony.

Senator SIMON. And then one final question to the three of you. I have not had a chance to ask a question to Mr. Francisco, Mr. Brennan, and Mr. Metz.

If all of a sudden you were named Secretary of State, what would you do to try to improve the situation, to help Mozambique, the people of Mozambique, to help their humanitarian situation, encourage independence from the Soviets, and at the same time encourage independence from South Africa so that we can put pressure on South Africa to change their policy of apartheid? Mr. Francisco?

Mr. FRANCISCO. I could easily answer this question. Being an American now and knowing what freedom is, I would give a chance for the other party to sit down with us and listen to their side and give us the story.

I would sit down with RENAMO, I would sit down with FRELIMO. Because what has happened today, they are talking only about the projects, they are not talking about the people.

I have brothers in jail today, I have my mother there, I have my sister, I have nephews taken to the Eastern bloc. And these over here was Mozambique, he does not talk to people. What he cares about is the project.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Brennan.

Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. Chairman, I think U.S. policy at the moment is pretty much on line. To further improve relations to provide economic assistance as opposed to humanitarian assistance, I think we would have to see a very substantial improvement in the human rights record of the government of Mozambique.

Let me just say that I think that both sides have been terribly guilty of gross brutalities against their people, not simply in the 1970's but also more recently, and continuing until today.

There is not much to choose from. But if we are going to assist the people, if we are going to look toward the long term for the next decade or two, then I think we should continue doing as we are doing, providing assistance to the masses of Mozambicans.

Senator SIMON. Mr. Metz.

Mr. METZ. I would also agree that current policy is pretty much on line, particularly the program of support for the development of alternative transportation and communication networks that would end the dependence of the states of the region on South Africa.

But at the same time, I would make it very clear as this economic assistance continues, and maybe increases, that its continuation

is in fact linked to continuing improvements in human rights, and continuing improvements, particularly in economic rights and the development of free enterprise.

Senator SIMON. If I may ask this one further question of you, Mr. Metz, I understand the background of the others and how they became knowledgable about Mozambique. What is your own background?

Mr. METZ. My own background is as a scholar and academic, through discussions, correspondence with people in southern Africa and South Africa and Mozambique, and through I guess you could say the normal types of scholarly research.

Senator SIMON. I thank you. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Francisco, you have a brother in Mozambique and you have a sister and your mother. Where is your brother?

Mr. FRANCISCO. My brother was jailed in 1975 by FRELIMO forces. I have written a letter to Samora Machel, I have a copy here.

Senator HELMS. I have a copy of it too.

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes. He never answered me. I have written to Mozambican Ambassador, they never answered, and I have written three times.

I have written to the State Department to help me find out his fate.

Senator HELMS. Let me interrupt you to say that I have instructed staff to renew the request for information about your brother. We are writing the State Department today.

And since the government of Mozambique has taken such a sharp turn toward the West and the United States and is now so moderate, perhaps they will have more information.

It is true that the last correspondence that you had, and this was indirect, it was a letter signed by Mr. Dyer, Acting Assistant Secretary, whatever that is, of the State Department, that they had no information.

And they were cabling, according to his letter, have cabled our Embassy in Maputo, Mozambique, to ask for information that they may have or be able to develop on him. Now that letter was dated May 16, 1986. Is that correct?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Have you heard anything further from the State Department directly or indirectly?

Mr. FRANCISCO. No, sir.

Senator HELMS. So, what this was was a typical bureaucratic write it, forget it, and file it. You know.

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Well, we are going to sort of press and see if we can get them to get this moderate Government that is emerging and developing in Mozambique at least to tell us something about where your brother, whether he is still alive and so forth.

You have not had any correspondence with your brother?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Well, I do have indirect correspondence.

Senator HELMS. Pardon?

Mr. FRANCISCO. I do have indirect correspondence, through the church.

Senator HELMS. Indirect.

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes. Through the church.

Senator HELMS. Right. OK. Do you know Mr. Afonso Dhlakama?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes, I do.

Senator HELMS. He is the head of RENAMO. Is that correct?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes.

Senator HELMS. What kind of fellow is he? What is your assessment of him?

Mr. FRANCISCO. I met him him in 1983 in West Germany, and I spoke to him, and he said, despite the refusal from the State Department, he is going to try to press to see who can help us to save our lives in Mozambique.

Senator HELMS. Are you convinced that he is committed to what we call democratic ideals?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes, I believe he is genuine, because he has never been Chinese like Savimbi was. Savimbi used to be Chinese, and now he is pro-America.

Senator HELMS. Do you have any doubts that he would institute democracy, if RENAMO should happen to come to power in Mozambique?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. You think he would.

Mr. FRANCISCO. He would.

Senator HELMS. How about Mr. Chissano, the president of Mozambique? What is your assessment of him?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Mr. Chissano, to me, is a Communist.

Senator HELMS. Say again.

Mr. FRANCISCO. Mr. Chissano, to me, is a Communist, and I have known him since 1967. I even spoke to him 3 weeks ago. I asked him about the fate of my brother. His answer was, "I do not know."

Senator HELMS. He laughed and said, "I do not know." Is that what you said?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Yes.

Senator HELMS. The acoustics in this room are horrible. Mr. Crocker, in his prepared statement, was astounding, as far as I am concerned, based on information I have gathered.

Did his testimony sound a whole lot like what you hear from the people of Mozambique?

Mr. FRANCISCO. No, differently. I am surprised to hear him saying that. I could not believe a high official from the United States of America would behave that way.

Senator HELMS. Should anybody of reasonable intelligence have any difficulty ascertaining who is the head of RENAMO, who are the leaders of the movement, if they go over there?

Mr. FRANCISCO. Well, they have representatives in the District of Columbia, in Washington, DC. They have in Germany, they have in Portugal, they have in Kenya. They have in all these places and still he says, "I do not know who they are."

Senator HELMS. And that declaration was made, has been made on a number of occasions, including here this morning, that RENAMO does not have a whole lot of support. Is that your impression? That RENAMO does not have much support?

Mr. FRANCISCO. That is not my impression, sir.

Senator HELMS. You think it is the other way around?

Mr. FRANCISCO. If RENAMO would not have had support, they would not have provinces. And RENAMO does not have mercenary as FRELIMO has. FRELIMO, they are a handful and they call them bandits. That is why they have 30,000 Zimbabweans, Cubans, Ethiopians, Nigerians, and so forth.

And President Dhlakama is inviting America, and they have written a letter to President Reagan, to the United States, to send an envoy to go and investigate and see for themselves, if we have mercenaries or not.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Henriksen, you have followed events in Mozambique for a long time. Is your professional judgment consistent with what Mr. Crocker said that Mozambique is moderating its Marxist-Leninist ideology?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. No, it is not. I think what it will do is gladly join the IMF, the World Bank, take aid from the West. This is your traditional Communist trick.

The Soviet Union, as you know, in the early 1920's, with its so-called new economic policy, turned to the West. We know, for example, that Mr. Hoover provided food relief after receiving a letter from Maxim Gorky, with the same arguments many times that are used here, that the Mozambican people would in fact remember us for decades, or in this case the Russian people would remember us for decades.

That has not been the case. It is not the people themselves that may remember us, but it is the government and the party.

The same thing happened in China. China, with its so-called Hundred Flowers Policy, which in fact preceded the Cultural Revolution terror, so this is a traditional Communist tactic, that they will moderate some of their language, but still will remain unswerving to Marxist-Leninist principles.

Their whole ideology, in fact, their whole reason for being is based on these principles. They cannot surrender any more than America can surrender their own revolutionary past, and their own traditions, and remain true to themselves.

Senator HELMS. Well, I am sorry Secretary Crocker is not here, because I would like to hear a dialog between some of you and him.

I was astonished at Chet Crocker's declaration that there is a vast difference between Angola and Mozambique. Do you see a vast difference between Jonah Savimbi and the folks in Mozambique?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. No, I do not. The comments made here that RENAMO does not enjoy popular support defy all explanations of a guerrilla movement.

We all know that the guerrillas have to swim among the fish of the people. We have heard that from Mao Tse Tung. But now when rightwing or democratic guerrillas are using the same technique, then it is suddenly denied.

They could not exist in wide-ranging parts of the territory, they could not have recruits, they could not have resupply lines, they could not have information without popular support.

They are stronger in some areas of the country, but so is UNITA and Mr. Savimbi, than other areas. But there are many parallels. They are both fighting entrenched Marxist governments. They do not receive the proper support they should from the United States.

Senator HELMS. Now, Mr. Henriksen, you are a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Is that correct?

Mr. HENRIKSEN. That is correct.

Senator HELMS. Tell me a little bit about your background.

Mr. HENRIKSEN. I have a Ph.D. I have been following Mozambique since I was a graduate student. I have written two books on Mozambique, one a history book, which ended in 1975 when FRELIMO came to power.

The second volume was a study of FRELIMO's coming to power, the war itself, from 1964 to 1975. And I have written a number of academic and popular articles on Mozambique appearing widely.

Senator HELMS. Maybe we ought to buy a few copies and send them down to the State Department. Well, Mr. Chairman, time is up and it is 12 o'clock, and we could go a long time longer, but I suppose I should not.

I know you are grateful to these gentlemen for being here today, and certainly I am.

Senator SIMON. I certainly am. We appreciate your testimony. Our hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. BRENNAN

The nation of Mozambique--beset by insurgency, economic mismanagement, and the vagaries of weather--is in a state of crisis, and some six million of its citizens who are seriously affected within Mozambique or seeking sanctuary in neighboring states require continued international protection and assistance if a major human tragedy is to be avoided.

In November 1986, the U. S. Committee for Refugees issued a report, Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum, which discussed the conflict that has caused large population displacements from and within Mozambique. The report noted that the number of civilians internally displaced or seriously at-risk because of the conflict had doubled to almost 4 million between mid-1983 and the end of 1986. It reported that nearly 350,000 persons had fled Mozambique to seek refuge from the conflict in neighboring countries.

Since that report was issued, the situation in Mozambique has continued to deteriorate. By the end of last month, the number of Mozambicans in neighboring countries had increased by an additional 37 percent, to about 477,000 refugees, while within Mozambique the number of persons internally displaced or seriously affected by the conflict had reached more than 5.9 million, an increase of 51 percent in six months.

While these numbers are daunting, especially when applied to an impoverished nation of only 14 million persons, they do not even remotely reflect the suffering that the citizens of Mozambique have

been forced to endure. What has impelled their flight from their villages and their country is almost unspeakable. Heinous and widespread brutalities against noncombatants--skulls crushed, civilians cruelly disfigured, and women and girls brutally raped--have been widely and credibly reported by survivors displaced within Mozambique and by refugees reaching sanctuary across national frontiers.

These atrocities have been ascribed most often to the insurgent forces of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), but also to soldiers of the Mozambican government (FRELIMO), and recently to Zimbabwean forces, which support the government, as well. Atrocities such as cutting off the ears and noses of school teachers, health workers, and village leaders are invariably attributed to the insurgents. Less systematic abuses such as rape, torture and beatings, and the theft of family food stocks are ascribed to forces on both sides of the conflict.

The effect of widespread violence and economic disruption on the people of Mozambique has been tragic. UNICEF has estimated that approximately 85,000 infants and children under the age of five died in the conflict or in war-related circumstances during 1986 alone. Because of the escalating violence, large numbers of Mozambicans have made the difficult choice to abandon their homes and seek asylum in neighboring countries. As the chart and map which accompany this testimony indicate, major flows of Mozambican refugees into Malawi have occurred in the past six months, and, for the first time since independence, Mozambicans have also sought sanctuary in Tanzania.


The Flight of Mozambican Refugees
ZAIRE
TANZANIA
15,000
MALAWI
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
25,000
Lilongwe
Blantyre
Nacala
Lusaka
200,000
10,000
Harare
ZIMBABWE
Beira
NAMIBIA
Indian Ocean
BOTSWANA
Gazankulu
MOZAMBIQUE
Lebowa
Kangwane
Pretoria
Komatipoort
Johannesburg
Maputo
SWAZILAND
LESOTHO
AFRICA
Kwazulu
SOUTH AFRICA
Mozambique
South African "Homelands" with Mozambican refugees.
Arrows and numbers indicate major flows of Mozambican refugees.
UNHCR refugee camps. U.S. Committee for Refugees, May 1987.

Substantial numbers of Mozambicans have also fled to South Africa, and their flight is very dramatic indeed. Enroute to South Africa by foot, Mozambicans trying to escape must avoid armed forces of either side; both FRELIMO and RENAMO are proven to harm or at least stop those seeking to leave. At the border they must also avoid mines planted on the Mozambican side by FRELIMO to deter "desertion". After crossing the mine fields, the refugees must contend with a fence network, erected by the South African authorities. This includes an electrified barrier recently extended by South Africa and now running from Kruger National Park to the border with Swaziland. The electric charge is regulatable: sometimes it kills; at other times it maims. Electrocution has resulted in the deaths of several would-be refugees, and others have had to have fingers or hands amputated after coming into contact with the fence. Even when refugees manage to reach South Africa they are not safe. If they are caught by South African security forces outside of or enroute to a "homeland", they are arrested and forced back to Mozambique. Some observers have reported that refugees are often subjected to pressure to join RENAMO forces; if young men agree to serve with the insurgents, their families are permitted to remain in South Africa.

As harsh and uncertain as the lives of many Mozambican refugees are, it is generally the case that internally displaced Mozambicans are even worse off. Forced to abandon their homes and farms, most are now wholly dependent for their survival on food rations donated primarily by Western nations and distributed through government and international relief agencies. The gap between domestic production

and total food requirements greatly exceeds the amount of food donated, however, and constant interdiction of supply routes by RENAMO has severely curtailed distributions. Malnutrition and its related diseases are common, and famine continues to threaten some areas of the country. Most seriously affected are the areas immediately north and south of the Zambezi River--the provinces of Zambezia, Sofala, and Tete--and the province of Nampula, in the north.

Early this year, the U. S. Ambassador to Mozambique declared a food emergency in Mozambique, noting that "the disruption of social and economic life (mainly food production activities and transportation infrastructure) by civil strife has reached disaster proportions. The magnitude of the impacted populations, the geographic dispersion of affected areas, and the diminished capacity of the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique to provide relief from its own resources require immediate and sustained assitance from the United States."

Indeed, the U. S. Ambassador has raised very important points. The magnitude of the impacted population is great in absolute as well as relative terms. Two million uprooted people represents a vast problem by any standard; relative to total population, the uprooted Mozambican population greatly exceeds that of Ethiopia during the tragedy of 1984. The total affected population of nearly six million represents about 42 percent of all Mozambicans. In respect to geography, Mozambique is approximately twice the size of California, but has a population density roughly the same as Utah.

Distances between communities are vast and the delivery of relief commodities, even in peacetime, would be a major undertaking. In a conflict situation it is almost overwhelming.

Having compared the humanitarian needs of Mozambique with those of Ethiopia in 1984, it is necessary also to point out a major distinction between the two situations. Unlike Ethiopia, the government in Mozambique is not hindering relief efforts, but is working wholeheartedly with organizations such as CARE to meet the emergency needs of its citizens, while the insurgents consistently disrupt relief activities.

At the same time, we recognize that there are very serious shortcomings in respect to the Mozambican government's record on human rights, and we continue to deplore the brutalization of Mozambican civilians that is carried out by both sides in the conflict. The U. S. response to the crisis in Mozambique, though, has clearly enhanced the status of the United States in the eyes of millions of Mozambican civilians, and has saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent people.

We therefore agree with the Ambassador, and we commend AID and the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs for their initiative in responding to both Mozambican refugees and those displaced within Mozambique. We encourage them to be especially bold in assisting the peasant families who have become the tragic victims of the region's strife.

The U.S.C.R. report, Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum, is attached as written testimony before this Sub-committee.

UPROOTED MOZAMBICANS

November 1986 and May 1987

Asylum Country	11/86	5/87	Increase
Malawi	70,000	200,000	185%
So. Africa	170,000	170,000	-
Swaziland	4,500	9,000	100%
Tanzania	-	15,000	NC
Zambia	23,000	28,000	22%
Zimbabwe	65,000	65,000	-
Internally displaced	1,100,000	1,600,000	45%
TOTALS	1,432,500	2,087,000	46%

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHESTER A. CROCKER

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee on United States policy toward Mozambique. In view of the current high level of interest in that topic, I propose to deal with some of the prevailing myths about Mozambique and our policy toward that critical southern African country. By way of introduction, a little history.

Mozambique's Turn to the West

Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975 under a government comprised of the national liberation movement FRELIMO. The new government took over from a Portuguese colonial administration that had never achieved full

control over the vast and unruly Mozambican countryside, much less established an effective national administrative structure.

Mozambique at independence lacked even the rudiments of a modern economy. The new government inherited a large external debt and a currency that was virtually worthless abroad. With independence, most of the 250,000 Portuguese inhabitants fled, taking with them Mozambique's limited fund of administrative and technical expertise. Mozambique's work force was untrained and uneducated; the illiteracy rate at independence was 96%. Given this dismal legacy, it is not surprising that by the late 1970s factories were running far below pre-independence efficiency and agricultural production had dropped sharply in many areas.

With two strikes against it at independence, the new government of Mozambique proceeded to make matters even worse. FRELIMO tried to implement "socialist" economic and social policies -- nationalization of industry and agriculture, rationing, proliferation of unproductive bureaucracy -- which eventually brought the nation's economy to a standstill and contributed to the drought-induced famine of the early 1980s. Together with this disastrous course at home, Mozambique in the late 1970s de-emphasized its relations with the Chinese and Western nations and opted for a closer relationship with the USSR, associating itself with Soviet objectives in southern Africa and internationally.

By 1983, faced with economic collapse, a suffocating and unproductive link to Moscow, and a growing insurgency, Mozambican leaders made a fundamental decision to reorient their country's foreign and domestic policies. Under the leadership of the late President Samora Machel, the Government of Mozambique began to change drastically its economic

policies, reduce its dependence on Moscow, reassert its independence and non-alignment, and reach out to the West.

Relations between the U.S. and Mozambique have paralleled this evolution. When I first went to Mozambique in April 1981, relations were at a low ebb: the Government of Mozambique was harshly critical of our policies, and it had just expelled four of our diplomats from Maputo. In mid-1982, however, the Mozambicans signalled their desire to explore a new relationship. After Secretary Shultz and then-Foreign Minister Chissano had a constructive meeting during the 1982 UN General Assembly, we began to see tangible signs of Mozambique's determination to pursue a new course. Hostility gave way to cooperation, public criticism was replaced by more balanced language, and a productive dialogue began.

As hard evidence of Mozambique's new positive course mounted, relations gradually improved. We began working closely with Maputo on the complex effort to negotiate Namibia's independence and Cuban withdrawal from Angola. We also undertook to open channels of communication between Maputo and Pretoria, a process that led ultimately to a series of constructive Mozambican decisions in favor of regional coexistence and opposed to sterile confrontation with South Africa. In September 1985 President Reagan received the late President Machel in the White House. That meeting provided fresh impetus for a U.S. policy of encouraging Mozambique's new direction and working with its government toward peace and stability in southern Africa. Despite President Machel's death in an October 1986 plane crash, the positive momentum of U.S.-Mozambican relations has continued -- and even accelerated -- under his successor, President Joaquim Chissano.

In view of this history, it is especially ironic that

Mozambique got little attention in Washington when it appeared to be firmly committed to socialism, close relations with Moscow, and antagonism toward the United States. Only when Mozambique manifestly changed its course and began to reach out to us and to our Western Allies did Mozambique and U.S. policy toward that country become an issue in our own foreign policy debate. That debate has given rise to a number of myths which deserve to be closely examined by Americans who wish the people of Mozambique well and are concerned about advancing U.S.

Affirming Independence and Non-Alignment

Despite Mozambique's dramatic reassertion of independence and non-alignment, the myth persists that it remains a compliant client of the Soviet Union. Let's look at the facts. Although Moscow remains Mozambique's largest supplier of military assistance, the trend line of Soviet arms transfers to Mozambique has been down, in sharp contrast to escalating Soviet arms deliveries to Angola. In sharp contrast with the MPLA regime in Angola, Mozambique has never afforded the Soviets military access rights on its territory, nor have Soviet or Cuban combat troops ever been deployed in Mozambique. Today the number of Western advisors in Mozambique actually exceeds that of advisors from the Soviet Union and its allies.

In foreign policy as well, Mozambique has pursued a courageous course that clearly distinguishes it from Angola and separates it from Moscow in southern Africa and internationally. In 1984 the Government of Mozambique, in the face of active Soviet opposition, signed the Nkomati Agreement under which Mozambique and South Africa agreed not to support insurgent movements on the territory of the other party.

Mozambique has complied with its commitments under Nkomati, expelling guerrillas of the exiled African National Congress (ANC) from its territory and taking steps to prevent ANC operations against South Africa from Mozambique.

Despite evidence of post-Nkomati South African assistance to the Mozambican insurgent movement RENAMO, the Government of Mozambique has continued to affirm its commitment to Nkomati and to seek dialogue and constructive relations with the South African Government while maintaining its steadfast rejection of apartheid. The May 29 South African raid in Maputo and the continuing South African threats against Mozambique are thus both indefensible and contrary to Pretoria's own interests in promoting accommodation with its neighbors, stability in the region and reduced openings for Soviet Bloc influence. The U.S. continues to believe that strict adherence to the provisions of Nkomati can advance the cause of peace and stability between Pretoria and Maputo.

Mozambique has also played a constructive role elsewhere in southern Africa. It has quietly but effectively supported U.S. efforts to negotiate with the MPLA regime in Angola -- negotiations directed at obtaining the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia. Mozambique has been a steady and clear-headed voice in the councils of the Frontline States against a self-defeating cycle of sanctions and retaliation against South Africa and for a greater role for regional moderates and friends of the U.S., such as Zaire.

After a period of tensions with neighboring Malawi in the fall of 1986, the GPRM has sought actively to reduce these tensions through a successful bilateral security dialogue. As

a result, Mozambique and Malawi are working together to rehabilitate the Nacala rail line, and Malawi has deployed its forces along that critical rail link to protect it against RENAMO attacks. Zimbabwe and Tanzania have made larger proportional commitments to Mozambique's efforts to cope with RENAMO's offensive against Mozambique's transport and economic infrastructure. It is worth noting in this connection that regardless of their political complexion, all of Mozambique's black-ruled neighbors -- from Botswana to Zambia -- are providing concrete support to the Mozambican Government and oppose the South African-inspired destabilization effort to which it is being subjected.

No country in southern Africa has worked more consistently than Mozambique with the United States to further the cause of peace and stability in southern Africa. Farther afield, Mozambique no longer votes with the USSR in the United Nations on such international questions of overriding importance to Moscow as Afghanistan and Kampuchea. In short, Mozambique has over the past five years evolved a more independent, non-aligned foreign policy course that has distanced it from Moscow.

From Socialism to a Sensible Economic Recovery Plan

Another myth about Mozambique holds that the GPRM is seeking Western economic assistance to bail out a failed experiment in socialism. In reality, Mozambique made its break with socialism because of disillusionment with statist economic policies and with no guarantees in advance that significant Western help would be forthcoming. At a time when many other governments are retreating from economic reform programs,

Mozambique has reached agreement with the IMF and World Bank on a tough and sensible economic recovery plan that sources in those institutions tell us is the most far-reaching such program undertaken by any African country. Maputo has already undertaken a sharp currency devaluation and moved aggressively to expand private economic initiative.

Since 1984 at least 30 firms in the light industry sector have been privatized. In the same way, the government has returned large tracts of land from state farms to private farmers. We anticipate further moves in the period ahead to expand individual land tenure in Mozambique. To attract new capital, foreign investors are encouraged to form joint ventures or wholly owned operations and are guaranteed the right to repatriate their earnings. In an impressive vote of confidence in Mozambique's new economic course, the Paris Club has just granted Mozambique some of the most favorable terms it has ever offered for rescheduling of external debt. It is important that we and others who believe in freedom of economic opportunity respond positively to a country that has made a courageous effort to turn away from failed statist economic policies.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Relief

Mozambique is a country with enormous human problems, including a critical food situation exacerbated by insurgency and drought. It is sometimes asserted that the U.S. has allowed political considerations to hobble our response to Mozambique's human needs. This myth is also untrue. In response to UN appeals, the United States has pledged 194,000 tons of food, $3 million for logistical support and $3.5

million for health. The U.S. commitment is approximately $75 million.

The insurgency in the countryside has created problems for food deliveries and other relief operations, and even for the maintenance of normal social services. The American private voluntary agency CARE has lost 12 food delivery trucks because of RENAMO attacks during the last two years, and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) has reported that RENAMO insurgents have destroyed 718 clinics since 1981. The United States is working closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international agencies to arrange distribution of relief supplies in conflict areas. We will continue to support ICRC's quiet diplomacy with all the parties on the ground to achieve better access to the victims in conflict areas and ensure that all hungry Mozambicans are fed.

A word is in order about Mozambique's human rights record. It is far from perfect, and we have said so clearly in the Department's annual human rights report to Congress and elsewhere. At the same time, there are some impressive positive trends, especially in the government's relations with Mozambican churches. Most churches that were closed after independence have been reopened. The government also recently allowed 1300 Jehovah's Witnesses expelled after independence to return to Mozambique.

The government has given the Roman Catholic Church permission to build a new seminary in Maputo. Pastoral letters by Mozambique's Catholic bishops have circulated freely, despite criticism of government policy or discussion of controversial topics. On his recent European trip, Chissano had a cordial meeting with Pope John Paul II, thus maintaining momentum toward productive relations between the Vatican and

the Government of Mozambique. There will be no relaxation of our strong, consistent advocacy of individual human rights in Mozambique. This is a special concern of Ambassador-designate Wells which I am sure she will pursue with skill and dedication when she takes up her duties.

Support From the West

Another of the myths about our policy toward Mozambique is that it puts us out of step with our friends and allies and the forces of freedom. The reality, however, is that our NATO and Asian allies and friends continue to expand and deepen their support for the Government of Mozambique. No Western democracy supports RENAMO. No country in the world has relations or official contacts with it. Even South Africa, which converted RENAMO from a nuisance into a well-armed rebel group, recognizes the Mozambican Government and conducts its dealings with RENAMO on a clandestine basis. Western economic assistance to Mozambique dwarfs that of the Soviet bloc, and our allies are assisting Mozambique in the security field as well. In 1986, the British began training Mozambican army personnel and conducted a very successful naval ship visit to Mozambique. Other NATO governments have also developed productive security relationships with Mozambique.

President Chissano's first trip to Europe was to London and Rome, not Moscow. Chissano met with Prime Minister Thatcher May 6, 1987 for talks described by the British as "exceptionally warm". During his visit, the British government announced that it would provide $25 million in additional economic assistance to Mozambique. In addition the British are increasing military training assistance to the Mozambican Army and, like the U.S., have assigned a resident military attache in Maputo.

In Rome, President Chissano met with President Cossiga, Prime Minister Fanfani, and Foreign Minister Andreotti. Italy, which provides more economic aid to Mozambique that any other country, has announced a cancellation of the Mozambican debt and a $38 million emergency assistance program for Mozambique.

Both the British and the Italians were impressed by President Chissano's moderate stance. They and our other allies are clearly committed to a policy of encouraging Mozambique's westward turn and eroding Soviet influence in a key southern African country. They look to the U.S. to continue our own similar policy and to do more to support their efforts.

RENAMO: An Alternative?

Another persistent myth about Mozambique holds that the insurgent movement RENAMO is a democratic alternative to the Government of Mozambique. Here again, a little history is in order.

RENAMO was created by the Rhodesian secret services in 1977 to punish Mozambique for that country's assistance to Zimbabwean liberation movements. With Zimbabwean independence in 1980, sponsorship of RENAMO was taken over by the South African Defense Force (SADF). South African direct support for RENAMO diminished after the Nkomati Accord and as RENAMO capture of weapons and equipment inside Mozambique reduced its requirements for South Africa hardware. However, there is credible evidence that South Africa remains a reliable supplier of high-priority items that RENAMO is not able to acquire on its own.

In 1984, the GPRM made an effort to negotiate with RENAMO

with South Africa as an intermediary. At the critical moment in those talks, RENAMO inexplicably walked out of the negotiations. Since then, the insurgency has followed an inconclusive pattern of a rural guerrilla conflict. RENAMO scored some significant successes in the fall of 1986, but Mozambican and Zimbabwean forces regained the initiative in the first few months of 1987. With neither the Government nor RENAMO in position to win a military victory in the foreseeable future, the conflict in Mozambique is likely to be characterized by ebb and flow of the combatants' military fortunes, with the long-suffering Mozambican people the real losers.

RENAMO appears to draw most of its adherents from the Ndau-Shona tribal group of central Mozambique. It has shown little capability to expand its political influence in other areas of the country or to create a cohesive political organization, even in areas where it has ethnic support. Credible reports of RENAMO atrocities against the civilian population have undercut its popular appeal, as have increasingly apparent divisions among its military and political leaders. We have heard reports that RENAMO recently began hitting civilian targets in Zimbabwe. One such incident, in Rushinga district in northeastern Zimbabwe, resulted in the death of more than a dozen villagers, including four or five children. In addition, RENAMO has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping on May 13, 1987 of a group of seven foreigners from five countries, including an American citizen. The U.S. has and will continue to do everything in its power consistent with our "no concessions" policy to bring about the early safe release of these hostages, but at this point, they remain in RENAMO hands.

Despite this record, there are those who would have us initiate an official relationship with RENAMO. Advocates of this position might find instructive this excerpt from a recent BBC interview with the Archbishop of Maputo, Jose Maria Dos Santos. When asked whether he or other Mozambican bishops might talk to RENAMO's leaders, Archbishop Dos Santos replied: "We don't know who the leaders of RENAMO are, and we don't know how to contact them. It is very difficult. We have no relationship with these people." These comments by a prominent Mozambican not associated with the Government but interested in promoting an end to the fighting indicate that RENAMO lacks a credible political identity where it really counts -- in Mozambique itself.

In addition, a U.S. official relationship with RENAMO would isolate us from our Allies and our African friends, and providethe Soviets with an opportunity they would be only too happy to exploit. With the exception of South Africa, Mozambique's neighbors, regardless of their political complexion, support the Government of Mozambique against the insurgents and would regard official contact with them by Western Governments as a hostile act implying endorsement of South African destabilization efforts. We will continue to operate within this Western/African consensus.

The U.S. and the Mozambican Conflict

Our skepticism about RENAMO has sometimes been incorrectly portrayed as USG advocacy of a military solution to Mozambique's problems. I welcome the opportunity to refute this myth and reaffirm our consistent conviction, in Mozambique as elsewhere in southern Africa, that military conflict cannot

solve political problems. Mozambique's pressing human and economic problems cannot be solved as long as the devastation of civil strife continues. It is the policy of the U.S. to use whatever influence is available to us, as we do everywhere in the region, to encourage an end to hostilities and peaceful solution of conflicts.

The U.S. has in the past, when circumstances were propitious for doing so, promoted contact between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO. For example, we did so inconnection with negotiations between them that followed the conclusion of the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa. Should further opportunities arise for us to play a similar role in ending hostilities between the Government and the insurgents in Mozambique, we will not hesitate to undertake that role. We must, nonetheless, realize that Mozambicans themselves must be the primary architects of a peaceful future for their country.

The Wells Nomination

Mr. Chairman, I could not close my testimony today without a direct appeal to you and your colleagues to act on President Reagan's nomination of Melissa Wells to be our ambassador to Mozambique. It has been more than eight months since the President nominated Ms. Wells to take on a tough job for which she is superbly qualified. This nomination has been favorably and overwhelmingly reported to the floor by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Ms. Wells has answered numerous written questions. I hope the Senate will act promptly on this nomination.

U.S. Policy -- Building on Success

The fate of Mozambique is a critical issue for all of independent southern African and for U.S. interests in that key region. Even a quick look at a map of the region indicates why this is so. The road, rail, and pipeline corridors through Mozambique represent virtually the only transport egress for southern African countries that is not dominated by South Africa. All the independent countries of southern Africa, including democratic Botswana and staunchly pro-Western Malawi and Zaire have a vital stake in keeping those transport links open and in preventing the regional instability that would surely follow their closure by violent means. Mozambique is thus the key policy question by which Southern Africans judge the intentions of the U.S. and other foreign countries toward the region.

Because of Mozambique's key position, the success of our efforts to promote peace and stability in southern Africa depend importantly on how we handle the critical issue of relations with that embattled country. The policy of the Reagan Administration has helped to bolster a consciousdecision by the Government of Mozambique to reduce its dependence on Moscow and move toward genuine nonalignment and improved relations with the West. In so doing, we have reduced Soviet influence in southern African and advanced prospects for regional peace and stability. This successful course has the support of our Allies and our African partners and has placed the Soviets squarely on the defensive.

We intend to stay with it because it is good for the people of Mozambique, good for the region, and good for U.S. interests.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN

I welcome this opportunity to speak with this committee today about the situation in the People's Republic of Mozambique and the American policy toward and aid to that country.

Our policy objectives for the People's Republic of Mozambique should be to restore and advance United States influence; to deny the Soviet Union the use of that country's ports and airfields to expand its influence in southern Africa, the Indian Ocean and even reaching into the continent of Antartica. Our goal should also be to further the development of democracy in Mozambique as we did in such countries as the Philippines and Haiti by withdrawing support for the anti-democratic regime in power.

It is apparent that these objectives and goals are not furthered by present U.S. support for the current government of the People's Republic of Mozambique--FRELIMO, or the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. FRELIMO is by its own declaration a "Marxist-Leninist vanguard party", which has in 1977 entered into a party-to-party twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In addition to acting as a staging area for Soviet objectives in the region, Mozambique has a long history of antidemocratic policies and oppression of its own citizens.

Following the growth of an opposition party espousing a platform of free and fair elections, such as the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO, formerly MNR), FRELIMO has reputedly seen the light. But despite FRELIMO's assumed conversion to pragmatism and neutralism, the FRELIMO leopard has not changed its spots. Allow me to summarize the key aspects of FRELIMO's rule before dealing with aspects and arguments of American aid and policy for the main players in the current drama in the People's Republic of Mozambique.

FRELIMO came into being in 1962 when three small organizations merged to launch a campaign to end Portuguese colonial rule. True to its name, the Front for the Liberation assumed "popular front" tactics designed to secure a broad base of support among Mozambicans and foreign states against colonialism. FRELIMO's initial political platform called principally for national liberation. Other resolutions of the First Congress in September, 1964, were directed to the achievement of independence by means of mobilization, preparation for war, education and diplomacy.

By the time of FRELIMO's second party congress in 1968, the party program had shifted to the Marxist left, as FRELIMO sided with those who wished to wage a world-wide class struggle. When called a communist movement by Portuguese colonial officials during the guerrilla war, FRELIMO officials, however, denied the charge and stated that their reliance on Soviet bloc military assistance was a necessity.

But after independence, FRELIMO's alliance with the Soviet bloc was as unmistakable as was its hostility to the West in general and the United States in particular. Likewise its domestic and foreign policy's demonstrated a wholehearted and genuine conversion to Marxism. I have mentioned already FRELIMO's announcement of being a "Marxist-Leninst vanguard party" at the Third Party Congress in 1977, and FRELIMO's party-to-party treaty with the CPSU. Additionally, FRELIMO invited Soviet warships to Mozambique ports, allowed Soviet aircraft to use its airfields and sent its youth and cadres to Soviet and Cuban schools and training camps.

In the last analysis, it was FRELIMO's domestic policies which caused its greatest problems. FRELIMO is the only legal party in the country. It controls the media. Soon after independence it set up

"re-education camps" for thousands of Mozambicans deemed guilty of political offenses. It was indeed FRELIMO communist schemes of collectivization and confiscation of private property and oppression of individual rights that planted the seeds of the formidable internal challenge now posed by RENAMO.

The new regime in Maputo (formerly Lorenço Marques) sought to abolish private enterprise, introduce People's Shops, formed cooperative industrial centers and collective farming by moving tillers off the soil into communal villages. FRELIMO nationalized many farms, banks, industries and even the services of morticians, doctors and schoolteachers. It became embroiled in controversy with the Catholic Church in Mozambique by criticizing its rituals and schools, and by proclaiming its Marxist version of atheism as official state doctrine. The FRELIMO government also sought to undermine traditional rulers and ancient customs in its efforts to create a New Man, reminiscent of other communist regimes.

Alarmed by government policies, the Portuguese colonial population fled, leaving about 10,000 - 20,000 of the former 230,000 present before independence. The departing whites took their skills and capital, leaving the new country woefully short of managers, farmers, bankers, physicians, teachers, technicians and repairman. The economy worsened. Agricultural output tumbled to well below colonial production figures. The service sector collapsed. FRELIMO's efforts to improve literacy and health standards faltered.

Just as devastatingly, FRELIMO policies helped destablize traditions and customs of the rural Africans, who little understood and greatly feared the changes in their daily lives. The government moved them from traditionally held lands to communal villages by promises of readily accessible water, schooling, medical care and farming assistance which proved to be upsetting. When the promised amenities

failed to appear, Mozambicans, who had experienced rising expectations, expressed discontent and some turned to opposition. Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) capitalized on Mozambican discontent by organizing, training, arming FRELIMO opponents.

The Marxist government matched its sweeping domestic programs with a forward foreign policy. FRELIMO granted sanctuaries and support to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), whose guerrillas fought to displace the Rhodesian government. The Rhodesians retaliated by devastating raids and pre-emptive strikes, not only on ZANU bases, but also on Mozambique's economic infrastructure. The Rhodesian imbroglio only extended the scope of FRELIMO's problems.

RENAMO's message and actions gained new converts. Former FRELIMO members, as well as urban dwellers and rural folk, became increasingly disenchanted with a Marxists regime, which strove to impose its vision of a reordered society on an economically backward land. For a time, the rebels received assistance from South Africa (until the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984.) But since its inception, RENAMO has proved adept at capturing weapons from FRELIMO or by simply improvising them. By all independent accounts, RENAMO lacks sophisticated weapons, uniforms, and arms for its recruits. Yet the struggle goes on.

In my opinion, it was and is FRELIMO's collectivized agricultural schemes that led directly to the famine which stalks that unhappy country. FRELIMO's policies occasioned widespread famine and the flight of refugees into neighboring states, just as similar schemes had helped to create the Ethiopian catastrophe of 1985. Under Portuguese colonialism, no equivalent famine had existed. Many Mozambicans wanted to get rid of Lisbon's rule - they won their independence - but not their expected freedom from fear or want.

The United States should once more support the popular cause. Hence, I should like to make the following recommendations.

1. The United States Department of State, Agency for International Development and other appropriate American government offices should open contact with RENAMO.

2. The United States, wherever possible, must provide moral and material support to peoples struggling against communist inspired and communist aided governments. If we, as a nation, can back democracy in authoritarian states friendly to the United States, such as in Marco's Philippines or Baby Doc's Haiti, then we can and should support democratic forces, such as RENAMO, in countries such as Mozambique, which have not been friendly to the United States.

Specifically, we should provide military assistance to RENAMO to the same extent provided to UNITA (União Nacional para e Independência Total de Angola), about $15 million a year.

If the Soviet bloc (including Cuba and Ethiopia) withdraws its forces, advisors and ground troops from the People's Republic of Mozambique, in an effort to extend its policy of glasnot to the Third World, then the United States could consider reversing its decision to send arms to RENAMO.

Additionally, the United States should match its humanitarian aid, such as food relief, to FRELIMO with a similar amount to RENAMO. RENAMO's objectives of free and fair elections and the withdrawal of Foreign forces are commensurate with both American goals and values.

3. The United States should not participate in aid programs designed to rebuild or to protect the Beira Corridor. Some wellwishers of the FRELIMO regime point to its apparent adoption of pragmatism in its

economic policies. We should, however, be wary of undue optimism in this regard. Short periods of economic liberalization in communist countries have never as yet produced political freedom. For example, the Soviet Union's New Economic Policy of the early 1920s was followed by the brutal Stalin policies of the next three decades. China's campaign of a Hundred Flowers preceded the terror of Cultural ~~Reform~~ Revolution. Hungary has done somewhat better; but even Hungary is not a free country, and Janos Kadar does not serve as a model for the Mozambican nomenclatura.

United States assistance to FRELIMO may in fact have unintended consequences. The United States would strengthen a Marxist-Leninist regime. By offering help in rebuilding Mozambique's infrastructure, the United States may unwittingly encourage individual Mozambicans to pursue private enterprise. Once the FRELIMO regime feels secure from foreign pressure, FRELIMO might well again change the party line and purge the new, but now unwelcome class of entrepreneurs. Speaking in more general terms, the West has never as yet succeeded in converting any communist regime into a democracy through the provision of foreign aid.

At the very least, the United States should post an accredited ambassador from Washington to Maputo, who will strive to place the United States in a position to offer its good offices in a search for peace. Such an ambassador should take as an initial step in fostering communications and negotiations between RENAMO and the Maputo regime.

In my opinion, history is at a crossroads in the People's Republic of Mozambique. The United States should choose to march with democracy.

It is a positive step that this committee is bringing into the open the question of People's Republic of Mozambique. It, of course, is up to the committee to decide what position it will take on the situation

in Mozambique. In conclusion to this statement, I would like to suggest, however, that America's best interests are served by a strong Congressional stand that this country is on the side of RENAMO and the democratic government in Mozambique.

If I can provide additional details or answer your questions, I would be pleased to do so.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD L. SAIERS

I welcome this opportunity to address the subcommittee on the situation in Mozambique, the progress it is making in rehabilitating and reorienting its economy, and the problems it still faces, especially the acute food shortage and insurgency.

Mozambique won its independence from Portugal in 1975 after 10 years of bitter warfare which disrupted much of the countryside. Moreover, the legacy of five centuries of Portugese colonialism was meager. At independence, only seven percent of Mozambique's population was literate and life expectancy estimated at only 44 years. Only a handful of Mozambicans were university trained. Though Mozambique inherited an impressive urban infrastructure, a vital regional transport network and some agro-industrial industries, these were all operated by expatriates and colonial settlers, most of whom left the country soon after independence. Also, the new government of Mozambique soon faced an insurgent force created by the neighboring white minority government in Rhodesia.

After independence, Mozambique's new leaders exacerbated the country's poverty and problems by adopting a Soviet-style economic strategy that was a prescription for disaster. This strategy emphasized state farms, government controls, fixed prices, and the deliberate stifling of private initiative. In a few short years, Mozambique was in ruin: its

currency was nearly worthless; its foreign debt in arrears; its exports declining and productive capacity sitting idle. Most important, Mozambique faced an acute food shortage exacerbated by drought and war.

In 1983, Mozambique's leaders publicly and candidly admitted that their experiment in statist economics had failed. Since then, Mozambique has turned increasingly toward the West for economic advice and assistance, and to the private sector to manage and operate production entities. It has joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, signed the Lome Convention with the European Community, and welcomed western donors, advisors and investors. More importantly, it has adopted a new economic strategy, emphasizing private agriculture, more participation by private firms, both domestic and foreign, more realistic prices, and more disciplined monetary and budget policies. This new policy has been implemented gradually, through a series of key reforms.

The most important of these reforms has been in agriculture. These have included:

-- Breaking up some state farms to create private family and commercial farms. For example, 13,000 hectares from a major irrigated state farm, the Limpopo Agro-Industrial Complex, were transferred to family and commercial farms. In May of this year, several reforms were implemented in Zambezia province: a state cotton farm was abolished, its land being turned to commercial and family farmers; some land from a second state farm was shifted to private hands; and two other state farms were merged into a company to provide seed multiplication for private farmers.

-- Lifting price controls on many agricultural products. In May 1985, the government completely deregulated the farmgate prices on all fruits, and

most vegetables, as well as cassava, sweet potatoes, green maize and some poultry.

-- Significantly increasing the prices of other agricultural products. In May 1985, it raised the farmgate price of maize, wheat and beef by 100 percent, and groundnuts by 33 percent. Prices were also increased for rice, beans, chickens and eggs. In January 1987, a further price increase was announced, raising almost all fixed agricultural prices by between 200 and 400 percent. I should note, however, the prices for staples, such as rice, corn and flour are still controlled.

In addition, the government has begun to provide private farmers with technical services and inputs that were once reserved for only state farms.

The impact of these reforms has been substantial. In 1984, prior to these reforms, there were virtually no fruits or vegetables for sale in Maputo's deserted central market. Now, the market is full. Prices initially shot up with the price liberalization causing short term diffulty for urban consumers. However, they are now coming down as production catches up with demand. The increase in production was aided by A.I.D.'s Commodity Import Program which supplied much of the equipment, fertilizer and other inputs used by the private farmer in and around Maputo.

The government's liberalization program has also allowed more freedom to local private companies. More than 30 state-run manufacturing companies have been turned over to private hands. Private firms now supply agricultural inputs in some areas, directly competing with government parastatals. The government has surrendered its monopoly on foreign trade and private exporters today automatically retain some of their foreign exchange earnings to meet their own hard currency operating costs.

The government of Mozambique has welcomed foreign firms. Foreign investment regulations have been liberalized and the government has negotiated investment agreements on very liberal terms for repatriation of profits. Western multinationals, including some American firms, are now involved in plantation agriculture, light industry, mining concessions and hotels. American companies doing business in Mozambique today include Caltex Oil, Johnson & Johnson, General Tire and Caterpillar.

Mozambique has also undertaken important reforms in budget and finances. While these reforms in themselves are not evidence of economic liberalization, they are necessary if the liberalization program is to succeed. Most important of these steps was the devaluation of the "Metical" by 429 percent in January of this year. Subsidies have been cut for many goods, especially food. Credit controls have been put on all parastatals which are now to run on a profitable basis.

The government of Mozambique has just completed negotiation of an agreement with the IMF and IBRD for an economic stabilization and recovery program which will extend and speed these reform measures. The recovery package has four basic objectives:

-- reduce central administration of the economy through more private sector participation;

-- base resource allocations on market-oriented prices and credit policies;

-- provide better incentives by linking income to economic performance; and

-- improve planning, policy making and budgeting.

Features of the program include:

-- a review of forty parastatal firms for possible closure or divestiture;

-- further devaluation of the Metical;

-- further reduction of foreign trade controls;

-- the reduction by 20 percent in 1987 of the number of products for which prices are fixed and a further 15 percent by mid-1988; and

-- increases in taxes and reduction in subsidies.

The IMF's proposed program would provide $36 million of financing to assist Mozambique during this reform period. According to the Government of Mozambique, the IBRD plans to provide a further $90 million including technical assistance in budget, planning and reforming parastatals. The IBRD and IMF's program will be complemented by bilateral aid from western countries which have now become Mozambique's principal source for economic aid. More than a dozen western and Asian governments provided approximately $345 million in development aid to Mozambique in 1985, compared to $54 million provided by the Soviet Union and its allies.

A.I.D. has been providing some $10 million per year since FY 84 in commodities and technical assistance to rehabilitate Mozambique's private sector. This year's Commodity Import Program is providing agricultural inputs to private, commercial and cooperative farmers in the Maputo marked area and other imported goods to small, private manufacturing operations.

Most A.I.D. assistance this year, however, is for emergency relief. A.I.D. is providing 194,000 MT of food aid valued at $63 million, and an additional $7 million in disaster relief grants, making the U.S. the largest contributor to Mozambique's emergency relief effort. The country's food emergency, and the insurgent war which is a major cause of the food problem, pose the greatest threats to the government's reform program.

The relief effort in Mozambique differs greatly from those in other African countries where A.I.D. has been involved recently. In Mozambique, about two-thirds of the 630,000 MT of food aid required this year is being sold rather than

distributed free by relief agencies. Most of this food being sold goes to urban populations which have the ability to pay for the food. It is the policy of the Mozambique government to provide free food only to those who are truly destitute. Wisely, Mozambique is trying to limit the population dependent on food handouts. Many of those who do receive free food are people displaced by war or drought who have fled to urban areas. Most of the relief food going to rural areas for free distribution is being distributed by the Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities (DPCCN), the government's relief arm, which is assisted by CARE. World Vision also has a major relief operation and the International Committee of the Red Cross is expanding its presence as well.

Another contrasting point between the Mozambique and other recent food emergencies in Africa is the cause of the food shortages. In Mozambique, climatic events are no longer the major factor. In 1986, the weather was generally good for agriculture in most of the country. Though some areas have experienced poor rainfall in 1987, it is still not the main cause of food shortages this year. Rather, the disruption and displacement caused by the insurgency, coupled with the cumulative effect of years of poor economic policies and inadequate internal transport, have caused the collapse of food production and marketing in many areas of the country.

Our A.I.D. office in Mozambique estimates that 3.8 million rural people are in need, excluding some 400,000 refugees who have fled into neighboring countries, and some 2.2 million urban people who also rely on imported food. This 3.8 million includes some 1.5 million who have been displaced within Mozambique and 2.3 million still in the countryside who are believed to be at risk. The overwhelming number of displaced people have fled the war. The picture in the countryside is less clear. The GPRM attributes the cause for most rural people being in need to the war but it has little

concrete information on the extent of the need. A new survey is being implemented to reasses the current numbers at risk.

Access is a major obstacle to the relief effort. Of course, insurgency is only part of the problem. Many areas are isolated simply by virtue of the terrain and lack of roads. Over large areas, however, the insurgency has also impeded access. Delineating these areas is difficult because of the fluid nature of the war. Transport routes alternate between being safe for transport or highly dangerous depending on the presence of the armed insurgents.

Only a handful of areas have been completely inaccessible because of war. One such area has been in Tete province north of the Cabora Bassa Lake. Some half dozen DPCCN trucks were destroyed in 1986 in northern Tete in attempts to reach this area.

More often, however, the insurgency isolates areas for limited amounts of time. In some districts, fighting may be so intense and wide-spread that these areas become "no-go" zones until the fighting subsides. Many areas in southern Mozambique that were unreachable because of war in 1984-85 are freely accessible now because the fighting has shifted to the north-central provinces. More recently, large areas of Tete and Zambezia were cut off in 1986 and early 1987. Access to much of these two provinces has been restored in the last month. It is impossible, however, to predict where a new flare up in the fighting will cut off access.

The most serious effect of the insurgency on access has been hit and run interdiction of roads with mines, ambushes or sniper attacks. These tactics lead to uncertainty about the safety of roads and force the use of armed convoys, even when the combatants have long since moved on to other areas. Using hit and run tactics, the insurgents have impeded access to large areas without actually controlling them. Few relief

vehicles have been lost in such attacks. In 1986 the DPCCN lost 12 trucks out of a fleet of 186 and all but three of these in one province -- Tete. Several more were damaged by gun fire.

The war has affected more than just food production, marketing and delivery. It has also disrupted what meager social services there were available to rural people, causing further suffering and privations. According to UNICEF, some 718 health clinics have been destroyed by insurgents since 1981.

The DPCCN, CARE and other relief agencies are making a concerted effort to deliver food further into rural areas. CARE and the DPCCN have a fleet of more than 300 trucks and, by the end of the year, will add 30 farm-style tractors from the U.K. and 16 from the Netherlands that can penetrate far into the bush where there are no roads. One cannot be certain that these efforts will not become targets for insurgent attacks. The USG is also working through other organizations such as ICRC and UNICEF to deliver food and medical supplies to areas presently inaccessible because of the war.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. We will be happy to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSE A. FRANCISCO

As a Mozambican-American this is a rare opportunity to speak to the Free World about what is happening to the people of Mozambique, people who are captives in their own land. 14 million Mozambicans live under one of the most hard-line, Marxist-Leninist regimes in Africa. They cannot speak for themselves about the same things I am going to tell you - without risking certain death. Even now, I have family in Mozambique who may suffer consequences, but silence,the alternative, means that many thousands more will die unless the truth is told. On behalf of my Mozambican countrymen, I thank you for the freedom I have received on these shores.

I was a former member of FRELIMO. I fought against Portuguese colonialism for the Independence of Mozambique. Originally, FRELIMO was a nationalist movement but communist infiltration from abroad culminated with the murder of moderate, American-educated founder of FRELIMO, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane. During this period I witnessed unbelievable atrocities committed by the very leaders whom Mr. Chester Crocker presently calls "moderate".

The FRELIMO defense chief to Samora Machel (now Minister of Defense), Alberto Chipande, personally executed his own father in the presence of 1000 FRELIMO cadres as an example for establishing "the new order". This public murder was committed by stabbing his father in the stomach and ripping upwards until his viscera spilled to the ground.

Joaquim Chissano, who was then chief of security, personally approved the execution as a teaching method, as he did all atrocities I witnessed. Later as Foreign Minister, Chissano was the de facto head of the State secret police, SNASP, which implemented the system of concentration camps and political torture once FRELIMO came to power. His deputy, Jorge daCosta, defected from Mozambique in 1983 and revealled the files of FRELIMO's state sponsored terror network, which included extensive input from the KGB, East-German intelligence and the Cubans.

Mariano Matsinhe, now Security Minister, became a member of the International Socialist Party while a student in Portugal. When he returned to Mozambique, he gave instructions to soldiers in my unit to carry out a gang torture-execution session of another moderate FRELIMO leader, Silveiro Nungo. I saw my officers take diabolic glee in flogging Nungo repeatedly for 12 hours. He was left overnight tied to a tree. The next day he was beaten again until unconscious. The third day after he regained consciousness, the most gruesome part followed. Nungo was dismembered, joint by joint, starting with his fingers going up to the shoulders. Using crude machetes to do the hacking, Nungo died by mid-day.

I also witnessed mass executions. Young FRELIMO cadres returning from indoctrination in Russia and other East-bloc countries were secretly identified by their instructors as being either "converted communists" or "unconverted". The unconverted were met at the airport in Dar es Salaam with orders for "special missions". They were transported into the operational area of Cabo Delgado only to find themselves in a detention center. Here they were executed by bayonet, first being sexually dismembered. This was a regular occurence; the largest single massacre I witnessed involved 120 individuals.

Eventually, FRELIMO leadership was consolidated by the Marxist faction, most of whom had received training in Algeria. They became known as the "Algerian Gang", which includes the top FRELIMO leadership today, including Chissano and dos Santos.

It was this gang of "Algerians" who were handed power following the hasty Portuguese departure after the socialist coup in Lisbon in 1974. The new Portuguese socialist-communist coalition did not grant elections to Mozambique despite the existence of several healthy nationalist parties. My own brother disappeared during the transitional period amidst mysterious circumstances and has never been accounted for despite many attempts to locate him.

The purge that followed FRELIMO's installation in 1975 saw the establishment of Samora Machel's infamous concentration camps, nationalization of property, and gross abuse of all human rights. Hunger and unemployment followed almost immediately. Soviet and other East-bloc neo-colonials proceeded to rape Mozambique's natural resources, including human resources. Children were sent overseas for indoctrination and Mozambique slave labor was exported, 10,000 to East Germany for instance. This process continues today. This was the last straw for many FRELIMO members who considered that their "independence" had been betrayed. FRELIMO had merely exchanged Portuguese colonialism for an even worse form of Soviet colonialism.

One of Machel's own officers, Andre Matsangaisse, raised a protest and was immediately shipped out to Sacuze concentration camp along with his sympathizing colleagues. Before Matsangaisse and his men were brought up for execution, they orchestrated a breakout, overpowering their guards, stealing the weapons and taking to the bush. They regrouped at Gorongosa from where they initiated attacks against other concentration camps, capturing the weapons and liberating the detainees. The armed resistance was born and Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana, RENAMO, soon became a military threat to the new Machel regime. Matsangaisse was killed in battle two years later but his deputy, Afonso Dhlakama, took command of the popular rebellion.

In 1977, the Rhodesian government offered some logistical support to RENAMO as a counterbalance to the support and sanctuary given to the ZANLA guerrillas of Robert Mugabe by Samora Machel. When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, South Africa offered limited assistance to RENAMO in retaliation for Machel's support to the ANC. Medical supplies and communication equipment along with some captured SWAPO weapons were provided until the Nkomati Accord in March 1984, brokered by Chester Crocker, which resulted in breaking RENAMO's outside line of communication and supply.

The cut off resulted in some short term hardships for RENAMO, but in the long term it forced RENAMO to become more self reliant. Within one year, RENAMO tripled the number of contacts with the enemy, and doubled the land under its' control. Arms and ammunition were captured mainly from the well equipped but poorly motivated 15,000 Zimbabwean soldiers inside Mozambique. FRELIMO being ill equipped and demoralized were incapable of holding territory against RENAMO. In fact, FRELIMO had become riddled with RENAMO sympathizers and informers, a fact that holds true today. This naturally causes considerable tension and distrust between FRELIMO forces and their foreign "allies". With the support of the local people RENAMO is today capable of operating, and frequently does, in the outskirts of the capital, Maputo.

Nevertheless, the Algerian gang, the Soviet Union, and now the American State Department continue to refer to RENAMO as a "handful of bandits". They say RENAMO has no political legitimacy. Yet FRELIMO is now in the position of relying totally on foreign intervention to prevent its' collapse from within. Are 30,000 East-bloc and regional mercenaries necessary for the work of containing a handful of bandits? RENAMO has articulated the two criterion for political legitimacy, accepted by all western democracies - 1. elections and 2. the removal of all foreign mercenaries. FRELIMO is unable to meet these two simple criterion without total defeat.

The FRELIMO regime understands what Chester Crocker fails or refuses to recognize. RENAMO has the support of the majority of Mozambicans. RENAMO controls the majority of the country. RENAMO has restored basic human freedoms in their liberated areas. RENAMO has established civil administration and has a well defined political and economic program. And RENAMO demonstrates a nationalist vision for an independent Mozambique. All journalists to visit RENAMO have documented these basic points.

A document, known as "We the Former Freedom Fighters", was drafted by some nationalist elements of FRELIMO, and circulated to the FRELIMO hierarchy late last year. It advocates the expulsion of the Algerian gang and negotiations with RENAMO. It has caused great consternation within FRELIMO's shaky ranks.

Just recently the Catholic Bishops of Mozambique called upon FRELIMO to enter into negotiations with RENAMO. Clearly they believe that foreign intervention cannot solve the Mozambican dispute. The Church insists it is a matter which can be discussed only amongst Mozambicans themselves. Chissano's recent invitation to the Pope to visit Mozambique was rejected on the basis that only an invitation from the Bishops' themselves would be accepted.

Unfortunately for Mozambique, Chester Crocker has not taken into account the extent of Mozambicans contempt for foreign meddling in their affairs. His knowledge of Mozambique seems more influenced by his brief visits to the only functional hotel in Maputo and his client relationship with the Algerian gang. Crocker has never contacted RENAMO. Yet Crocker advocates increased foreign involvement in Mozambique which can only be meant to increase foreign profits at the cost of Mozambican blood. What is behind Crocker's behavior I do not exactly know. But his Zimbabwean wife and family political connections do not give me optimism about his ability to conduct policy from an impartial position.

Despite Crockers' constant attempts to isolate and undermine PENAMO, President Dhlakama has appealed to President Reagan to dispatch a personal envoy to make an urgent assessment of the situation inside Mozambique. That envoy would have liberty to travel the liberated zones and to provide crucial information that has not been gathered by State Department sources.

President Dhlakama's offer also applies to international relief organizations who unfortunately use only FRELIMO statistics and operate only in FRELIMO sanctioned areas. RENAMO's offer to cooperate and assist with relief operations has so far gone unheeded. Whether for political policy or humanitarian relief, it appears to me that decision makers must first have access to first-hand accurate information.

As long as the outside world is not prepared to look at the harsh facts in Mozambique, innocent Mozambicans will continue to be the victims of a ruthless regime that will stop at nothing to keep power. Regularly, the FRELIMO regime commits atrocities against tribespeople in order to eliminate opposition and at the same time manufacture propaganda against RENAMO's fledgling political image in the outside world. FRELIMO's accusations go unchallenged by organizations who do not want to jeopardize their aid contracts with FRELIMO.

Until humanitarian organizations are willing to defy the regime and responsibly investigate both sides of the story, these bully tactics will continue to the detriment of innocent Mozambicans.

God blessed America for a reason. America was born to help people who are persecuted either for religious, racial, or political reasons. America, as the backbone of western civilization and leader of the free world is looked up to by persecuted people everywhere. As a Mozambican, I feel more acutely the hope and yearning of my people for the reality of freedom which I enjoy today as an American. The freedom loving people of Mozambique are risking their lives in the struggle for freedom. It is not too much to ask that we give their cry a fair hearing. For America to ally herself with the enemies of freedom would be a grievous error and a negation of her divine charter. This is precisely the decision which confronts American policy in Mozambique today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, DC

GORONGOSA
27th November, 1986

Dear Mr. President,

Greetings from Free Mozambique

I know you share my concern about the spread of Communism and Soviet attempts to destabilize Southern Africa. However, I am pleased to inform you that in Mozambique we are now in a position to inflict a major defeat on the communists.

After 10 years of struggle we control 85% of Mozambique and we are close to unseating the marxist FRELIMO regime in Maputo. This we have done alone. Since the signing of the Nkomati Accord and the withdrawal of South African support in 1984, we have not received any foreign assistance. The weapons, supplies, and medicines we use have all been captured from the enemy. FRELIMO is now confined to a few towns and military bases and RENAMO has freedom of movement in the entire country. Under our administration people are returning to their lands to grow food and rebuild their lives unmolested by the cruel regime.

The only thing that prevents final victory is the presence of foreign military personnel in Mozambique: Soviet, Cuban, Zimbabwean, Tanzanian, North Korean, East German, and Ethiopian troops supported by foreign economic aid including American assistance. I think your Government has been misled by FRELIMO propaganda as to the true nature of our cause. We seek merely to liberate our country from communist domination and to give our people the freedom to lead their lives in peace.

I would like to invite you to send a representative to see our successful effort and how closely our goals coincide with the Reagan Doctrine.

Yours for final victory,

Afonso Dhlakama
President of RENAMO

PRESIDENT AFONSO DHLAKAMA'S MESSAGE TO THE UNITED STATES

The address by RENAMO President Afonso Dhlakama at the Press Conference in Washington D.C., 28 October 1986, at 10:00 A.M., Senate Foreign Relations Committee Room.

Text:

Through my newly appointed representative in Washington, Dr. Luis B. Serapiao, I take this opportunity to address the American people for the first time. This is a time of change in the history of Mozambique; it is also an opportunity for change in the relations between our two countries. Over the past 10 years the people of Mozambique have challenged the dictatorship of the Marxist-Leninist Frelimo regime. Frelimo introduced foreign ideologies and abolished the basic freedoms of our people. They replaced Portuguese colonialism with an even worse Soviet colonialism.

RENAMO'S OFFER

Today I have issued an ultimatum to Frelimo regime that RENAMO is prepared to make certain amnesty provisions should Frelimo accept the following two conditions:

1. The withdrawal of all foreign mercenaries from Mozambique.

2. The holding of general elections.

This is Frelimo's last chance to avoid total military defeat. If Frelimo rejects these reasonable conditions RENAMO has no option but to press on with the final conquest. The choice of continued war or immediate peace is on Frelimo's doorstep.

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROGRAM

RENAMO has always advocated constitutional government led by elected officials based on democratic principles. The rule of law must be enshrined by a system of legal justice predicated on a belief in God-given human worth and dignity. We embrace a limited government and a free market as requisite to a healthy society and competitive economy. Trade, diplomatic and security relations with friendly and like minded governments are to be encouraged and developed. There can be no doubt of RENAMO's sincerity, for this is the essence of our present government in liberated Mozambique.

RENAMO ADMINISTRATION

At our Gorangosa capital in central Mozambique I preside over the National Council of RENAMO. The council is composed of twelve members, some internal, some external who consult together on policy and administrative affairs. As commander in chief, I also preside over the military council, composed of 10 provincial generals, and 2 staff generals at headquarters.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

A civilian cabinet with portfolios for Agriculture, Health, and Education, and other public functions is resident at Gorangosa to supervise and assist the rebuilding and development program underway, Code-Named "Operation Nehemiah". Because we are isolated from trade and communications with the outside world, we are a self contained economy at present. Naturally, we are very needy of many humanitarian and manufactured goods like medicine, text books, clothes and the like. In spite of these hardships however, the conquest of freedom is bearing its fruit. Unmolested by the communist government our people are again returning to their land. They are growing food and rebuilding their homes, schools, and churches. Tradesman and artisans are against pursuing gainful employment to raise their living standards. RENAMO is demonstrating by its actions the principles which guide and motivate us.

RENAMO : THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT

RENAMO as a military entity is winning the war. RENAMO as a political entity is increasing its legitimacy. RENAMO is the de facto government of free Mozambique. This reality is obvious to every visitor that has toured the liberated zone. For this reason I find it difficult to understand why certain American officials with responsibility for Mozambique policy will not recognize RENAMO as a political entity in Mozambique. In fact they have never visited us nor have they met with my external representative. Instead they have dealt exclusively with the unelected, Soviet-backed, communist element in Maputo. They have rejected out of hand, the democratic alternative for Mozambique.

BETRAYAL AND HOPE OF THE REAGAN DOCTRINE

At a time when I am battling against travel restrictions and financial limitations the State Department has proceeded with impunity to use the resources of their vast bureaucracy to sabotage my fledgling diplomatic effort in Washington. Certain Administration officials have been actively recruiting Mozambican nationals in an attempt to create a bogus RENAMO faction.

But the winds of change are blowing in another direction. Mozambique will be the first country to defect from the camp of Soviet slave states and take her place among the free nations of the world. But where is America at this historic turning point? As the Frelimo regime is toppling to its knees, this Administration is still supporting the Marxist regime.

INVITATION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I therefore call upon the author of the Reagan Doctrine to repudiate this travesty of Administration in his own house and that he remove obstructionist bureaucrats with an interest in propping up the Marxist status quo. At this crucial junction in Mozambiques destiny, I appeal to the American President to make a fresh evaluation of the situation in Mozambique. In order for him to do this he must have direct access to the vital information which has hitherto been withheld from him. I therefore invite President Reagan to dispatch a special envoy to liberated Mozambique as a matter of urgency. This envoy will have complete freedom to travel in our liberated zones. In order to make an independent assessment I would encourage him also to visit communist Mozambique before hand to make a comparative analysis.

SELF DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL DESTINY

In an hour of fundamental decision in the birth of the American republic that firebrand of your own independence, Patrick Henry declared, "There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and that same God will raise up friends to fight our battles for us." We indeed are thankful to God for the growing coalitions of friends in the United States who have helped us in these early days to fight our battles for a fair hearing. These are Americans who share our vision of freedom and democracy. We look forward to working together with our friends to build a new Mozambique where these principles will flourish to the benefit of all our peoples.

Our struggle continues to final victory

A Luta Continua



Afonso Dhlakama

Excerpts from U.S. Committee on Refugees Paper by Tom Brennan, November 1986

Refugees From Mozambique
SHATTERED LAND, FRAGILE ASYLUM

Important events are rapidly unfolding in Mozambique, perhaps the most strategically placed nation in southern Africa.

In October 1986, against the backdrop of activity surrounding the imposition of international sanctions against South Africa, the South African government announced it would not renew work permits of 68,000 Mozambicans legally working in South Africa, thus eliminating Mozambique's major source of foreign exchange earnings. The authorities claimed their action was in retaliation for a landmine explosion inside South African territory, which they attributed to guerrillas of the African National Congress operating from within Mozambique.

In the same month, South African-supported insurgents in Mozambique wrested from government control huge tracts of territory and a number of towns, in what may signal the start of a major insurgent offensive. More than 100,000 Mozambicans, fleeing in terror, joined more than a quarter-of-a-million of their compatriots who had already taken refuge in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and even—indeed, especially—South Africa. As refugee numbers swelled, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the only international agency caring for refugees in South Africa, was expelled from that country in retaliation for the expulsion of a South African government delegation from a Red Cross conference in Geneva.

As Mozambique struggled to cope with its growing insurgency, massive population displacements, and the prospect of drastically reduced foreign exchange earnings, its president, Samora Machel, died in an air crash, in disputed circumstances, just inside South African territory. His death has shaken the nation and has deprived it of a strong leader and an internationally respected head of state.

In short, the nation of Mozambique is in a state of crisis, and some four million of its citizens who are seriously affected within Mozambique or seeking sanctuary in neighboring states require immediate international protection and assistance if a major human tragedy is to be averted.

The making of this crisis, however, did not begin in recent months. It can be traced to the threat perceived by neighboring white-minority regimes when Mozambique achieved independence eleven years ago, and it has grown steadily more violent ever since.

Until very recently, however, little has appeared in the U.S. media regarding the domestic situations of Mozambique or of the other nations of southern Africa, or regarding their relationships with each other and with the South African government. Even less has appeared on the impact that existing and potential armed conflicts in the region—stemming from ideological, as well as ethnic and racial differences—are likely to have on the civilian populations of the area as the struggle to eliminate apartheid gains momentum.

Yet, the potential for catastrophe—for human suffering and population displacements that are truly massive in scale—pervades the entire southern third

of the African continent, and a broader understanding of the problems of the region is essential if overwhelming physical suffering is to be avoided during the next several years.

This paper briefly discusses the conflict that is currently causing large population displacements from and within Mozambique, summarizes the status of Mozambican refugees in their respective countries of asylum, and offers recommendations to reduce the suffering these refugees are experiencing. It views their displacement within the historical context of events that have periodically impelled Mozambicans to seek safety in neighboring countries. While historical migratory patterns continue to influence the direction of Mozambican refugee movements, however, the existence of nation-states, fixed borders, spurious systems of government, and modern weaponry have immeasureably complicated their existence and have made their present situation untenable.

Shattered Land

Following its eleven-year struggle for liberation from Portugal, the present government of Mozambique came to power in 1975, recognizing many of the challenges immediately facing the fledgling nation of 13 million people, but also expecting ultimately to achieve dynamic economic and social growth.

The problems the leadership faced were substantial. While the peoples of Mozambique had demonstrated initiative and tenacity in their resistance to Portuguese rule, for example, actions directed against the colonial authority had traditionally been local or tribal in nature, and there was little popular sense of nationhood. Also, while Mozambicans were highly regarded for their industriousness as migrant workers—in the mines or on agricultural estates in neighboring countries—relatively little agricultural development had taken place in Mozambique during the Portuguese era, and more than 85 percent of the population was illiterate at independence.

Nevertheless, the expectations of the nation's leadership were not unfounded. Twice the size of California and strategically situated on the Indian Ocean, Mozambique possessed a coastline equivalent to that of the United States from Boston to Miami. Several modern and well-placed deep-water ports—linked by rail to the land-locked nations of Zimbabwe (previously Southern Rhodesia), Zambia, Malawi, and Swaziland, and to the principal mining and industrial region of South Africa—offered substantial opportunity for generating foreign exchange. Mozambique was also earning modest revenue from the export of agricultural commodities—cashews, cotton, sugar, and tea—and the nation had been generously endowed with mineral resources. Perhaps most importantly, Mozambique achieved independence under a charismatic leader, Samora Machel, whose personal integrity inspired the loyalty of great numbers of Mozambicans and the respect of a diversity of African and Western heads of state.

Mozambique's hopes for prosperity, however, have not been realized. From the moment of its independence, the new nation fell victim to foreign influence and to pressure from a persistent insurgency that have turned Mozambique into an international battleground. And, while Machel retained much of his personal popularity, the policies of his ruling party alienated many within the country.

Rigid Marxist policies, civil disorder, and pernicious drought combined to devastate the nation's economy, and, as Mozambique's financial infrastructure crumbled, the insurgency gained additional momentum. By the early 1980s, national unrest had evolved into a bitter civil war, displacing or seriously affecting close to two million people within Mozambique. Heinous and widespread atrocities against noncombatants—skulls crushed, infants boiled alive, throats slit, and women and girls brutally raped—have been reported by numerous eyewitnesses, ascribed most often to insurgent forces, but on occasion to Mozambican government troops, as well.

Since mid-1983, the numbers of those internally displaced or seriously affected have doubled to almost four million people, and an estimated 350,000 persons have fled from Mozambique into neighboring territories, about half of them into South Africa.

Part of a Pattern

The movement of large numbers of black Africans into racist South Africa in search of asylum is, on the surface, an anomaly. But, while the oppressive policy of apartheid in South Africa attacks their human dignity and well-being, the brutality these refugees fled in Mozambique immediately threatened their very survival. And the flow of refugees to South Africa—like the flows to Mozambique's other neighbors—is rooted in the historical patterns of migration in southern Africa, and in the family and tribal relationships that have developed throughout the region as a result of these movements.

Large-scale migrations have been a feature of African life for many centuries, at times in the peaceful form of a slow infiltration of relatively small groups seeking new economic opportunities, at times in the form of conquerors seeking to dominate new areas, and at times, as now, by those seeking escape from subjugation and brutality. The history of Mozambique is replete with such migrations.

Early History

Small numbers of hunters and gatherers were probably the only inhabitants of present-day Mozambique until sometime around 350 A.D., when iron-working Bantu speakers from the north and west began a series of migrations that continued intermittently well into the nineteenth century.

The Tsonga, for example, expanded in stages out of what are now the regions of Transvaal and Natal in present-day South Africa, from the fourth to the tenth centuries, and settled in southern Mozambique. Shona-speaking peoples, from present-day Zimbabwe and Botswana, conquered the upper Zambezi River Valley and some coastal areas by 1450. Warrior tribes of the Maravi cluster, who originated probably in Zaire and migrated through Malawi and Zambia, arrived on the northern bank of the Zambezi River in the sixteenth century. And Ngoni warriors swept in from South Africa between 1820 and 1850 to escape a rival Zulu chief, eventually settling in scattered locations in Mozambique.

From outside Africa, too, groups came seeking opportunities to profit from the land and the people. Arab traders had come to Mozambique as early as the eighth century, setting up outposts along much of the East African coast in order to trade manufactured goods for gold and ivory. The Arabs concluded military

and trade agreements with individual African chieftains, prospered immensely from these arrangements, and ultimately established a distinctive Islamic culture along much of the Mozambican coast.

The first visit of Europeans probably occurred toward the end of the fifteenth century, when a Portuguese expedition travelled along the East African coast as far south as Mozambique and reported to their king on the lucrative Arab trade in gold. A few years later, Vasco da Gama, on his epochal voyage to India in 1498, reprovisioned on the coast of Mozambique and bombarded an Arab town as a warning that the Portuguese were prepared to challenge Muslim control of trade in the area.

By 1505, the Portuguese had returned to sack another Arab town and began construction of a fort at Sofala, on the Zambezi River—the first European settlement in southern Africa. Within five years, the Portuguese controlled the flow of commerce out of every major port between Sofala and the Horn of Africa, 3,000 miles to the north. Portuguese attempts to penetrate the interior of the continent, however, were much less successful, and Portuguese presence beyond the coast was sporadic and limited to isolated settlements for several hundred years.

During these centuries, the huge profits that Portugal had hoped to derive from trading in gold and ivory failed to materialize, as trade was repeatedly interrupted by civil wars waged in the interior by competing factions of African kingdoms. These hostilities also resulted in continuing population displacements around the border areas of present-day Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Portugal was coming to doubt the efficacy of its limited presence in Mozambique.

As Portugal sought to reconcile its visions of empire with its extremely limited resources, however, the demand for slaves in Brazil, Madagascar, and overseas French territories precipitated a transformation of Mozambique's economy that would enrich the Portuguese authorities and that has profoundly affected its population even to the present day: Mozambique, in effect, became an international labor reserve.

The rise of slavery established a precedent for the authorities in Mozambique to derive profit from the export of indigenous manpower. But, for the peasant, flight from enslavement reinforced the patterns of migration established during the centuries of civil conflicts. As slavery was abolished, these patterns were largely maintained by migration for wage labor, by flight from Portuguese colonial rule, and, today, by refugees once again seeking escape from civil strife that has shattered their land.

Human Commodities—Phase I

The earliest significant overseas market for Mozambican labor was on the islands of Mauritius, where French settlers had begun to establish sugar plantations. During the 1770s, Afro-Portuguese settlers, Indian merchants, and Swahili traders in Mozambique responded to the relatively modest French demand for labor by exporting about 1,000 slaves annually.

As the need for new sources of slaves developed in Brazil and Central America, however, slaving operations grew dramatically, and by 1790, the colonial government was deriving substantial tax revenues from the legal exportation of approximately 9,000 slaves annually from Mozambique. This trade continued to

grow well into the nineteenth century, peaking at about 15,000 slaves legally exported across the Atlantic each year during the 1820s and 1830s. Probably twice that number were exported through unofficial channels to avoid government taxation, and an unknown number were also exported to Indian Ocean markets.

As demand for slaves rose, the potential for profit increased accordingly, and slaving parties ranged farther afield in their search for exportable humans. Entire villages were razed, crops were devastated, and large populations, particularly in northern and central Mozambique, fled farther inland along long-established migratory routes in order to escape enslavement.

In response to international protests, Portugal sought to minimize slavery by taxing it more heavily, but even in 1875, slaves were still Mozambique's dominant export commodity. Finally, Portugal decreed a complete abolition of slavery in 1878 and began taking forceful measures against it. By some reports, however, covert slave trade within the region continued until as late as 1913, and it is almost certain that the combined legal and illegal exports from Mozambique exceeded one million slaves in the course of the nineteenth century.

Human Commodities—Phase II

Circumstances in southern Mozambique during the first half of the nineteenth century created an opportunity for the export of wage labor that would come to replace slavery as the principal source of revenue for the colonial government, and would further reinforce Mozambican migratory patterns.

To survive in that century, the settled peoples of Mozambique had not only to avoid slaving parties, but, particularly among the ethnic Tsonga in southern Mozambique, had also to contend with migrations of warriors from South Africa. The warrior tribes decimated the cattle herds of the Tsonga and seriously disrupted their cultural patterns, which relied heavily on the accumulation of cattle for social esteem and for bride payments. The Tsonga saw their future as very bleak, indeed.

In the second half of the century, as the international demand for slaves began to wane, the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa resulted in intensive mining operations requiring vast resources of unskilled manual labor. At the same time, young Tsonga males needed a new means for acquiring cattle—or cloth and agricultural tools, which were becoming popular substitutes—in order to obtain wives and social stature.

The need of the mining authorities to obtain steady labor, uninterrupted by absences during planting and harvesting seasons, also fit neatly with the division of labor common to the Tsonga, in which most agricultural tasks were regarded ideally as women's work. Men were thus free to be away from their farms for extended periods while their families subsisted on what the women grew.

For many Tsonga men, the opportunity for wage labor was not only welcome, it was irresistible.

Labor recruiters from the mines in the Transvaal quickly recognized southern Mozambique as the best available labor pool, and the journey to the Transvaal to spend a year or two under the earth soon came to be viewed almost as a rite of passage for the young Tsonga male. By 1889, already about half of the 90,000-man labor force in the Transvaal were from southern Mozambique. This flow of

migrant labor increased dramatically during the next decades as the Portuguese colonial government, anxious to profit once again from the export of the indigenous population, formalized migrant labor arrangements with the official labor recruitment agency of the Transvaal mining industry.

Under the terms of an accord signed in 1901, the Portuguese colonial government received a head-tax for each worker recruited for the mines—just as it had received a tax on each slave exported a quarter-century earlier—plus an additional payment for each month's service beyond the initial one-year contract period. Also, half of each worker's wage was paid directly to the colonial government in gold. This payment was calculated at a rate fixed significantly below the world market price for gold, permitting the Portuguese government to resell it at a substantial profit. Together, the recruitment taxes and these wage remittances accounted for about one-third of Mozambique's total annual revenue.

Equally important, in return for cheap labor, the Transvaal government agreed to divert a percentage of its imports and exports through the Mozambican port of Lourenco Marques (now Maputo), which had been linked by rail to the Transvaal in 1895. Customs duties and transshipping charges were soon yielding an additional one-third of the colony's total revenue and represented the largest single source of colonial income.

Similar arrangements were later made with Southern Rhodesia, permitting that country to recruit 25,000 Mozambicans annually in return for moving Rhodesian goods through the Mozambican port of Beira. By 1913, rail and port charges against Southern Rhodesia had already reached almost a quarter-of-a-million dollars per year.

Escape from Tyranny

The draconian colonial policies applied by the Portuguese within Mozambique also contributed significantly to population movements that were spontaneous in nature, and, once again, these followed and reinforced the established migratory patterns.

As Portugal gradually gained effective control of Mozambique between 1894 and 1912, it imposed a particularly severe colonial regime. After putting down popular revolts against its rule, the colonial administration used the whip and cudgel to collect taxes from the populace and instituted policies requiring all adult males to be gainfully employed as migrant workers, as wage earners within Mozambique, or as farmers possessing very large holdings.

As some 90 percent of Mozambican men were considered unemployed under the colonial labor codes, they were subject to impressment on public projects and on the estates of Portuguese settlers. They were entitled to neither food nor lodging, were subject to repeated physical abuses, and received little or no remuneration. Additional burdens, notably the requirement to grow cotton and rice on behalf of the government, were later placed on the peasantry. These circumstances drove additional thousands of Mozambicans across the border into neighboring territories, either as illegal migrant workers or as permanent settlers.

Legal migration to South Africa grew to more than 91,000 by 1919, and from 1920 onward remained at about 100,000 annually. But at least that many again are believed to have fled clandestinely from southern Mozambique to escape forced labor on the European farms concentrated there. Thousands fled as well from northern and central Mozambique to join ethnic enclaves in neighboring countries.

By 1919, it was estimated that more than 100,000 Mozambicans from the north had resettled in Nyasaland (now Malawi), and at least another 200,000 fled there during the next 25 years. In Southern Rhodesia, the number of migrant workers from central Mozambique grew from 25,000 in 1936, to 72,000 in 1946, and to more than 122,000 in 1956. By 1950, more than 100,000 Mozambicans were living in permanent exile there. Similar numbers fled to Zambia and to Tanganyika.

Exiles Arise

While the colonial authorities effectively suppressed any political dissent within Mozambique, among the great numbers of Mozambicans who had fled to the neighboring British territories were many who were influenced by the ideas and successes of nationalist parties in their host countries. In Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, and Tanganyika, they formed separate exile political organizations, each concluding that independence from Portugal was essential.

In 1962, these groups came together in Tanzania, where they formed the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Chosen as FRELIMO's president was Eduardo Mondlane, a committed Mozambican nationalist, who at the time was on the faculty of Syracuse University. Under Mondlane, FRELIMO established an administrative structure with political and military wings, and gained the recognition of the Organization of African Unity as the legitimate representative of the Mozambican people. FRELIMO's guerrilla struggle to liberate Mozambique from Portugal began in earnest in 1964.

In its early years, FRELIMO was plagued by internal ethnic, regional, and ideological disputes which led to the assassination of a number of FRELIMO leaders by rival factions within the party. Operating initially from bases in Tanzania, FRELIMO was nevertheless able to carry out an ever-increasing number of guerrilla attacks in the northern provinces of Mozambique where Portuguese control had historically been weakest. In 1969, Eduardo Mondlane was also assassinated—probably by the Portuguese secret police—and the presidency of FRELIMO was ultimately assumed by Samora Machel, who had risen rapidly through the ranks of the guerrilla organization. Under Machel, dissidents were purged, and the party quickly came under the control of those committed to establishing a socialist society in Mozambique.

During the next several years, FRELIMO continued to improve its military position and eventually gained effective control of the northern third of Mozambique. The colonial government's overreaction to the insurgency, and abuse of the civilian population by Portuguese troops during this period, contributed to increasing support for FRELIMO in areas which had previously been indifferent to the liberation struggle. Portuguese soldiers had, in any case, been only half-hearted in their pursuit of victory, and, in 1974, a coup by military reformists in

Lisbon led to an offer of self-determination for Mozambique and other Portuguese overseas territories.

In Mozambique, the colonial government proposed an immediate cease-fire to be followed by a popular referendum to determine the country's future. FRELIMO was invited to participate openly in the democratic process in competition with a number of smaller liberation groups.

FRELIMO, however, insisted on the granting of independence without a referendum. Despite its lack of a political organization in two-thirds of the country, it also demanded Portuguese recognition of FRELIMO as the sole representative of the people and the transfer of all governmental authority directly to FRELIMO. The Portuguese government attempted to negotiate these issues, but FRELIMO remained adamant, Portuguese resolve weakened, and FRELIMO achieved all its demands.

While FRELIMO was generally popular throughout Mozambique for having won the war for independence, it appears there was neither widespread understanding nor support for its political doctrine or economic policy. Smaller liberation groups, concentrated in southern and central Mozambique, voiced their concern at FRELIMO's commitment to establishing a one-party, socialist state. The vast majority of Portuguese, who comprised virtually the entire managerial and technical resource of the country, immediately fled.

The Independence Government

During the nine-month transitional government which preceded complete independence in 1975, FRELIMO made clear its intolerance of dissent, arresting and imprisoning the leadership of all opposition groups. Within a few months after independence, FRELIMO had established its own secret police to replace those of the Portuguese, and had arrested several thousand more purported opponents, most of whom were sent to "re-education" camps. All property was nationalized, the private practice of medicine and law was made illegal, all mission schools were taken over by the state, religious activities were discouraged, and some churches were closed.

The FRELIMO government also abolished the rights of political detainees to *habeas corpus*; citizens were subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, and, throughout the late 1970s, the population imprisoned in the camps at any one time was estimated at up to 10,000 individuals. Prisoners were reliably reported to be routinely bound and flogged, deprived of food, and, in some cases, murdered. Despite President Samora Machel's "Legality Offensive"—launched in 1981 and relaunched in 1984—to curb such abuses, reports indicate that a considerable number of untried detainees continue to be tortured and subjected to cruel and degrading treatment.

Even within FRELIMO, no popular participation in the decision-making process was allowed, and frequent purges of party ranks prevented the rise of rivals to challenge the leadership of the elite group that had controlled the party since Mondlane's death in 1969. With excessive reliance on ideology, FRELIMO instituted many policies that were predictably misguided, unpopular, and economically disastrous. Socialization of the agricultural sector, followed by heavy emphasis on state farms and neglect of cooperatives, for example, contributed to a significant decline in both subsistence and cash-crop production.

An Insurgency Established

In addition to its commitment to establishing a society guided by the principles of "scientific socialism," the FRELIMO government was firmly pledged at independence to engage actively in eliminating white-minority regimes in southern Africa. Toward this end, FRELIMO began in 1975 to provide a haven and launching point for guerrilla operations against Ian Smith's white-minority government in Southern Rhodesia.

The Smith government, together with Portuguese ex-colonialists and others who had fled the FRELIMO regime, responded by establishing and supplying a group of Mozambicans to gather intelligence on the anti-Smith guerrilla operations. They also established a clandestine radio station aimed at creating disaffection among the rural populace for FRELIMO's socialist policies. Given the havoc these policies were wreaking on the economy, the task did not prove particularly difficult, and, before long, what had started as an intelligence and propaganda operation had blossomed into a nascent insurgency that proclaimed itself the Mozambican National Resistance (commonly known by its Portuguese acronym, RENAMO). The insurgency grew gradually during the next several years, as the FRELIMO government continued to alienate some of its citizenry by heavy-handedly applying its Marxist policies.

After the British-brokered election process was completed in 1980, however, minority-ruled Southern Rhodesia became majority-ruled Zimbabwe, and RENAMO lost its source of essential outside support. Also, President Machel was coming slowly to recognize some of his government's failings. His increasing pragmatism resulted in the evolution of a more popular mixed economy of state, collective, and private sectors, and he moved forcefully to improve relations with the West.

For many in Mozambique, however, the government's new emphasis on private farming came too late, as poor rains and mismanagement continued to restrict growth in the rural areas. With backing from South Africa, the insurgency was revived, and, as drought helped to cripple the rural economy, peasants were more easily recruited. By mid-1985, RENAMO had become active in all ten provinces of Mozambique, and its strength had grown to about 14,000 combatants.

Using classic guerrilla tactics—striking at economic targets and sowing insecurity among the civilian population—RENAMO has scored major military gains. The government has demonstrated that—with the help of Zimbabwean troops, and Soviet and Cuban technicians and advisers—it can mount effective attacks against guerrilla strongholds. But, in the absence of specific coordinated offensives, the insurgents are free to operate throughout much of the countryside.

Close to four million civilians have been displaced or seriously affected within Mozambique, including about one million who were initially displaced by drought in 1983 and 1984, but who have been unable to return to their villages because of the prevailing security situation. Most of the displaced villagers have been relocated to areas under government control near the cities and larger towns. They have been forced to abandon their homes and their farms, and are now almost wholly dependent for their survival on food rations distributed through government and international relief agencies. The gap between domestic production and total food requirements, however, greatly exceeds the amount of

food available from donor agencies, and constant interdiction of supply routes by guerrilla forces has severely curtailed distributions.

Malnutrition and its related diseases are common, and famine threatens large areas of the country. Most severely affected are the areas immediately north and south of the Zambezi River—the provinces of Zambezia, Sofala, and Tete—where RENAMO threatens to cut the country in two, and the provinces of Gaza and Inhambane, north of Maputo, where there have already been reports of isolated cases of starvation.

The government's administrative and development activities are also restricted almost entirely to the immediate environs of the cities and larger towns. Indeed, the FRELIMO government is utterly dependent on military support from the Soviet Union to maintain its hold even on these limited areas.

In seeking to gain diplomatic recognition and international support, RENAMO has been much less successful—although it has made concerted efforts in this regard in recent months—due to its largely negative image among African and Western leaders. The nominal leader of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, for example, is widely perceived as an agent of Portuguese colonialist and South African interests, and the organization has presented no political program which might justify its existence.

Whatever the merits of the case against RENAMO, the guerrilla movement clearly does receive material, logistic, and technical support from South Africa in violation of the Nkomati Accord, signed by South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984. Under the terms of that compact, Mozambique agreed to stop providing a sanctuary for guerrillas of the African National Congress, and South Africa agreed to stop supporting RENAMO.

Also, unlike the guerrilla campaign against the Portuguese—during which FRELIMO sought only to disrupt economic activity and was selective in targeting civilians—RENAMO has often completely destroyed productive economic infrastructure and has been generally indiscriminate in its attacks on the civilian population.

RENAMO's attacks on the important economic links—the railways and the oil pipeline—between Mozambique's ports on the Indian Ocean and the landlocked nations of Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi have increased the dependence of each of these nations on South Africa, their primary alternative access to the sea. And, while there is undoubtedly widespread disenchantment with FRELIMO's rule in Mozambique, it is largely RENAMO's wanton slaying and brutalization of the civilian population that have forced hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans to seek refuge in neighboring countries.

Fragile Asylum

That refugees from Mozambique are fleeing a chaotic and life-threatening situation is not disputed. That they are almost invariably welcomed in their countries of asylum by distant relatives, or by those with whom they share ethnic affinities or clan ties, is also beyond question. Yet, the governments of the asylum countries have been reluctant to recognize the plight of the Mozambican refugees. Only when faced with an overwhelming refugee presence—and following the persistent promptings of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—have most of these governments begun to respond in accordance with interna-

tionally accepted standards of support and protection. Indeed, in each of the nations of asylum, Mozambican refugees continue to face severe hardships that have yet to be addressed.

SOUTH AFRICA Despite its opposition to white-minority rule in Africa, the FRELIMO government, since independence, has maintained the profitable migrant labor arrangements originally established with South Africa by the Portuguese colonial authorities. Migratory flows to South Africa have thus continued virtually uninterrupted for more than a century.

Since 1984, however, the traditional attraction of wage labor in South Africa has been overtaken by the life-threatening situation in Mozambique, and the 68,000 Mozambicans legally working in South Africa have been joined by some 160,000 to 220,000 others who entered without documentation, seeking refuge, as well as economic opportunity, there. Although there are important differences in their treatment in the various nations of asylum, the flight of Mozambican refugees along traditional migratory routes to South Africa is, in many ways, illustrative of their escape to countries throughout the region.

In keeping with established migratory patterns, Mozambican refugees in South Africa have not settled along the border—as they have in other neighboring countries—but have moved further inland, to the black African "homelands" of Gazankulu, KaNgawane, Lebowa, and KwaZulu, and to the industrial, mining, and agricultural areas around Johannesburg.

In contrast to late-1985 and early-1986, when many thousands of Mozambicans fled into these areas each month, the flow of refugees into South Africa decreased in late-1986 to about 500 monthly, as both RENAMO and government forces gained greater control over the populations in their areas of operation. But, the intense ordeal that these refugees endure in order to reach the relative sanctuary of South Africa provides some indication of the magnitude of the horrors they have fled.

Typically, in order to leave Mozambique, the refugees must flee their villages in small groups, and in the dead of night, to avoid detection by the government army or insurgent troops. Both forces are displeased at the prospect of villagers escaping their "protection," and invariably express their displeasure in violent ways, brutally beating and sometimes killing would-be escapees.

Usually travelling by night and hiding by day, the villagers reach the border in three days to a week. Arriving there hungry and exhausted, they still face their worst obstacles.

On the Mozambican side of the border are terrifying minefields. Soviet-made "jumping-jacks"—spring-loaded anti-personnel mines that can literally cut a person in two at the waist—have been laid by the Mozambican government to deter incursions from South Africa and to stem the tide of runaways. Bleached skeletons along the border bear silent testimony to the threat these mines present.

Beyond the minefields, South African Border Police and Defense Forces patrol rows of ten-foot high security fences, erected by the South African authorities to stop the refugee influx. Since August 1986, sixteen miles of the security fence have been charged with potentially lethal doses of electricity. The South Africans have posted signs to this effect, but virtually all of the refugees are illiterate, and, during August, at least two refugees are reported to have died as a result of

electrocution. If the refugees are able to negotiate their way through the minefields, to skirt the electrified fence, and to scale or crawl through the remainder of the fence undetected, they are still only half-way to safety.

Once in South Africa, the Mozambicans must cross Kruger National Park, southern Africa's largest game reserve, avoiding detection by park rangers and additional South African Defense Force personnel, and the possibility of attacks by savage animals. If caught, the refugees are handed over to Mozambican authorities at Komatipoort and repatriated to Mozambique in accordance with an agreement between the South African and Mozambican governments.

During the height of the exodus, in 1985, approximately 1,500 refugees were captured at the border and in the park each month, and were forcibly returned to Mozambique. Now that figure is estimated at 300 to 400 monthly. Also, some refugees, often children, have been attacked and killed by wild animals before they could complete their trek across the park.

Once inside South Africa, the women, children, and elderly refugees make their way to one of the black "homelands" established by the South African government as part of its effort to perpetuate apartheid. These are barren, impoverished wastelands, but the refugees have family or clan ties with the homeland residents, and they know they will find welcome there. Between September 1984 and February 1986, an estimated 45,000 refugees arrived in this manner in Gazankulu, about 25,000 in KaNgwane, and about 5,000 each in Lebowa and KwaZulu.

According to doctors working in the homelands, refugees continue to arrive in these areas in deplorable physical condition, near starvation and suffering from exhaustion and dehydration. The flesh on their feet has been torn by rocks and brush, and their legs are swollen from the arduous trek. Many suffer from malaria, tuberculosis, and skin infections. Children typically have bronchial infections and gastro-intestinal diseases; many show the effects of malnutrition. But most difficult to treat, say the doctors, is the psychological depression that most refugees are suffering as a result of their experiences in Mozambique and during their escape.

South Africa has no legal or organizational mechanism for determining refugee status or ministering to refugee needs, and the government initially regarded these refugees as illegal immigrants, subject to deportation. Following strong representations from the homeland authorities of Gazankulu, however, the government agreed to treat the refugees within that homeland as "visitors", and sought to regularize their status through a registration exercise. In the other homelands, no formal policy regarding the refugees has been announced. Understandably suspicious of the government's motives, and fearful of being repatriated to Mozambique, the great majority of refugees have refused to register, and so remain in a kind of limbo.

At the request of the government, the International Committee of the Red Cross was, until its expulsion from South Africa in October 1986, providing emergency assistance in proportion to the numbers who had registered their presence (about one-third of the total). This has been supplemented by contributions from local church and community groups, and by the activities of organizations such as World Vision and Operation Hunger, a South African voluntary relief organization. Also, some women have been able to obtain employment—though illegally and at meager wages—making bricks or working as domestics.

Through a combination of such self-help measures and international assistance, and nurtured by a prevailing spirit of sharing among themselves and their hosts, the refugees in the homelands are eking out a bare existence.

The expulsion of the International Committee of the Red Cross delegation from South Africa, however, has eliminated this important source of material assistance and international protection for these refugees. The burden of assisting them is now further depressing the already low living standards of the indigenous populations.

Able-bodied male refugees generally by-pass the homelands and make their way directly to the agricultural, industrial, and mining areas around Johannesburg. Here they have friends or relatives among the Mozambicans legally employed in South Africa.

Some of the refugees have purchased false papers and pose as legal immigrants, while others simply use their contacts—or trade on the southern Mozambicans' reputation for industriousness—to obtain illegal employment, albeit at lower wages, in the mines, the factories, or on the large estates of farmers in the area. The South African government estimates that there are approximately 160,000 Mozambicans working illegally in the country.

As the West moves toward applying stricter sanctions against South Africa for its failure to move more rapidly away from its apartheid policy, the plight of these refugees has become of particular concern. The South African authorities have already indicated that they will not only forcibly repatriate illegal workers when sanctions are invoked, but have even raised the prospect of repatriating refugees from the homelands under such conditions.

The future of Mozambicans in South Africa is further complicated by the accusations exchanged between the Mozambican and South African governments. Maputo charges that some Mozambicans are receiving guerrilla training from the South African Defense Force, to be infiltrated back into Mozambique as insurgents. Pretoria countered, in October 1986, that Mozambique is once again providing a sanctuary for guerrillas of the African National Congress operating in South Africa. In retaliation, the South African government stated it would not renew the work permits of the 68,000 Mozambicans legally working in South Africa.

Close observers of the southern Africa situation acknowledge that there is probably some basis for both countries' allegations. In any case, except for registered migrant workers, male Mozambicans repatriated from South Africa would undoubtedly be regarded with great suspicion by the Mozambican authorities. They would likely be subject to intense interrogation followed, at best, by conscription or incarceration in a "re-education" camp.

SWAZILAND In 1980, when only a small number of Mozambican political refugees had sought asylum in Swaziland, the Swazi authorities yielded to Mozambican pressure and applied to these refugees a previous agreement with the Mozambican government requiring repatriation of illegal immigrants. As a result, and in violation of United Nations protocols and the Organization of African Unity

convention on refugees, 68 individuals were forcibly repatriated to Mozambique, where they met an uncertain fate. More recently, refugees entering Swaziland from Mozambique have been fleeing civil strife in general, rather than the Mozambican regime in particular, and the agreement has not again been invoked.

Mozambicans now in Swaziland, most of whom have entered during the past two years, total about 4,500, a relatively small number when compared to those fleeing to other nations in southern Africa. But Swaziland is also host to about 7,000 ethnic Swazi refugees from South Africa, and, to this tiny land-locked country, these numbers already represent a considerable burden. By overcrowding the existing refugee settlement for South Africans, the Mozambican influx has disrupted the government's program to help the South African refugees achieve self-sufficiency and has increased pressure on already scarce natural resources.

Nevertheless, the Swazi authorities, with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Lutheran World Federation, are now attempting to deal humanely with the Mozambicans. The Swazi government has accorded the refugees temporary asylum, is providing education for their children, and is assisting them to establish small farmsteads where they will eventually be able to produce much of their own food.

To attain full self-sufficiency, however, the Mozambican refugees will ultimately require additional land to cultivate. For now, they depend largely on the food rations distributed by the Lutheran organization. The severe limits on the amount of arable land in Swaziland have raised the concern of the Swazi authorities and international organizations as to what will happen if the flows of refugees from Mozambique continue or increase.

ZIMBABWE Mozambique's closest political ties in southern Africa are with the government of Zimbabwe, a nation that achieved majority-rule in 1980 with the assistance of the present Mozambican regime, and that today has 12,000 soldiers in Mozambique to help that government contain the RENAMO insurgency.

Substantial numbers of refugees began flowing into Zimbabwe from central Mozambique in 1983, and, for the most part, spontaneously settled along the border where many had relatives among the existing population or shared clan ties with them. Reluctant to acknowledge that the Mozambican government was unable to provide security for these refugees, and concerned that their presence along the border might be used to mask insurgent activity against Mozambique, the Zimbabwe government reportedly forced some of the early arrivals back into Mozambique. As the influx continued, however, the government acknowledged the inevitable and agreed that UNHCR should establish camps for the refugees away from the border region.

In 1984, UNHCR established four camps for the exiles, but, by the end of that year, only 12,187 of the then-estimated 45,000 Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe had moved into them. By mid-1986, the camp populations had doubled, but the increase was attributed largely to new influxes from Mozambique, and the total Mozambican refugee population in Zimbabwe had grown to almost 70,000. The majority of these continue to live in scattered locations along the border.

Although only those refugees residing in the camps are receiving direct assistance through UNHCR, a number of private, voluntary organizations—including Save the Children Federation (U.S.) and World Vision—have been encouraged by the government to expand their activities in villages along the border, thus providing indirect developmental assistance to refugees in those communities. Also, the relatively sophisticated Zimbabwean social service system has been assisting needy persons in the area without questioning their national origin. In these ways, the government of Zimbabwe, while not having to acknowledge the magnitude of the influx, has been generally able to ensure that the material needs of Mozambican refugees are basically met.

Significantly, however, the government of Zimbabwe has not yet officially accorded asylum to refugees from Mozambique, and these refugees are therefore without the legal status essential to their protection. There continue to be isolated reports of refugees in Zimbabwe being forcibly repatriated to Mozambique.

ZAMBIA Estimates of Mozambican refugees in Zambia range from 25,000 to 40,000, most of whom arrived in 1985 and early 1986, settling along the border in Eastern Province, one of the most remote regions of Zambia.

The remoteness of the refugees and the fact that they were often sheltered by Zambian relatives and clansmen allowed the government of Zambia generally to ignore their presence until UNHCR drew attention to their situation. By mid-1986, the government had agreed to establish with UNHCR a refugee camp at Msanzara, some distance from the border, and had requested the assistance of several voluntary agencies in meeting the needs of the refugees until the camp could be completed. Tents for those in need of shelter, as well as cooking utensils and blankets, have been distributed to refugees along the border.

Once ready, it is expected that residency in the camp will be required for any further assistance and, perhaps, simply to remain in the country. Reports from the field, however, indicate that most of the refugees are reluctant to move away from the border area where they are among their own people, are able to return periodically to tend their fields in Mozambique, and, at least for the moment, are out of harm's way. As in Zimbabwe, the government of Zambia has not officially accorded asylum to refugees from Mozambique, and there have been reports of some refugees being repatriated to Mozambique against their will.

MALAWI Between mid-1985 and late-1986, estimates of the Mozambican refugee population in Malawi have fluctuated between 20,000 and 50,000, with refugees crossing and re-crossing the border as hostilities between the Mozambican government and rebel forces dictated. Despite their ethnic ties with border peoples in Malawi and their generally short periods of refuge, the con-

stant disruption of the lives of these refugees has had significant deleterious effects on their economic, physical, and psychological well-being. In October 1986, this ebb and flow became of even greater concern, as the numbers of refugees increased dramatically to more than 100,000, and as the government of Mozambique repeatedly accused Malawi of providing a haven for Mozambican insurgents and of possibly even providing them material and logistic support.

Malawi has consistently denied the charges, but many observers remain doubtful of its intentions. The conservative government of Malawi, alone among southern Africa's independent nations, maintains full diplomatic relations with South Africa, and is not among the "front-line" states of southern Africa, whose leaders have outwardly maintained common policies in opposition to white-minority ruled states and territories in the region. Border crossings in both directions by uniformed anti-Maputo insurgents, most recently involving several thousand guerrillas moving into Mozambique in early October, have been reported.

There is no permanent UNHCR presence in the country, and the government of Malawi has not yet allowed UNHCR officials into the border area to assess the needs of the refugees.

Several hundred of the refugees have fled the border area to the Malawian cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe, where they are receiving assistance through UN agencies. For the near future, the remaining tens of thousands of Mozambican refugees are expected to stay in the border region. However, a recent threat by the government of Mozambique to close the border "with a chain of missiles"—and South Africa's allegation in November 1986 that Mozambique and Zimbabwe were, prior to President Machel's death, planning hostile actions against Malawi—raises the very real prospect that these refugees may find not only that their

revolving door to asylum is no longer open to them, but also that their lives are imperiled by new, even less predictable, assaults.

Prospects for Peace

While it is doubtful that RENAMO possesses any widespread political support within Mozambique, its military forces have established themselves to such an extent that the government has little hope of defeating them in the foreseeable future without very substantial military assistance from outside Mozambique.

President Samora Machel had been unable to regard RENAMO as anything more than a surrogate for Pretoria, intent on destroying the economy of Mozambique in order to increase its dependency—and that of its majority-ruled neighbors—on South Africa. That view of RENAMO is widely shared in southern Africa, and, with the probable exception of Malawi, RENAMO is without friends in the capitals of Mozambique's majority-ruled neighbors. If Machel was aware of any substantial legitimate opposition to FRELIMO's Marxist rule—and even this is doubtful—he clearly did not recognize Dhlakama's RENAMO as representative of genuine political disaffection.

To Machel, the real opposition was the Pretoria regime, with which he had already reached an agreement—the Nkomati Accord of 1984—that South Africa has repeatedly violated. From Machel's point of view, peace in Mozambique could only be achieved by a transition to majority rule in South Africa. This, he suggested, was possible within ten years, and he claimed his FRELIMO government was prepared to contain the insurgency for that long.

Machel's successor, former Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano, is, like Machel, regarded as a pragmatist, and has suggested he will continue the economic and political reforms initiated by Machel in recent years. Indeed, many of these reforms were originally proposed to Machel by Chissano, and continued improvements in Mozambique's relations with the West are, therefore, quite probable. In respect to RENAMO, however, Chissano is unlikely to accord them political legitimacy by entering into peace negotiations.

Anxious to acquire political stature, RENAMO is therefore likely to focus its diplomatic efforts on obtaining the recognition of opposition groups within neighboring countries and support from the West. Particular efforts in this regard are already underway in the United States, where RENAMO is attempting to draw parallels between itself and the UNITA forces of Jonas Savimbi, which are receiving U.S. assistance in their attempt to overthrow the Marxist government in Angola. Lacking a political program, however, and burdened by a reputation for brutality, it is extremely doubtful that RENAMO will be able to obtain diplomatic backing from Western quarters.

Recognizing the improbability of a political solution, both RENAMO and the government of Mozambique may attempt to widen the war. RENAMO has already suggested it will carry its guerrilla campaign into the cities of Mozambique and into Zimbabwe, and there have been credible reports that the Mozambican government is considering attacking RENAMO bases in Malawi. There are also indications that South Africa may carry out military strikes in Mozambique.

The apparent strategies of FRELIMO and RENAMO are both long-term in nature, and the military support they receive—from the Soviet Union and South Africa, respectively—is unlikely to cease in the foreseeable future. Thus, the prospects for peace in Mozambique, at least for the moment, are discouragingly dim, while there are very real prospects for a widening war and a substantial escalation of violence.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Within Mozambique, millions of civilians find themselves in an extremely perilous situation, as conflict in that country continues to escalate and brutalities are inflicted upon them. Hundreds of thousands who have managed to escape to neighboring countries, often under the most arduous and terrifying circumstances, have only a tenuous grasp on a fragile asylum.

In South Africa and Malawi, in particular—but also in Zimbabwe and Zambia—the refugees from Mozambique are in urgent need of international protection. Unless and until international protocols are applied to these refugees, they must live in constant fear of being cast back into the fray they risked their lives to escape.

The conflict in Mozambique also has serious regional implications; for, in the absence of conflict, Mozambique's three major ports—linked by rail to each of its eastern neighbors—offer the opportunity for the landlocked nations of Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa. While the prospects for reconciliation are unfortunately few, the stakes are enormous. Peace in Mozambique is vital, not only for the sake of the people of that long-suffering nation, but also in the interest of social and economic growth throughout the region.

While massive political and armed conflicts convulse the region, the world community must not ignore the humanitarian needs of the hundreds of thousands—even millions—of displaced persons and refugees who are caught in the crossfire. In the hope of improving protection and assistance for these civilian victims, the U.S. Committee for Refugees makes the following recommendations:

1) The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with full diplomatic support from the international community, should heighten its presence in the region, in particular making every effort to: a) establish a formal presence in Malawi; b) obtain from the governments of Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi declarations of asylum with respect to Mozambican refugees in their respective countries; and c) formulate appropriate plans to move refugees away from the border areas in these countries as their security situations, and those of the asylum countries, warrant. More permanent settlements, where refugees can attain a measure of self-sufficiency, should be established in each country of asylum.

In recent months, the major flows of refugees from Mozambique have been into Malawi, as FRELIMO and RENAMO forces have been launching major military offensives in the Mozambique-Malawi border area.

Malawi's refusal to allow UNHCR officials into its border areas is particularly worrisome, and further calls into question that government's attitude toward these refugees and its role in the conflict in Mozambique. UNHCR's mandate is to protect refugees in this situation, but it cannot hope to do this without an official presence in the asylum countries and without forceful and coordinated support from the international community—in this case, from Malawi's major trading partners: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Japan.

The failure of the governments of Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe to issue formal declarations of asylum for refugees from Mozambique suggests an unwillingness to acknowledge openly and live up to their obligations under the United Nations and Organization of African Unity conventions on refugees. By this failure, these governments are subjecting refugees in their countries to additional anguish, and to continuing uncertainty and fear.

In all of their nations of asylum but Swaziland, the refugees from Mozambique have been able to rely for initial consolation, shelter, and sustenance on networks of relatives and clan members, networks established and reinforced by previous migrations and by arbitrarily drawn national boundaries.

The presence of family and tribal structures in the countries of asylum, however, also tended at first to mask the magnitude of the refugee flows from Mozambique and to encourage the spontaneous settlement of refugees in border areas. Now, with the threat of a widening war, the very presence of these refugees along international borders is likely to create legitimate security concerns, not only to the host country governments, but to the government of Mozambique, as well.

It must also be recognized that the prospects for a resolution of the crisis in Mozambique are not encouraging, and that, in all likelihood, the refugees will be forced to remain in exile for a number of years.

2) The South African government should immediately de-activate the electrified portion of its border security fence and cease the forced repatriation of Mozambican refugees, regardless of where in South Africa they may be apprehended. South Africa's compliance with international norms of refugee protection should be monitored by UNHCR.

The problems associated with large numbers of black refugees seeking asylum in the Republic of South Africa are especially complex due to South Africa's anomalous status in the region. In some respects, Mozambican refugees residing in the South African homelands are being treated in a manner not unlike those in neighboring majority-ruled states, inadequate as that has generally been. At the same time, South Africa's forced repatriation of large numbers of refugees apprehended before reaching the homelands and its electrification of a portion of its border security fence are callous and intolerable acts, graphically symbolic of the worst violations of internationally accepted refugee protection standards.

Despite its status of pariah in Africa and elsewhere, South Africa must be made aware that it will be held to account by the international community for violations of accepted standards of refugee protection. As a member of the United Nations, South Africa remains at least morally obliged to apply to refugees United Nations standards of protection, and its performance in this respect should be monitored

by the appropriate United Nations agency. To that end, UNHCR should be invited to establish a presence there.

3) The South African government should regularize the status of all Mozambicans in South Africa, formally recognizing that those in the homelands, and those working illegally elsewhere in the country, are in a genuine refugee situation. The government should further grant them the most generous form of temporary residence under applicable South African law, and accord them the right to seek employment.

It must be recognized that South Africa, by supporting the insurgency in Mozambique, is, to a significant degree, responsible for creating the influxes of refugees into its own and into neighboring territories. Mozambique's charge that South Africa is training some of the refugees as guerrillas further complicates the situation and may signal that many of the estimated 160,000 Mozambicans illegally working in South Africa cannot return to Mozambique without potentially dire consequences. Thus, these workers will be at risk if forcibly repatriated to Mozambique.

4) The Western media, donor governments, and international organizations should pay considerably more attention to events and issues which affect human rights and precipitate humanitarian emergencies throughout the southern African region.

The problems which plague southern Africa—refugees, apartheid, civil wars, hunger, and oppressive regimes—are interrelated issues, each has important regional aspects, and none is amenable to solutions which ignore the related problems or which focus entirely on any single country. Yet, there has been little recognition of this reality in the public debate on these matters.

While no abuses of human rights by majority-ruled nations in southern Africa can rationalize or justify the evils of apartheid, the legitimacy of the struggle against that system should not be allowed to obscure the other major humanitarian issues in the region. It should be recognized that disregard for the principles of refugee asylum, for example, or the denial by governments of the basic rights of their citizens, is unacceptable regardless of the identity of the culpable state.

The Western press has a duty to investigate and report more fully on such issues throughout southern Africa, while major Western donors, in particular, must act in an aggressive and in a more coordinated manner to promote basic human rights there.

Equally important, donors, international agencies, and nongovernmental organizations—while responding to current humanitarian tragedies in the region—should also prudently commit resources toward establishing regional capacities to deal with potential future humanitarian emergencies. Realistic planning and preparation now could save many thousands of lives in the future.

• • •

The political and armed conflicts that pervade southern Africa mirror a web of synergistic relationships that inextricably bind together all nations in the region, including South Africa. Unfortunately, these conflicts will almost inevitably intensify in the near future, and there is no question that justice in the region is the prerequisite for peace on the broad scale. But saving the lives of the innocent—one by one—must become a clearer priority. Displaced persons in the shattered nation of Mozambique and Mozambican refugees in fragile asylum deserve such consideration.

AFRICAN CONCORD MAGAZINE, 16 January 1986

OPEN SPACE

Mozambique

Crisis of Political Legitimacy

When FRELIMO came to power in Mozambique in 1974, it had the support of the majority of the Mozambican population, thus enjoying a high degree of political legitimacy.

However, that legitimacy seems to have decreased in the last six years. Two major reasons explain the decline: (1) the nature of FRELIMO's leadership and its ideology; and (2) the mismanagement of the Mozambican economy. FRELIMO's leadership is dominated by individuals who do not have their roots in Mozambique, but in Portugal, and India/Goa; other members of the leadership are *mesticos* (individuals of mixed blood). All these Portuguese, Indians and *mesticos* share one thing: the attitude and the behaviour of the Portuguese of the colonial era.

Pass Cards

How did this group come to power? In the late 1950's and early 1960's a group of white Portuguese, Indians, and *mesticos*, who were dissatisfied with the Portuguese regime of premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, left Portugal. These exiles stayed in several European countries and finally settled in Algeria. They had special links with the Communist party in Portugal, as well as with the Soviet Union. This may explain why the group espoused a 'Marxist-Leninist' ideology. Their avowed aim was the overthrow of the Salazar's regime, not only in Portugal, but also in the colonies. To this end they divided themselves and concentrated on their various regional interests for political/military action. The Mozambique coterie was led and controlled by Marcelino dos Santos, a *mesticos* of Cape Verdean descent, and Aquino de Braganca, an Indian/Goan.

In the early 1960's these 'Marxists' joined the Mozambican black nationalist movements: Mozambican African Nationalist Union (Manu), Democratic National Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), and African Union for Independent Mozambique (UNAMI). The years 1965 to 1970 were characterized by internal power struggles between the Marxists and the nationalists. By 1970 the Marxists had succeeded in controlling FRELIMO, after the assassinations of prominent black nationalists, among them, Dr Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of FRELIMO; Filipe Samuel Magaia, the first commander-in-chief of the FRELIMO army; Silverio Nungu, the secretary of the interior; and Jaime Rivaz Sigauke, a secretary for organizing the Mozambican interior.

When FRELIMO came to power in Mozambique, the Mozambican population was not aware that it was going to be led by a Marxist faction, which had a predominantly non-black leadership. Once in power, the marxists became bold in articulating their ideology and openly recruited many non-blacks to top civil service and political positions. Today more than 60 per cent of the Mozambican cabinet is controlled by non-blacks.

"Hence, most of FRELIMO decision-makers have no genuine link with the majority of the Mozambican population. MOre deplorably, their political outlook is remarkably similar to that of the Portuguese colonial government."

FRELIMO has reintroduced corporal punishment, including the most hated *palmatoria;* it coerces peasants to work on the state farms, a practice of forced labour inherited from the colonialist period. The pass card system, another old colonial holdover, to control the movements of blacks inside Mozambique, has been perpetuated in independent Mozambique.

Ill-fated Policies

Mozambicans' political and social problems have been exacerbated by the famine that has devastated the country in the past few years. From 1981 to 1984 it is estimated that between 70,000 and 100,000 people died. Yet FRELIMO's response to this grim situation has been indefensible. Many rural survivors tried to reach the cities, where some food aid was arriving from foreign donors. FRELIMO has been forcing these people back to the drought ravished area under its program known as "Operation Production." FRELIMO will have a lot to answer for in any assessment of the management of the famine crisis. The *cooperantes,* foreign technicians sympathetic to FRELIMO, are quick to blame Mozambique's plight on drought and flood. Not wanting to lose the privilege of staying in Mozambique, they play down the human factor, that is FRELIMO's mismanagement. They assiduously avoid criticizing FRELIMO.

One study of the economic situation in Mozambique showed that agricultural production dropped by 75 per cent in some provinces, the first year (1974/75) that FRELIMO was in charge. In Manica and Sofala, for instance, potato production fell from 15,000 tons in 1974 to 3,000 in 1975; onion production from 41,000 tons to 7,000; and citrus production from 265,000 boxes to 11,000. Since around 70 per cent of Mozambican foreign exchange comes from agriculture, a sharp drop in agricultural production dramatically affects total exports. In fact this decline was so severe that it forced Mozambique to default in 1983. Salary checks for foreign technicians bounced, as some Western bankers decided to deny credit to Mozambique.

Many people, particularly those with much needed skills, have been compelled to leave the country, thrown in jail or sent to re-education camps. Although it is difficult to know the exact figures, by 1982, Jorge Costa, FRELIMO's former director of secret police, acknowledged the existence of 14 to 20 camps collectively interring up to 64,000 inmates. The vast majority of Portuguese in Mozambique left immediately after independence — about 230,000 out of 250,000. There were a few black university-trained Mozambicans abroad at the time of independence. For example, in the United States of America, there were at least 70. Few of them are inclined to return to Mozambique given the prevailing political climate. While FRELIMO's short sighted policies discourage skilled persons from returning or staying, the need for them at home is growing. The 20,000 Portuguese who remained in Mozambique after the big exodus have had little impact on the development of the crucial agricultural sector, since 12,000 of them are living in the city of Maputo alone.

After a decade in Power, FRELIMO's political legitimacy may be called into question. The leadership has lost touch with the majority of the Mozambican populace. Some of the most retrogressive and hated colonial practices are being reintroduced. The economy has been virtually destroyed. Mozambicans from all over the country, disaffected with FRELIMO, are joining RENAMO. The growing strength of RENAMO is a symptom, not a cause, of Mozambique's ills. Through its own ineffectual management, inhumane policies and unenlightened leadership, FRELIMO is sowing the seeds of its eventual downfall and destruction.

Luis Benjamin Serapiao

Professor Serapiao is Associate Professor of African and International Studies at Howard University in Washington, D.C. He is also RENAMO's Representative for the United States and Canada.

THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 1987 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 17

EDITORIAL

"First the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear."

LETTERS

Mozambique's rebels

I was appalled by the rationale employed by Robert I. Rotberg in his opinion-page column "Why Mozambique's rebels merit no US support," June 2.

Mr. Rotberg makes no mention of the concentration camps, torture, and state-manipulated starvation practiced by the communist regime in Mozambique. Neither does he seem concerned about the 30,000 foreign troops, including 15,000 Zimbabwean mercenaries inside the country, who are committing wide-scale atrocities against the civilian population in their bid to annex central Mozambique, which they call "Mozambabwe." Mr. Rotberg labels the anti-communist resistance, Renamo, "non-legitimate."

Yet curiously, he ascribes political legitimacy to an unelected regime of a Leninist dictator whose only hope of survival is the strange combination of East-bloc military intervention and Western economic support.

For too long, the Mozambican people have suffered from foreign intervention.

Political legitimacy, the key to Mozambique's future, must be decided among Mozambicans themselves.

Luis B. Serapiao
Renamo
Rep. to the US
Washington

British Economist Human Rights Report
1986

Mozambique

Human rights rating: 25%

Population: 13,413,000
Life expectancy: 51
Infant mortality (0–1 year)
per 1,000 births: 109
Form of government: Marxist one-party state
United Nations covenants:
ratified or signed – None.

Income per head: US$120 (1982)
% of GNP spent on military: n/a
% of GNP spent by state on health: n/a
% of GNP spent by state on education: n/a



FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN RIGHTS

The country was granted independence in 1975 following the withdrawal of the Portuguese after a 500-year presence. The people, however, have remained subordinate to the aims and ideals of the Marxist Frelimo governing party. Two threats have deflected the government from its course. First there is the rebel activities of the right-wing National Resistance Movement, which lead to atrocities by both sides and, second, the need to reach an agreement with neighbouring South Africa to reduce the number of troops committed to that frontier and to encourage much needed aid and trade with that country.

FREEDOM TO:		COMMENTS:
1 Travel in own country	no	Permits needed for internal travel and the many security checks because of armed rebels. Estimated 10,000 Zimbabwean troops cooperating with government in counter-insurgency operations in frontier areas
2 Travel outside own country	no	Exit permits and passports only for approved purposes
3 Peacefully associate and assemble	NO	Only when the purpose is favourable to the state
4 Teach ideas and receive information	NO	Only pro-Frelimo teachings at universities, where there is much student unrest. Sentences of 8 years' prison plus 45 lashes for insulting government
5 Monitor human rights violations	no	Attempts to monitor by international bodies have been opposed by government
6 Publish and educate in ethnic language	YES	Rights respected

FREEDOM FROM:		COMMENTS:
7 Serfdom, slavery, forced or child labour	no	Forcible conscription and population transfers to different regions. Operation recently terminated

FREEDOM FROM:		COMMENTS:
8 Extrajudicial killings or 'disappearances'	NO	Many killings are the result of over-zealous military operations against rebel units and areas
9 Torture or coercion by the state	NO	Usually during interrogation of captured or suspected rebels
10 Compulsory work permits or conscription of labour	NO	Conscription of civilians for national projects as well as for military forces
11 Capital punishment by the state	NO	Firing squad. For crimes against the state, murder, economic crimes, etc. Until recently many executions in public
12 Court sentences of corporal punishment	no	Floggings for many offences. Maximum 90 lashes. For armed assaults, rape, black market activities, etc
13 Indefinite detention without charge	NO	For criticising government, suspicion of subversion, major economic crimes. Many detainees have 'disappeared'. Some amnesties in 1984
14 Compulsory membership of state organisations or parties	no	Joining the governing party is a necessary step towards self-advancement
15 Compulsory religion or state ideology in schools	NO	Marxism-Leninism a compulsory school subject
16 Deliberate state policies to control artistic works	no	'Art must serve the people' limits artistic freedom and essential state support
17 Political censorship of press	NO	All government owned. Journalists are state employees
18 Censorship of mail or telephone-tapping	NO	Wide surveillance of all communications to and from abroad

FREEDOM FOR OR RIGHTS TO:		COMMENTS:
19 Peaceful political opposition	NO	Nothing that conflicts with Frelimo policies
20 Multi-party elections by secret and universal ballot	NO	One-party state. An elected national assembly of 210 Frelimo candidates sits as a compliant legislature
21 Political and legal equality for women	no	Despite the ideals of the Marxist party, women hold only a few senior government posts
22 Social and economic equality for women	no	Traditional and tribal roles and customs persist. The overwhelmingly agricultural economy is worked mainly by women manual labourers
23 Social and economic equality for ethnic minorities	YES	Rights respected
24 Independent newspapers	NO	State owned and controlled. 2 daily papers and 1 weekly
25 Independent book publishing	NO	State owned and controlled

FREEDOM FOR OR RIGHTS TO:		COMMENTS:
26 Independent radio and television networks	NO	State owned and controlled
27 All courts to total independence	no	System inefficient due to lack of qualified judges and lawyers. Military tribunals have power to take over all serious cases
28 Independent trade unions	NO	Newly-formed organisation controlled by Frelimo

LEGAL RIGHTS:		COMMENTS:
29 From deprivation of nationality	YES	Rights respected
30 To be considered innocent until proved guilty	no	The continuing civil war and social instability make such assumptions unlikely
31 To free legal aid when necessary and counsel of own choice		Private law practice prohibited in 1975. Means test for accused. May choose counsel from a panel
32 From civilian trials in secret	NO	Political suspects may be tried in secret by the Revolutionary Military Tribunal
33 To be brought promptly before a judge or court	NO	Up to 6 months but this may be extended arbitrarily
34 From police searches of home without a warrant	no	The armed conflict and general instability are responsible for many breaches of the law
35 From arbitrary seizure of personal property	YES	Rights respected

PERSONAL RIGHTS:		COMMENTS:
36 To inter-racial, inter-religious or civil marriage	YES	Traditional tribal marriages from age 10
37 Equality of sexes during marriage and for divorce proceedings	no	Traditional practices still prevail in most rural areas despite Frelimo campaign for equality
38 To practise any religion		60% follow animist beliefs. Other faiths subject to surveillance and a degree of harassment
39 To use contraceptive pills and devices	YES	State aided since 1978
40 To practise homosexuality between consenting adults		Tolerated despite official disapproval

COMPULSORY DOCUMENTS FOR CITIZENS

Legally required at all times:	ID card and residence permit
For employment in own country:	ID card, work permit and residence permit
When applying for passport:	ID card, birth certificate and residence permit
Period of validity of passport:	Varies with purpose of journey
Countries forbidden to holder:	None

What Mozambique Watchers are Saying:

Rebels of Mozambique

FEATURES JULY 12, 1986


MOZAMBIQUE UNDER SIEGE
Anti-communist rebels threaten to topple shaky Marxist government
Indian Ocean
800 miles
TANZANIA
The Cabora Bassa Dam and its power line have been sabotaged so often no power has been delivered since 1975.
The entire region of Mozambique north of the Zambezi River is controlled by RENAMO and they are exerting heavy pressure on the south. All traffic proceeds in convoys escorted by armored cars and armored troop carriers.
MALAWI
NIASSA
CABO DELGADO
ZAMBIA
TETE
Cabora Bassa Dam
Nacala
NAMPULA
MOZAMBIQUE
ZAMBEZIA
Zambezi
Quelimane
Rebel HQ in Gorongoza fell August '85, recaptured by RENAMO February '86
de Harare
Gorongoza Game Reserve
MANICA
Beira
Installations in Beira as well as the Beira-Umtali railroad/pipeline have been attacked and sabotaged. The pipeline is heavily guarded by 12,000 Zimbabwean troops.
ZIMBABWE
SOFALA
GAZA
INHAMBANE
The Kompatipoort-Maputo corridor is under regular attack by rebels. They are striking close to the capital, often cutting off water and electricity.
SOUTH AFRICA
Komatipoort
Maputo
SWAZILAND
AFRICA

Map by Paul Woodward

JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY

WITH THE CIVIL WAR in the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique in its ninth year, the anti-Communist rebels are operating in all parts of the country.

More importantly, they seem to be winning over the local population.

◄

RENAMO HAS DEVELOPED considerable credibility, despite being unable to enjoy foreign support — unlike the government whose policies it opposes.

The armed struggle began in 1977 under Rhodesian Intelligence control.

Later there was support from South Africa, but this disappeared with the 1984 agreement between Pretoria and the Maputo government.

Despite the loss of outside assistance, the insurgency is growing in strength — possibly because of the Mozambique Government's policy of imposing collectivisation.

Herding the rural populace into *aldeias* (communal villages) has alienated peasants and created opposition in areas which were previously compliant.

The people appear to prefer to live in the resistance's 'liberated areas', where they have their own fields and can grow crops as they wish.

Three nuns, who had been prisoners of the rebels and travelled extensively with them in Nampula, Niassa and Zambesia provinces, told *JDW* they crossed vast areas where the rebels apparently enjoy total control, getting food and help from the farmers.

Support bases

During our five-week journey in different parts of the country, we witnessed the same. Everywhere Renamo has a network of support bases, the locations of which are well known to the people, to the extent that the commander of our escort normally asked local civilians to guide our party to the camp in their area.

FRELIMO

ПРАВДА PRAVDA

"The mutual striving to further strengthen and develop friendly cooperation between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and FRELIMO was confirmed" in a warm and comradely atmosphere by a Mozambique party delegation which visited the USSR.

PRAVDA, May 24, 1986, USSR Teaches Party Control Skills to Mozambique

[The Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1987]

Mozambican Misconceptions

By Peter Godwin

In Mozambique, unlike many other parts of Africa, famine is a direct consequence of war. Sending aid treats only the symptoms, not the causes. Much of the aid is disrupted, looted or destroyed. The only way to really help the Mozambican people, of whom 1.5 million are displaced, 4.5 million face starvation and at least a quarter million have fled into neighboring states, is to help end the war.

Three possible ways exist to achieve this. The one increasingly popular in the West is to beef up the forces of the Frelimo government, by giving military as well as humanitarian aid, ignore for the time being, proponents say, that it is Marxist and heavily dependent on Soviet patronage. Together with soldiers from Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, the East Bloc (including Cuba), Nigeria, and lately Ethiopia, Frelimo could be helped to drive the rebel guerrillas into the ground.

Perfect Environment

This view holds that a much more pro-Western, pragmatic Mozambique would then rise from the ashes of one of the world's poorest countries. The West continues to be tantalized by the theory that Frelimo is just about to turn conclusively pro-Western, dumping its Marxist baggage and Soviet Bloc partners. This is more a tribute to the charm of Frelimo officials in winning over locally based diplomats and aid officials, and in playing East against West, than to the sober realities.

But anyone who believes this is an easily winnable war cannot have seen the battle ground. Thousands of square miles of thickly vegetated countryside surround isolated, run-down towns: a perfect environment for the guerrilla, as Frelimo found when fighting the colonial Portuguese.

Who or what is primarily to blame for the desolation, queues, and empty shops of the nation's towns and cities can be endlessly argued over: the abrupt exit of the colonial Portuguese in 1975 after a rule that denied blacks all but the most menial jobs" Rhodesia, South Africa and Renamo for waging a war of attrition in Mozambique for the past decade" or Frelimo, first for scaring whites into flight and later for its ponderous collectivization policy"

To some extent, London accepts the colonial explanation. Mozambique is now the biggest single recipient of British aid—$153 million so far this year—despite not even belonging to the Commonwealth. The British army is training Frelimo officers in battle camps in neighboring Zimbabwe. President Joaquim Chissano's first visit abroad as president was to Britain.

The U.S., meanwhile, has provided Frelimo with $70 million in direct assistance since 1981 and has backed $150 million more in multilateral aid, all nonmilitary.

Those who argue that the West should give Frelimo direct military aid say this would leave Frelimo finally free to boot out the East Bloc, whose paltry economic aid Frelimo has long realized is vastly inferior to what the West can offer. Military hardware, it is argued, is the last link, and if the West could offer this too, that would be the end of the Soviet hold on Maputo. A strong, peaceful Mozambique could then play its full role as a front-line state in breaking reliance on South Africa.

London's policy has flowed from its former colony Zimbabwe's commitment to underpinning Frelimo's survival. Zimbabwe's prime minister, Robert Mugabe, has a debt of honor to Frelimo, which despite the appalling cost to itself allowed his Zanla guerrillas to fight their way into power from Mozambique.

But what is dubbed in some quarters as Zimbabwe's "silent war" is rapidly becoming its Vietnam. Although Harare conceals the true cost of its 12,000 soldiers now fighting alongside Frelimo, it is estimated at as much as $350 million a year, depriving the country of scarce foreign exchange. And not all of Mr. Mugabe's men share his commitment to the war.

Soldiers I met at a Zimbabwe garrison in Mozambique were clearly demoralized and unmotivated. They were not happy to die far from home, in a war they said was not their concern, among a local people they said did not help them. The Mozambican bush could probably suck in double the number of foreign battalions without the course of the war being significantly altered. Zimbabweans and their allies are falling back on the old losing formula of depending too much on air support, patrolling in large groups, sticking to the roads, and hurrying back to base.

Zimbabwe's special forces are still very competent, scoring notable successes in attacks on Renamo base camps. But Renamo withdraws only to return when all the fuss is over. The war continues to show all the signs of being unwinnable by the Frelimo alliance.

In any case, South Africa would probably be unwilling to sit idly by watching any conclusive defeat of Renamo. Maintaining



the Mozambique pot on the boil, with Zimbabwe's energies diverted by the war, its coffers draining into it, and the Beira corridor (Zimbabwe's only non-South African route to the sea) unreliable, is all to Pretoria's advantage.

If Frelimo can't perform the coup de grace, how about Renamo? It, too, is stymied. It has no air support and so cannot occupy towns for long without becoming a sitting target for the other side's planes. Renamo claims to control as much as 75% of the countryside, but it is unlikely to be able to increase this significantly, and will certainly be unable to march on the cities so long as many of Africa's armies are deployed to assist Frelimo.

It also has the albatross of its origins, as a fifth column created by Rhodesian intelligence to fight against Frelimo in the mid-1970s. With the demise of Rhodesia, patronage passed to South Africa, with equal damage to credibility. Pretoria's claim that it ended logistical support to Renamo after the Nkomati accord was signed between South Africa and Mozambique in 1984 is generally disbelieved. But from what one sees of Renamo soldiers, Pretoria's support must be very low-key or uncharacteristically inefficient.

The bulk of Renamo's operations are designed with looting in mind. They claim that their weapons, ammunition, clothes and much food is captured from the other side; it certainly looks secondhand.

In stark contrast to Unita guerrillas on the other coast, Renamo members are not an impressive sight. But this archetypal barefoot army belies its appearance and has even won grudging respect from the Zimbabwean soldiers ranged against it.

Battle-weary Zimbabwean NCOs, without their superiors present, also conceded that the local people mostly supported the guerrillas. This support comes from a brew of fear and volition. Renamo is accused of great brutality and destruction. Stories of Renamo "slave camps" compete with those of Frelimo "work camps." Refugees fear both armies. But such is the nature of war in Africa. Not all Mr. Mugabe's guerrillas abided by the Marquess of Queensberry rules, but that did nothing to undermine his war's legitimacy.

But however well Renamo does, with or without external support, it realizes its own limitations. For there is a sting in the end of the Frelimo tail. If beaten, ultimately, it too can return to the bush, where Frelimo fought a 20-year guerrilla war against the Portuguese, and so the cycle would continue.

Renamo claims it is ready to negotiate with Frelimo. It says it would be prepared to hold democratic elections, a novel experience for Mozambique. This is the third possibility, and probably the one that the U.S. should support. But there are some important pre-conditions.

The first is that Renamo has to be taken seriously. It may not have Unita's slick PR operation, or its lobbyists, or a contiguous external base, or even the open commitment of South Africa (and the U.S.) that Unita has. But it controls more of Mozambique than Unita does of Angola, and Renamo is no longer merely the bunch of bandits Frelimo wishes it were. Until Renamo is taken seriously, it can be neither defeated nor negotiated with. President Samora Machel, shortly before his death last October, realized this. He was clearing his desk to take on personal responsibility for the conduct of the war when his airplane plunged from the sky.

Because of its lack of publicity, Renamo is still shrouded in mystery. Jonas Savimbi has an image as an anti-communist African folk hero, but Renamo leader Alfonso Dhlakama is a parochial fellow whose name is still largely unknown. Mr. Dhlakama claims to be an anti-communist fighting for real democracy against a communist regime. From its origins as a surrogate Rhodesian intelligence group, Renamo has grown into a catch-all for opponents of Frelimo. Many of its officers and men are Frelimo defectors. Many say they left because they objected to the seizure of land by Frelimo to create communal state farms. Some bear other grudges. They include black former Frelimo officers who criticize Frelimo as an elitist urban clique disproportionately influenced by radical Goan and mulatto Mozambicans.

No Starvation Under Renamo

In the areas Renamo penetrates, it has tended to run a minimalist administration, in effect restoring a pre-colonial status quo. Traditional tribal structures are revived, and in return local chiefs must supply a quota of food and recruits. The system is in sharp contrast to an intrusive, hands-on Frelimo administration. Renamo claims there is no starvation in the areas it controls. Visiting reporters concur.

To push negotiations, the U.S. would risk antagonizing Frelimo and sending it scurrying back into the Soviet Bloc hug it is alleged to be on the verge of leaving. Even to talk to Renamo boosts the rebels' status and legitimacy. President Chissano reiterated in March that he would not consider even talking to the "bandits." But Western muscle, combined with the lure of considerable economic aid, might just persuade him otherwise. After all, Frelimo has a precedent in talking to the devil. It signed the Nkomati accord with South Africa, so maybe it can talk to Renamo.

Mr. Godwin covers southern Africa for the London Sunday Times. In April, he was briefly kidnapped into Renamo territory.

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Release: 31 March 1987

Contact: Tom Schaaf (202)547-7160

Tenth Anniversary of the Mozambique - Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

Washington, D.C. - Today marks the tenth anniversary of the twenty year Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship signed between the FRELIMO government of Mozambique and the Soviet Union on March 31, 1977. Current American policy in Mozambique is predicated on the Reagan Administration theory that the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO regime can be "weaned" away to the West by American assistance programs. The following excerpts allows FRELIMO to speak for itself.

-30-

THE TIMES OF LONDON
March 7, 1987

Minister denies tilt to the West by Maputo

By Andrew McEwen
Diplomatic Correspondent

Mozambique's Minister of Information, Mr Teodato Hunguana, said in London yesterday that speculation that his Government was beginning to lean towards the West was mistaken. "The Soviet Union has been an historic ally," he said, adding that this had not changed.

Mr Hunguana, on an unofficial visit to Britain, added: "Mozambique is not shifting from one side to another, from West to East, we are staying at the same point, defending our independence"

When asked if Mozambique would accept Soviet bloc troops to help in its war against the rebel Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), he said his country's needs were so great that it would not deny itself any support.

He confirmed that Tanzanian and Zimbabwean troops were assisting the Mozambique Army, but declined to give numbers or to confirm that Cuban troops were also in the country.

V. 6 Feb 87

MOZAMBIQUE

Chissano Reaffirms Commitment to Socialism

MB031704 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1400 GMT 3 Feb 87

The supreme leader of the Mozambican revolution was speaking in Maputo before the secretariat members of some 400 party cells as well as members of democratic mass organizations. He explained that the choice of socialism as the path to development is the fruit for all of our combined experiences. We have combined our experiences with the scientific teachings of Marxism-Leninism, President Joaquim Chissano said.

He made it clear that although Mozambique is negotiating with the IMF and other financial organizations this does not mean that it is relinquishing its principles. There is the need to organize and make the party's grassroots structures more dynamic. Their work [words indistinct].

Speaks at Heroes Day Celebration

MB041043 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1800 GMT 3 Feb 87

[Speech by Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano at a meeting with secretariat members of the Frelimo Party cells in Maputo on 3 February — recorded]

[Excerpts] Today we celebrate two events which are very important to our country and people. We celebrate the Day of the Mozambican Heroes and the 10th anniversary of the creation of the Frelimo Party. [passage omitted]

The rehabilitation program states that we are going to support the private sector. We have been holding talks with the IMF and the World Bank. One might feel that we are having doubts about socialist option. No, that is not the case. We must not confuse the issue. We chose socialism and we did not do it arbitrarily because of some dream. That is not the case. We chose socialism as a result of our experiences. We have combined these experiences with the scientific teachings of Marxism-Leninism. We did not choose socialism just because we read about it. If that were the case, the United States would have been the first socialist country, because there are many people with doctorates in Marxism-Leninism. In every capitalist country there are those with doctorates in Marxism-Leninism. However, the historic and social conditions are not yet ripe to justify the existence of socialism there. Here we have read very little about Marxism-Leninism but there was a class struggle. It occurred in a ferocious manner and we learned from it. By creating the Frelimo Party on 3 February we really wanted to create an organization capable of leading our revolution so that it would not be led in an anarchic manner. It looks as if talking about socialism is good. The room has even become cooler since we started talking about socialism. [passage omitted]

V. 12 Mar 87

Prime Minister Machungo Meets USSR's Koshelev

MB111310 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1100 GMT 11 Mar 87

[Text] Mozambique's Prime Minister Mario Machungo has expressed the will to strengthen relations between Mozambique and the Soviet Union. Mr Machungo was speaking yesterday during a meeting with the deputy chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Relations and co-chairman of the Mozambique-Soviet Joint Cooperation Commission, P.I. Koshelev. Mr Machungo also said that the visit by Mr Koshelev and his delegation takes place at a time when the two countries are preparing to mark the first decade of the signing of the general treaty of cooperation and friendship between the two countries. The prime minister was accompanied by Finance Minister Adbul Magid Osman, who is also the chairman of the joint commission on the Mozambican side. The Soviet delegation, which is visiting Mozambique since last week, has made several contacts with government officials, including the minister of cooperation, Jacinto Veloso.

Today, Mr Koshelev and Mr Magid Osman will sign an agreement which will rule future stages of cooperation between the two countries.

Economic Accord Signed

MB112017 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1730 GMT 11 Mar 87

[Text] An accord providing for wider cooperation in the context of the joint Mozambique-USSR commission was signed in Maputo today. The accord provides for USSR involvement in the rehabilitation of the Petromoc [Mozambican National Petroleum Enterprise] refinery, the modernization of [words indstinct] Metalo-Mecanica enterprise's foundry, and the repair of the Beira-Moatize railroad. The accord also cites the possible creation of joint Mozambique-USSR enterprises in certain areas.

The USSR will also provide scholarships for the training of semiskilled ship repair technicians and the training of technicians in the Beira agricultural implement factory.

The accord was signed by P. Koshelev, deputy chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Relations, and Mozambican Finance Minister Abdul Magid Osman.

Mozambique: drought does not mean hunger

- **The World Council of Churches has decided to restrict the circulation of a report on the food situation in Mozambique compiled by a local catholic organization (Cáritas). The report, entitled «Food, production and distribution, in a situation of internal conflict» includes controversial conclusions like the one that «in Mozambique to listen to the people, to be in empathy with the people» is seen by the party (Frelimo) and Government as a «reactionary attitude».**

THE CONCLUSIONS reached by the report, which was based on interviews with 400 family heads in Mozambique's rural areas affected by drought, say that most of the people interviewed did not blame on the drought the famine in their regions. «**Drought is a problem that comes and goes**». There might be periods of drought without hunger. For them, the famine was due to inadequate food supplies and distribution.

The results of Cáritas' enquiry have made the organization ponder on their task and role in Mozambique: it is common knowledge that rural people are turning more and more to the churches and missions and there is the theory that this sudden expansion in the numbers of followers of the Christian faith is more due to the belief that Christian communities are better off in what concerns food supplies than to genuine religious reasons.

Against this backdrop, the document concludes by questioning whether it would not be better to limit the assistance for the locals to have «**a clearer perception of reality**». The Churches appear to be conscious that their humanitarian aid has been having as a practical result «**a cover up operation of the real dimensions of the gravity of the situation**» while giving the Government the chance to use financial resources which should be applied in food and food production, in other areas, including the war.

The Cáritas report at one stage questions if the distribution of foodstuffs, which has become one of the main tasks of the Churches in Mozambique — «**is not an attempt by the Churches to follow the easy path towards local prestige, busy as they are in trying to get from the Government a certificate of good behaviour instead of challenging the official policy?**»

Cáritas' enquiry was conducted in the provinces of Niassa, Nampula, Manica, Sofala, Gaza and Maputo throughout 1985. Its aims were to survey the situation and to prepare Cáritas' and Mozambique's Catholic organizations' anti-famine program and also a project for emergency assistance (over the past five years the Catholic aid to Mozambique exceeded 10 Million US$).

The report also questioned the issue of how the assistance provided is distributed. «**This is a matter which has to be discussed**» because there are «**difficulties in entrusting the grants to the DPCCN** (Government Department for the fight and prevention of natural calamities) **as experience has proven that, sometimes, the goods just do not reach the destination intended by the donors**».

The conclusions of the report and the questions raised are based on the replies given to a questionaire by the Cáritas investigators. The question posed to the populations was: «**What do you think is the reason for the lack of food and for the famine in Mozambique? Why is this?**» Often the method followed to enquire the populations was group discussion.

The results of the enquiry show that the rural populations feel that the main causes of the famine situation are: the war, the forced and violent recruitment of peasants into the Forces; the deployment of special troops without proper logistic supplies which forces them to steal from local villages.

Another reason denounced as one of the main causes for the food shortage was the «**abusive behaviour by the militia forces**» who are accused of outright robbery. One of the men questioned in Nampula said namely that he was told: «**either you bring us the goods or the militia will get your wife**». Those enquired, says the report, have raised the question: «**who are the bandits? They dress the same. The people are suffering from the two sides**». Other reasons advanced for the famine situation are also linked with the war: forced resettlement of populations and arbitrary roadblocking of the main routes.

The present economic system and the regime of privileging a few are also mentioned as some of the reasons for the food shortages. «**The ruling system brings about a shortfall in production.**» There is also a general mood of condemnation of the difficulties put by the Government to the free flow of food stuffs in the country: «**the state owned companies buy cheaply to the producer and sell at high prices on the market**». There is also another complaint that people are being treated differently.

Local party officials and Government representatives have preference «**Frelimo demands contributions from the locals to the cooperative projects. The people give but it is a one way system. We get nothing from the cooperative, it all goes to the officials, Party or Government**».

Collective work and the system of drafting people to work in communal state-owned farms and the nationalisation of land are pointed out as «**demotivating factors**». From the interviews conducted in the region of Nampula there is a good example of this situation. The salary paid for a day's work at a state-owned communal farm is 2,5 Metical (5 Cents of the US$). In the report there are also references to other statements like: «**the famine came because religion and God were mocked which brought punishment and calamities over the country**»: «**they have destroyed the traditional systems which made it natural and legitimate to perform necessary tasks in common.**»

Comparisons are also made with the colonial period. The report says «**the people do not blame the colonial period for their present difficulties**». On the contrary they recall the previous economic and trade systems: **the cantinas** (small bush shops) **spread throughout the country had informal credit schemes or functioned on a barter system. The commercial network was in fact controlled by a few but it served all and specially it did work**».

For those who might consider it strange for the local population to be so candid about their difficulties, the report leaves a thought for the readers to ponder: «**the people answer to the place from where the wind blows**» and hints that the rural people would have been much more cautious and less candid if the enquiry had been conducted by Government officials.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL MONDAY, MAY 11, 1987

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Mozamthiopia

Two years ago, television screens were filled with appalling pictures of Ethiopian famine victims. The most horrifying aspect of that tragedy was that it was largely man-made. The Marxist government refused to allow relief groups into rebel-occupied areas, and hundreds of thousands died of starvation after brutal resettlement programs interrupted planting. A similar sordid story soon may be repeated in Mozambique, a drought- and war-ravaged country in southern Africa. Once again Western aid may do more to prop up a repressive regime than feed the suffering.

A famine in Mozambique now threatens an estimated 4.5 million people. The U.S. government has promised $75 million in emergency food aid, but all aid will be channeled through the Marxist regime. U.S. policy has been to avoid any contact whatever with RENAMO, the anti-communist resistance that has waged an increasingly successful civil war against the government since 1975. Yet at least a third of the population lives in RENAMO-controlled areas.

According to Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, the Agency for International Development, which is in charge of U.S. assistance, "has offered the lame excuse that they cannot locate anyone from RENAMO to talk to. In fact, there is a RENAMO office here in Washington that is practically beating down the door of the State Department to ask for aid. . . . I call on the State Department and AID to get off their duffs . . . and start the food flowing to people who do not have much time left."

The famine-aid debate has spilled over into the fight over confirmation of Melissa Wells as the next U.S. ambassador to Mozambique. Mrs. Wells has described RENAMO members as "bandits," the same term used by the Marxist regime, and—echoing the State Department—says they have no popular support, a view challenged by many journalists.

In hope of weaning Mozambique away from the Soviet orbit, the State Department and Mrs. Wells also have played down both the brutal nature of the regime and its ties to the Eastern bloc. Free-lancer Sam Levy reported from Mozambique on this page last year that the regime's "totalitarian inspiration" is clear and that, as in Ethiopia, there have been mass deportations to brutal rural work camps. Mozambique still calls the Soviet Union its "natural ally," and hosts military advisers from the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea—and Ethiopia.

On May 1, a bipartisan group of 28 senators blocked consideration of the Wells nomination in what Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd called "unprecedented opposition" to an ambassadorial candidate. A showdown vote is expected tomorrow.

Barring compelling circumstances, a president is entitled to have the people he wants in executive-branch positions. Our concern is not so much with Mrs. Wells but with the State Department's policy on Mozambique, which has gone astray in forswearing any contact with or aid to RENAMO.

President Reagan recently said he would be reviewing U.S. policy on Mozambique. Such a review is long overdue. The first question it must answer is why AID is denying needed supplies to millions of people whose only crime is that they do not live under the control of a brutal dictatorship.

RENAMO

PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 18 February 1987

RENAMO OFFERS TO HELP COORDINATE AID PROGRAM

RENAMO welcomes the aid proposals put forth for Mozambique on Friday by the U.S. Agency for International Development. RENAMO furthermore offers to assist government and relief agencies with distributing food to the 2.1 million people which A.I.D. Administrator, Mr. Peter McPherson says are inaccessible due to the fighting in Mozambique's civil war. Mr. McPherson's proposal centered on the difficulty of delivering 150,000 metric tons of food in 1987 to relieve the estimated 5.7 million people dependent on food aid. 3.6 million people in communist Mozambique face starvation while another 2.1 million people in areas of "restricted access" are also affected according to McPherson.

The balance of Mozambique's 14 million people live in the RENAMO liberated zones and are not threatened by famine. **"The time has come for the United States government and various international relief organizations to end their policy of dealing exclusively with the Marxist-Leninist element in Maputo."** said RENAMO's Washington Representative, Professor Luis Serapiao.

"When will they learn from the mistakes made in Ethiopia?" asked Prof. Luis Serapiao. **"Forced relocation, collectivization, institutional brutality in Mozambique are the same ingredients which created the Ethiopian disaster."**

On the other hand, the liberated zones of Mozambique under RENAMO's administration are producing abundant harvests. According to journalists recently returned from Free Mozambique, the restoration of basic human freedoms are permitting stability and food production in large tracts of Mozambique.

RENAMO MILITARY COMMUNIQUE - received 15 February 1987

Zimbabwean paratroopers invaded the southern Gorongosa region on 11 Feb. as part of an advance contingent to attack the RENAMO headquarters. Ground support for the paratroopers was interdicted by RENAMO on the main road leading into the operational area and 120 paratroopers were surrounded and killed by RENAMO units in the area.

In a separate action on the same day, a Zimbabwean commander, Major David Singaira, was killed along with thirteen of his men at the town of Mungari in Tete Province.

Also on the 13th, a FRELIMO unit was overrun by RENAMO near the town of Manhica, 20 miles north of Maputo. Twenty-one FRELIMO were killed including two Cubans, one a military trainer and the other an intelligence officer.

Mozambique Church pushing peace

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC Church's involvement in the Mozambiquan crisis has increased as the level of violence has risen. Bishops of the church believe the two sides have lost control of the struggle.

There has also been an evolution in church-state relations. The late President **Samora Machel's** reaction to the earliest church denunciations of atrocities — published in a secret letter by the Nampula diocese in 1984 — was «disrespectful».

They led to a meeting between Machel and the archbishop of Nampula in which the former was clearly **«irritated»**.

The latest, April 1987, church document titled **«The peace people desire»**, was greeted with sympathetic silence by the new team in Maputo. President Joaquim Chissano had known of the document's general outline since the beginning of April.

THE PASTORAL LETTER — grew out of a long debate. On one side priests proposed the church «dirty its hands», and get actively involved in the search for ways to end violence, on the other bishops advocated the continuation of a policy of «watchful concern» stopping short of direct involvement.

The latter group won a victory at the beginning of the year when the Archbishop of Beira, Dom Jaime Gonçalves was replaced as the head of the Bishop's conference.

The current moderate president of the conference, Dom Paulo Mandlate, is well accepted by the ruling Frelimo party.

The Pastoral letter represents a toughening of the church's stand and an indication of its interest in helping bring about peace. Individually, bishops insist the duty of Catholics is to work for national reconciliation. Their letter specifically refers to Renamo and considers the rebel movement a necessary component in the peace search.

The letter also reflects criticisms heard in development and non-governmental circles and considers the massive international aid programme now under way, a factor in the continuation and **worsening of the war.**

Caritas Mozambique, a branch of the international Catholic relief organisation, has complained of permanent conflict with provincial officials especially in areas getting international aid. Caritas charges these officials are stealing goods destined for the local population. It has several times threatened to withdraw from all support programmes. Its latest complaint was of an incident in the northern town of **Nacala** concerning aid sent by the **Santo Egido** community in Rome to Christian communities.

The letter also deals with foreign involvement, particularly by neighbouring countries, and contains references to fears about the country's future as a free nation. It warns of threats to national territorial integrity.

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS, NEW CYCLE — Ever since his cabinet days in the transition government of 1975, Chissano has maintained **«correct relations»** with the Mozambiquan bishops. One of the Archbishop of Maputo's chief counsellors is **Canon Mabulangue,** Chissano's direct cousin. On various occasions he has acted as emissary between the Bishops Conference and the Presidency. Another interlocutor has been Chissano's father who is a teacher at the Catholic mission at Malaisse (in southern Gaza province).

Gestures of sympathy towards the church have also been increasing. In the provinces of Zambezia (centre) and Nampula (north) mission hospitals and schools are being returned to the church. The latest was the nursing nuns' hostel in **Quelimane.** Negotiations are underway for the return of the **Carapiri** technical training school in Nampula, still run by priests.

In May the president's wife Marcelina Chissano, met with representatives of female religious orders, thanked them for their work and asked them to increase their activities.

During his May visit to **the Vatican,** Chissano assured the Pope there would be no obstacles to the building of an **Institute of Religious Science** (a Catholic seminary) and said he would welcome its eventual transformation into a Catholic University.

CHURCH'S PEACE SEARCH — The church has a grassroots information network. Representatives of Christian communities spread around the country, regularly send in written **reports about their communities.** They also send daily reports about the military activities of both government and Renamo forces. The Bishops Conference sends these reports, together with their protests, to the relevant side.

The church keeps open channels to the rebels in the provinces of Zambezia, Nampula and Niassa. But its contacts are only with Renamo's military wing because the conference has reservations about the rebel's **external representatives.** Contacts between the church and Renamo outside Mozambique have never taken place in Lisbon but always either in Italy or West Germany through non-office holding members of the movement.

In contacts with the regime the Church has also won some concessions, strengthening its relations with the state and reducing its contacts with Frelimo. Party idealogues like Jorge Rebelo and Sergio Vieira are, as a result of church pressure, likely to be replaced as Frelimo's contact men with the church by oldtime nationalists like Cangela de Mendonça, Rafael Magumi and Gabriel Simbine.

MOZAMBIQUE

Maputo Archbishop Discusses Peace Appeal

MB011651 London BBC World Service in English
1515 GMT 1 Jun 87

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Relations between the government in Mozambique and the Roman Catholic Church could become a little tricky following a recent impassioned appeal by the Catholic bishops for talks between the Frelimo government and Renamo rebels to end the 10 years of fighting. Nine bishops signed a pastoral letter calling for negotiations. In Mozambique, our East Africa correspondent, Mike Wooldridge, asked the archbishop of Maputo, Jose Maria dos Santos, if the bishops had heard anything from the government about their appeal:

[Begin recording] [Dos Santos] So far I have heard nothing about it.

[Wooldridge] Since there hasn't been a response, do you think then that your appeal was really unrealistic in the present circumstances?

[Dos Santos] We feel it our duty to denounce this situation, of injustice, of suffering, of killing, but I don't know (?for real) if they will accept it. But if they are Africans, the Africans used to solved their problems by dialogue. And we think they will also accept this because they are Africans.

[Wooldridge] But the government have said consistently, haven't they, that they will not talk to people who they regard as bandits.

[Dos Santos] They say that, yes, we know that. But how do we finish this war? How do we come to an end with this?

[Wooldridge] You don't think it is possible that the government could win militarily, particularly with the support they are now getting from countries like Zimbabwe and Tanzania? And they have had more success in recent months in Zambezia, haven't they, which is the place where the war has actually been fiercest? Do you not think that there might have been a turning point on the battlefield?

[Dos Santos] I would like to know how long we have been in this situation? How long? Many years. And more and more are coming. I don't know how they can finish it because it is long we have supported this situation.

[Wooldridge] So you don't think it is really going the government's way?

[Dos Santos] I don't know if, really, there is a possibility of defeating, destroying a guerrilla war. This is very difficult (?today) because they are in the bush. How can you finish them?

[Wooldridge] Do you intend following up the appeal in practical terms? Would you consider going and talking to Renamo's leaders, for example, you or any of your fellow bishops?

[Dos Santos] We don't know who are the leaders of Renamo and we don't know how to contact them. It is very difficult; we have no relationship with these people.

[Wooldridge] But if you don't, isn't the same true for the government? Isn't it easy for President Chissano to say: Okay, you're telling me to talk to Renamo, but who do I talk to?

[Dos Santos] We think you must talk with those who you're fighting against. They are fighting against somebody, and that one can come together with them to talk. [end recording]

Mozambiquans turn against government

RISING POPULAR UNREST in Mozambique has spread to such an extent that the authorities are worried. In a bid to control it they have stepped up political police (SNASP) vigilance and taken steps to eradicate some of the principal problems — notably the drastic shortage of food.

The anti-government Renamo rebel movement, which the Pentagon in its latest report labelled «a serious threat to the survival of the regime», has been taking full advantage of the internal discontent — despite the fact that its activities are partially responsible for the problem. Renamo's growing military success, (see page 10) now fuelling expectations among the population of victory, is fertile soil for expressions of discontent.

Among the urban population unrest is heightened by restrictive economic measures imposed under the government's agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Belttightening measures are worsening an already bad situation in wich for years there has been an endemic shortage of food, clothing and medicine. The austerity measures hit heavily at the middle classes which until now have given the regime support. Growing insecurity is also now affecting these urbanites.

In rural areas discontent is provoked by harsh living conditions, hunger, and insecurity but above all by the «excessive violence» with which Mozambiquan and Zimbabwean troops (especially the latter) treat rural dwellers whom they suspect of being Renamo collaborators.

IN THE CITIES — There has been an abrupt and widespread rise in the price of goods and services as a result of the IMF accord. By the end of this year the metical (the local official currency of which there are 202 to one U.S. dollar) will be devalued by one thousand per cent. Up to now salaries have increased only by between 50 and 100 percent.

Housing rents are to be substantially increased (partly as a way of forcing some city dwellers to return to the villages). A hospital consultation, which presently costs 7.50 meticais will rise to 500 and patients are to be made to pay for hospitalisation.

With everything in such short supply goods are available only by barter or in exchange for hard currency (hard currency shops, «Lojas Francas», are spreading. A new one has just opened in Tete province). Metical prices of vegetables and other foodstuffs are highly speculative.

Security problems are worsening. When night falls residents in the outlying suburbs of Maputo, such as Bairro de Liberdade, Bonhica and Machava, move into the city to sleep. Widespread anti-Sovietism is rampant in the cities — which to some extent partly deflects the blame for problems from the government.

IN RURAL AREAS — Popular discontent here is more clearly anti-Frelimo.

This is in clear contrast to the attitudes of urban dwellers, who are more sceptical about Renamo and believe in the «regeneration» of the regime. Rural dwellers are in closer contact with Renamo and, in some cases, feel protected by the rebels from the excesses of government forces.

Impartial and reliable sources have told us that among the rural population, especially where the rebels are most active, Renamo has been winning increasing acceptance. This in turn increases hostility towards Frelimo.

Rebel forces manage to evade many punitive, especially landbased, strikes by government and Zimbabwean forces, due to co-operation between a sympathetic rural population and Renamo.

The rebels have won such help because of atrocities committed against rural dwellers in areas under «Indetermined control» or won over by Renamo.

In March there was intensive aerial bombing of the inhabitants of Licuare (district of Nicoadala in Zambezia province), east of Morrumbala.

On April 6 in an operation ordered by Zimbabwean command headquarters in Quelimane, two helicopters based in Mocuba bombed the village of Maneira, killing and injuring dozens of civilians. A similar attack was reported in Chavundire (district of Mutarara in Zambezia province).

Zimbabwean troops on the whole are much more brutal than their Mozambiquan counterparts. Zimbabwean military experts on subversion are convinced that Renamo's operational success is due entirely to support from the civilian population.

Renamo's growing implantation in the rural areas is also due to its policy of restoring ancient traditions like the local chieftains or «regulados». In zones controlled by Renamo the «regulados» have regained their former powers and play a major role in the organisation of their communities.

The institutional authority imposed on Mozambique by Frelimo, which obliged the population to accept a highly regimented and authoritarian organisation, was only superficially accepted. Even though officially sidelined, the «regulados» continued to be more respected than the representatives of the State.

Renamo's policy of «psychological penetration» has also brought the re-establishment of farming methods done away with by Frelimo.

It allows farmers freely to till their own private plots or «machambas».

Hunger, lack of clothing and aid resulting from the destruction of rural administration and economic structures has eased Renamo's task of turning the population against the government.

Document: «We, the former fighters...»

• The document we will mention in this article was issued in Maputo about one week after President Samora Machel's death. Initially, the document was addressed to four members of Frelimo's Politburo — Joaquim Chissano, Alberto Chipande, Armando Guebuza and Mariano Matsinhe — but later, photostats of it reached many other parties, in and out of Mozambique's official circles. The authors of the document have remained anonymous. They identify themselves simply as «...former fighters and founders of this Republic...» (Mozambique). Evidence gathered by us does suggests this is an authentic document (see pg. 16). **There are good indications leading to the parties who could have produced such a document and, on the other hand, the ideas and concepts it reflects correspond to the line of thought of a large sector within Mozambique's political power.**

In its main points, the document (twelve pages plus a 7-page addendum) discusses matters like the role of the white people in the Mozambique society and displays great antagonism concerning the participation of whites in political affairs. The whites are described as «non-originally mozambicans». The document also deals at length with the problem of the civil war and advocates negotiations with Renamo to end it. The following is a transcript of the sections of the document which deal with the participation of people other than black Mozambicans in government and with the civil war.

«The bitter experience we have with the results of having opened political power to all and any citizen stems from the lack honesty and patriotism of citizens who despite being will always be compromised with foreign powers. (...) We believe that the criteria of origin and birth (place-of-birth) should be taken into account in the sphere of political power. Government and government action must reflect the wishes of our dear people. (...) It must represent the majority in this Homeland. It must represent those, who were in fact the targets of colonisation.

«We, Frelimo, we will exclude completely from political power, economic power or military power all the non-originally mozambicans. Such mozambicans may, if they wish, devote themselves to other activities such as: perform tasks for which they are professionally qualified; work in the private sector in trade, agriculture, industry and so on. This is not discrimination. It simply means we are putting into practice the origin criterion.

«Whites, indians and others may acquire mozambican nationality but that does no entitle them to take over political power in our country. (...) They have all the conditions and the possibility of continuing to live in our country. But what we do not want is for them to take over political power and rule our country. Should they have such ambitions then let them go back to their countries of origin where they have the legitimate right to demand and to assume political power.

«...The non-originally mozambicans know perfectly well that the People would never accept them as rulers. Hence, to become rulers they go about recruiting mozambicans of origin to act as their agents and lackeys. Those who accept such a task create a mentality which betrays the true aspirations of the Mozambique People and is against the People. That is why the People has no support, live in misery while the rulers and the non-[illegible] live and eat well and in great style.

«We have to find a solution for this problem (the war) if we want to be called the children of this People which is being daily massacred, mutilated, humiliated and exploited. (...) Let us be bold, we, the former fighters, and let us accept that on the battle field now, on the other side there are Mozambicans. That is called a civil war.

«We should not allow the war to become an international conflict. That would be no solution. It would only make us postpone the problem and waste more time. Our people wants peace. We, as a Government, we should look for more adequate and lasting solutions for the civil war. If we really represent the People and are in charge of the destiny of the Homeland, then let us allow no more massacres of the population in the defence of interests which are foreign to us.

«We believe that to bring about the end of the war we must create a climate of reconciliation. But such reconciliation should not be brought about just anyhow. In the event of an agreement between Frelimo and Renamo, the non-originally mozambicans in Renamo should not be allowed to take part in the peace talks. (...) The Government which will come from Frelimo and Renamo will be a Government of mozambicans of origin.

«A military solution can bring us peace but for a short while only. We must try and take the country out of an endless war. Let us look at what is happening in countries like Chad, Uganda and so on. (...)

«Let us imagine Renamo would achieve a military victory. We would go back to the bush. Should then Renamo lose again, they in turn would go back to the bush and the war would go on and on.

«We know we now fight against puppets, executioners and [illegible] and there are quite a lot of them. Hence it is better to talk directly to the executioners (puppets or armed bandits) for them to stop being used by their bosses. Should the Party and the Government not share this view, our view of this problem, then we better die right away, because the option is a slow and much more painful death.

«Let us look at this war of ours. Some say it is a struggle against armed bandits. Others say it is a struggle against Communist expansionism in the world. The real truth is that on the battle field we, mozambicans, are fighting each other. We are fighting among ourselves. We are killing each other. We are killing entire populations.»

Without being so exhaustive the document also considers other aspects like the return to Mozambique of all «intellectuals of mozambique origin» **who are now abroad so that a** «patriotic economic decision can be taken» concerning the **dismissal** of a good deal of «cooperators» (foreign workers).

On this the document states: «No country on Earth has managed to achieve real development with foreign cadres.»

The document also suggests that the crash of President Machel's aircraft was due to the «casual attitude, irresponsibility, lack of skill and incompetence» **of the former Security Minister**, Sérgio Vieira, **who is of indian origin and a very unpopular man.**

Further on the document states that on both sides of the Mozambique war there are external influences: «Under the cover of assisting us (meaning the Soviet Union which is described as 'the weapons supplier') in fighting the enemy they are draining us of our resources and when we have no more to be exploited they will abandon us...»

(On the subject White Mozambicans see AC

RENAMO'S Provisional Economic Manifesto For Free Mozambique

RENAMO's economic philosophy is the complete antithesis of the communist FRELIMO government. The FRELIMO regime is based on strict Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Alternatively, RENAMO believes state power is not ultimate. Government exists to protect the rights of individuals and serve in such functions as are necessary to the public good. Therefore we believe in limited powers of a Constitutional government based on democratic principles. Rule of law must be enshrined by a system of legal justice predicated on belief in God given human rights, freedoms, and dignity.

Our political reference logically implies economic freedom based on personal property rights, individual initiative and a free market environment. Competition is essential for a healthy and viable economy.

Foreign investment is encouraged and necessary for the development of Mozambique's untapped wealth. Foreign profits and national development are compatible processes within the bounds of respect for national heritage. Both exploitation and expropriation are destructive to investors and government relations.

RENAMO takes a dim view of unprincipled interests who have chosen to profiteer on the last gasp offer of the dying FRELIMO regime which sells the blood and birthright of our people for a season of power.

Alternatively, RENAMO is anxious to develop economic ties with those like-minded investors who believe real growth results from a free market system rather than from exploitive profits of communist concessions.

RENAMO is already putting to the test its policy of economic freedom. Although our economy is relatively unsophisticated and rural at present. We believe freedom is a reliable foundational principle when applied to more complex economic models as well.

MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE PROGRAMME

The objective of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement is to democratize, liberalize and create the conditions for the overall progress of the Republic of Mozambique in accordance with the following principles:

1. POLITICS
   a. The eradication of the system of communist dictatorship and the purge of the top governing cadres adhering to the system, without victimization. Only by forgiving and forgetting will it be possible to build a Mozambique belonging to all Mozambicans.
   b. The establishment of a Government of National Unity of pacify the country, to introduce and stabilize a democratic order, and to build the foundation for social and economic redevelopment.
      The unity of the Mozambique people is essential to be able to face the challenges of modern times.
   c. The people have the right to choose and freely vote for the political, social and economic system of the country.
      Nothing will be imposed on the majority by an aggressive minority.
   d. The traditions, customs and personality of the Mozambique people will always be respected by all sectors of authority. Progress will be made in step with history and never against it.

2. ECONOMICS

a. The public sector will first be defined and will then serve to optimize and organize the private sector, the generator of the economic prosperity of Mozambique.
The reconciliation of interests, synthesis of Government activity, is an essential condition for the economic recovery of the country.

b. Development plans will be orientated towards increasing national wealth, harmonizing the development of all regions and redistributing income.
We will fight against unnecessary, speculative or extravagant investment; measures favoring useful investment and full employment will be pursued.

c. Monopolies, oligopolies or the economic exploitation of one class or sector by another on will not be permitted.
Steps will be taken to protect consumers and to safeguard their respective participation in the establishment of economic laws.

d. The money taken from the people shall be used correctly and for the benefit of the people.
Taxation is an instrument of economic justice.

e. The situation of confiscated or appropriated assets will be analyzed with regard to their eventual restitution.
Nationalization will not take place without fair and opportune compensation.

3. JUSTICE

a. All citizens shall be equal before the law and shall have the same rights and duties.
No-one shall be tried without adequate defense, and no-one shall be arrested without an order or warrant from the appropriate authority.

b. Judges shall be professional, permanent and independent.
The widest guarantees and safeguards shall be adopted so that judges may judge according to their conscience and according to the law.

c. Trials will be public and will be open to public opinion.
Offenders will be defended by a lawyer of their own choice and no restrictions will be imposed on that right.

d. Political prisoners will be given their freedom and other prisoners will have their cases reexamined by impartial judges.
The prosperity of Mozambique lies in human dignity and justice.

4. HEALTH AND EDUCATION

a. Ill-health and illiteracy are Mozambique's worst enemies: it is the Governments's duty to apply the fullest resources of the promotion of health and education.
Every effort will be made to provide all regions with an adequate network of hospitals and schools.

b. International organizations and institutions, including religious ones, will be encouraged to continue or restart the work they have done in this field.
The State will foster the search for new methods and programmes in health and education in a free, participatory and progressive society.

c. Maternity, infancy and old age will be especially protected.
State services in the field of health will as far as possible be free.

d. Education will be obligatory and free up to the age of 12.
The most able will be encouraged to continue their studies.

5. PUBLIC SERVICES

a. Devotion to public duty and welfare will be the perquisite of state, local government and public company employees.
Public activities will open to hierachical and employee scrutiny and will be accountable to the majority of citizens.

b. The Armed Forces and the Police will not interfere in political activity.
They will be the guarantors of democratic political activity and their dignity will derive from this.

c. The Armed Forces of Mozambique will be constituted mainly by the Mozambique National Resistance Forces and by the incorporation of the actual regular units existing in the country, except for those which during the 2nd War of Liberation behaved in an unpatriotic manner.
The instruments of political power used by the present regime in the repression of fundamental citizens' rights will be dismantled.

d. Veterans, ex-combatants and victims of the Wars of Independence, Liberation and National Defence will be particularly well cared for and protected by the State.
Independence, Freedom and National Defence are the permanent and unifying commitments of past, present and future generation of the Mozambique people.

6. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

a. Agreements established previously with foreign countries or international organizations will be fully respected providing they do not affect National Independence and the basic democratic freedoms of our citizens, and do not contradict the inviolable principles of this programme.
Mozambique will not discriminate against any country because of its respective internal regime: international relations will be governed by mutual advantage and free determination.

b. Mozambique will respect and defend the principles governing the United Nations Organization and the Organization of African Unity, and will respect the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man.
We will fight against all forms of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism.

c. The country will cooperate actively with neighboring states, especially those which depend on our ports.
International cooperation is the fundamental instrument of peace in the region.

7. CONSTITUTION

a Approval of the Constitution will be carried out by means of the National Assembly and the Participation of the people in the form of a referendum.
The people of Mozambique are the yardstick and the ultimate end of the law and Government.

b. National Independence, Citizens' Freedom, Commutative and Distributive Justice, Respect for History and Progress in the future will be the bases for the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique.
Sealed by the blood of our martyrs, the supreme ideals of the Constitution are national imperatives.

May 16, 1986

Dear Senator Cranston:

I refer to the letter from Mr. Jose A. Francisco that you sent to this office under your memorandum of May 1, 1986 concerning Mr. Francisco's brother Antonio Francisco. We do not have any information in our files on Mr. Francisco but have cabled our Embassy in Maputo, Mozambique to ask for information they may have or be able to develop on him. As soon as we have a reply from our Embassy we will inform you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

James W. Dyer
Acting Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

June 25, 1987

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Jose A. Francisco, a Mozambican-American, testified before the Subcommittee on Africa on June 24. At that time, he pointed out that his brother, Mr. Antonio Francisco, is believed to be held by the Government of Mozambique, but his exact whereabouts and condition are unknown.

In a May 16, 1986 letter (copy attached) from Mr. James W. Dyer, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, the State Department indicated that it had cabled the U.S. Embassy in Maputo to ask for information on Antonio Francisco.

However, over one year later Mr. Jose Francisco has not heard further from his inquiry on his brother.

We ask the State Department to renew its inquiry into the safety and whereabouts of Antonio Francisco, and notify us and Jose Francisco at the earliest possible date.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Paul Simon
U.S. Senate

Jesse Helms
U.S. Senate

Nancy Kassebaum
U.S. Senate

Alan Cranston
U.S. Senate

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN METZ

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing. I am especially pleased to see that the topic of American relations with Mozambique is receiving the attention of the Congress as well as the public. I am convinced that the outcome of the current debate on this topic has important implications not only for that beleaguered nation, but also for the more general development of American policy in the Third World.

Specifically, the central question of whether to support the guerrillas attempting to overthrow the current government of Mozambique must be seen within the context of what is widely known as the "Reagan Doctrine." As we all know, this is the program of American assistance for a range of insurgent movements struggling with Marxist regimes in the Third World. As such, it

represents a new and important dimension of containment, one intended to be dynamic and aggressive rather than passive and to respond to the new realities of politics and cold war competition in the Third World.

But at the present time the Reagan Doctrine is badly in need of conceptual development and "fine-tuning." The ambiguities and lack of clarity which current characterize it diminish the chances for building a consensus among the American public and our allies; without this consensus, the policy cannot succeed. Within the context of American policy toward Mozambique I would like to briefly deal with the central question pertaining to the development of the Reagan Doctrine: Exactly when should the United States support insurgents attempting the overthrow of a Marxist regime? And from this perspective, I would argue that Mozambique is not a place where we should do this.

A "FOCUSED" POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR INSURGENTS

Any policy which calls for American support for any and all insurgent movements struggling with radical Third World regimes would be dangerous and counterproductive. An unequivocal belief that the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" not only fails to reflect the complexities of the current world, but also stands little chance of leading to the development of a domestic consensus. Thus a central element of the Reagan Doctrine must be a sense of when support for insurgents is appropriate or, to phrase it differently, a set of criteria for American assistance. This can be derived from a rather simple set of categories into which Marxist Third World states can be placed. The first category is composed of nations whose geostrategic value to the United States is clear and pressing or are ruled by regimes which pose a clear and impending threat to vital American interests. Nicaragua would fall into this category. The second category is composed of nations where the opposition to the government is clearly popular and/or democratic. Afghanistan and Angola would fit here. The third category is a "none of the above" grouping which consists of nations which are: 1) not geostrategically vital to the United States; 2) ruled by regimes which are not aggressively expansionistic or militaristic; and 3) where the opposition to the regime is not genuinely popular, broad-based, or democratic. Mozambique fits into this third category.

GEOSTRATEGIC VALUE AND THREAT POTENTIAL OF MOZAMBIQUE

In terms of tangible national interests, Mozambique poses little threat to the United States. While it is located on an important shipping route, its navy consists exclusively of a few coastal patrol boats, and thus represents no danger to free transit through the Madagascar Straits. The United States has almost no economic stake in Mozambique at the present time, and, with the exception of South Africa, very limited investment in or trade with neighboring states.

In a more general political sense, the threat posed by the current regime

in Mozambique is also minimal. The nation has been ruled since independence in 1975 by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), a Marxist organization which emerged victorious from a long colonial war with the Portuguese. During this struggle China was FRELIMO's major supplier of arms, but since then has been replaced by the Soviet Union. In 1977 Mozambique and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which called for economic, political, and military cooperation, but the government of President Samora Machel was never fully satisfied with the extent of Soviet support. The Soviets' reluctance to back the Machel government to the same extent as their allies in Angola and Ethiopia can be attributed to an assessment of the relatively low geostrategic value of Mozambique and to Machel's rejection of Soviet demands for military bases.

Since the end of white rule in Rhodesia in 1979, Mozambique has posed no threat to any of its neighbors except South Africa. This is an important exception, since the guerrilla war in Mozambique today is a direct result of conflict with the Pretoria regime. When FRELIMO assumed control of Mozambique, South African Prime Minister Vorster initially attempted to forge a modus vivendi which would exchange economic and technical assistance for political compliance. This was immediately rejected and, Pretoria feared, Mozambique appeared set to become a major backer of anti-apartheid efforts by black South Africans. In reality this threat never approached dangerous levels for Pretoria. After years of destructive anti-colonial war, the Machel regime could offer little real assistance to the guerrilla operations of the African National Congress (ANC), and Mozambique's economic dependence on South Africa served as a brake on any inclinations for a more active role in the anti-apartheid struggle.

But despite this, the eroding security situation within South Africa led the Pretoria regime to vigorously strike at any external source of support for the ANC. One form of coercion was economic pressure, including a decrease in the number of Mozambican guest workers in South Africa and a re-direction of South African shipping away from the port of Maputo. Another form was direct command raids. The first of these came on 30 January 1981 when South African commandos attacked ANC-owned houses in the Maputo suburb of Matola. Others followed in rapid succession. In addition there have been a number of other attacks usually attributed to indigenous insurgents, but which by their sophistication, were more likely the work of South African commandos. These include three attacks on port and railway facilities (including the buoys in the important port of Beira); the assassination of key ANC personnel; raids on fuel depots in Beira; air and, commando bombings. The most damaging form of South African coercion, however, has been support for anti-government insurgents.

The war between FRELIMO and the insurgents actually began at a low-level in the 1970s. At first this appeared to pose little threat to the new regime, so the revolutionary army was largely demobilized and government resources were concentrated on economic development and war reconstruction.

Eventually the conflict spread and became more destructive, thus causing a greater share of scare resources to be transferred to counter-insurgency efforts. As the conflict escalated, Machel sought military assistance in Western Europe, the Eastern Bloc, and other African nations. Great Britain has provided training for officers and equipment, and military cooperation with Portugal has slowly developed. Tanzania and, more importantly, Zimbabwe have provided more extensive support. At the present time about 12,000 crack Zimbabwean troops guard transportation and economic targets in Mozambique. In addition the FRELIMO government recognized that much of the public discontent that prolonged the insurgency was caused by the failure of centralized collectivist economic policies. Thus the regime began to allow a small degree of free enterprise, attempted to attract investment from the West, and started the integration of Mozambique into the world economy by membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These economic reforms, however, have failed, largely due to the endemic conflict between the government and the insurgents.

THE NATURE OF THE OPPOSITION

The insurgents currently attempting to overthrow the FRELIMO regime are known as the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) or by the Portuguese acronym RENAMO. Unlike most African insurgent movements, the MNR did not originate in the anti-colonial war or from ethnic, religious, or tribal struggle, but rather from the regional struggle between black nationalism and white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. The MNR was created by Rhodesian security forces during the long guerrilla war in that nation. It was to: 1) gather intelligence about Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which operated from Mozambique after the end of Portuguese rule; 2) serve as guides for Rhodesian incursions aimed at these bases; and, 3) disrupt the parts of Mozambique near the Rhodesian border in order to punish the FRELIMO regime for its support of ZANU. At this point the MNR was largely composed of ex-members of the Portuguese anti-insurgency units (the flechas) with a small number of FRELIMO defectors, Portuguese officers, and mercenaries. Actual operations were limited to the Rhodesia-Mozambique border area, and were at most a minor nuisance for the popular FRELIMO government.

After the Lancaster House Accords of 1979 and the end of the Smith government in Rhodesia, the MNR, which had made no attempt to build a base of popular support within Mozambique and thus was totally dependent on Rhodesian sponsorship, was on the verge of collapse. According to reputable observers, it had fewer than 500 members; these were locked in a bloody internecine struggle. But almost immediately after the end of Rhodesian sponsorship South Africa, which had become frustrated with its failure to create a compliant "constellation of states" in southern Africa, assumed responsibility for the support, supply, and direction of the MNR. As the white minority government in South Africa came under increasing domestic and

international pressure, Pretoria assumed that support for groups such as the ANC by the black "Front Line States" amplified the threat to apartheid. Support for insurgent movements within the Front Line States and a general policy of regional destabilization was, in part, a method to deter support for the ANC. In addition, by attacking economic targets insurgent movements such as the MNR helped prevent attempts by the Front Line States to end their economic dependence on South Africa through the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC). Thus rather than either disintegrating or evolving into a "national liberation" movement with popular support, the MNR simply changed from a tool of Rhodesian national security policy to a tool of South African national security policy.

The best evidence for this was found in the nature of the MNR's targets and its general mode of operations. Most attacks were directed at economic targets, particularly those which could provide alternatives for the use of South Africa's communication and transportation network. The transportation corridor between Zimbabwe and Beira was the focal point of these efforts. Potential targets of value to Pretoria were largely ignored. Wider MNR operations were aimed at general economic disruption which, in turn, fueled popular discontent with FRELIMO. Targets have included a wide range of facilities including food distribution networks; rail and road lines; telephone and telegraph stations; schools, sawmills; and state-owned farms. Development projects operated by foreigners drew special attention, with a number of development technicians killed or kidnapped. As a result, United Nations officials estimate that as many as 4.5 million Mozambican peasants are suffering from severe famine caused by drought and MNR disruption of relief efforts. Since very few outside observers have been permitted to see MNR operations first-hand, it is difficult to assess recent claims of alterations in tactics, but rumors of MNR atrocities such as the execution, torture, and mutilation of peasants and forced conscription into the group are too widespread to be discounted. Even journalists who have been allowed to visit MNR camps and areas of operation --including both South Africans and Europeans-- have not offered unqualified endorsements of the group.

Following South Africa's adoption of the MNR in the early 1980s, the group rapidly expanded in size and area of operation. As the government of Samora Machel came to recognize the threat which the insurgents posed, greater attention was given to fighting them, but the FRELIMO army, which suffered from low morale and reliance on inappropriate, Soviet-style tactics, had only uneven success. In an attempt to end South African support for the MNR, Machel signed an agreement with Pretoria in March 1984 (the "Nkomati Accord") in which both sides promised to terminate all assistance to groups attempting the overthrow of the other. Mozambique appears to have followed its agreement by expelling most members of the ANC, but, as Pretoria was later forced to admit, South Africa continued covert aid to the MNR.

Today it is unclear whether the MNR continues to receive official South African assistance, but it had developed an elaborate support network

composed of private groups and citizens of South Africa plus a number of Portuguese businessmen who lost holdings when FRELIMO gained power in 1975. Despite persistent reports of South African contact with the MNR, occasional attacks on targets of value to Pretoria such as the Maputo-Johannesburg power lines may indicate somewhat greater tactical autonomy on the part of the group, but also may simply serve as a ploy to camouflage continuing South African assistance. The fact that Malawi, which is one of the few nations in Africa on friendly terms with South Africa, has become a major basing area for the MNR indicates that Pretoria is still involved.

The war itself between the MNR and the FRELIMO government has reached a stalemate. The MNR remains unable to penetrate the cities, create and administer liberated zones, or build a base of popular support. While the government has enlarged its army from around 15,000 to nearly 50,000, developed counter-insurgency tactics, and received some modern equipment such as Soviet MI-24 helicopter gunships (which are largely unused), it is unable to exert control over much of the countryside, protect important economic targets, or consistently keep transportation networks open. In September 1986 the rebels launched a series of attacks from bases in Malawi with the apparent objective of cutting Mozambique in half and declaring the northern part a separate state to be called "Rombezia." The tide was turned by an influx of Zimbabwean troops which, in conjunction with Mozambican forces, recaptured a number of towns and the important Mutarara bridge over the Zambezi river. But even this offensive was not able to fully defeat the MNR. The MNR claims to have ended its reliance on external supplies, but most analysts disagree. It is therefore likely that so long as external supplies flow to the MNR, the military stalemate will continue and the Mozambican countryside will continue to experience famine, disease, and economic regression.

In general the MNR has utilized discontent with FRELIMO policies on the part of Mozambican peasants, but has not administered any "liberated zones" and has provided no political program beyond vague anti-communism/anti-FRELIMO statements. Attempts to emulate the strategy of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in Angola and play on tribal or racial divisions within Mozambique have also failed. While widespread popular discontent with FRELIMO economic policies has created potential support for the MNR, rebel atrocities have caused the peasants to fear the group, but not to actively back it. The objectives of the group also remain unclear as demands for negotiations and power-sharing were jettisoned when the 1984 "Pretoria Declaration" indicated some willingness on the part of the FRELIMO government to move in that direction. The leader of the MNR, Afonso Dhlakama, is an ex-FRELIMO quartermaster who was cashiered for corruption; he has not emerged as a popular leader in the Savimbi style. The atrocities, the lack of a political program, the clear linkage between the MNR and South Africa's policy of regional destabilization, and confusion over who speaks for the MNR have all

combined to deter international support for the group, even among avowed anti-communists such as Savimbi and Mobutu in Zaire.

CONCLUSION

Since the death of Samora Machel in October 1986 the FRELIMO government, which is now under the leadership of Joaquim Chissano, has continued to seek assistance from the West. Chissano has expressed interest in economic reforms and improved human rights performance, but notes that these are severely hampered by the war. This clearly indicates that FRELIMO wants to avoid total reliance on the Soviets along with the supplication which this would entail. But at the same time, the regime faces a severe threat from the MNR, and if Western assistance is not forthcoming, Chissano may be forced to make concessions to the Soviets concerning bases and other issues in exchange for a level of military support which can guarantee the survival of his regime. The nature of the Soviet delegation at Machel's funeral, which included Deputy Foreign Minister and Politburo member Geydar Aliyev and, more significantly, General Yevgeny Ivanovsky, commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces, shows that the Soviets are receptive to this.

While it can be easily argued that the FRELIMO regime, which still refuses to fully abandon failed Marxist economic policies, does not warrant active U.S. assistance, it is also true that support for the MNR would in no way safeguard our interests or strengthen our position in southern Africa. This support would prolong the conflict in Mozambique thereby contributing to further instability in the region, assisting South Africa in its policy of coercive destabilization, and providing opportunities for the Soviets to reverse their declining influence. But even American support would probably not lead to an MNR victory or greater popular support for the movement. The only possible conclusion is that U.S. support for the MNR would not only damage our influence and interests in southern Africa, but would also erode the credibility and support for the Reagan Doctrine within the United States and among those of our allies who have withheld judgement until the full development of the policy are evident. Thus the damage to American interests which would result from support for the MNR extend well beyond southern Africa.

As a great power the United States must occasionally associate with unsavory and even reprehensible allies, but as a symbol of a set of values and ideals, we must do this only when absolutely necessary. And, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is my belief that at the present time Mozambique does <u>not</u> represent such a situation.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TERRY JEGGLE

Mr. Chairman, Hon. Senators, respected guests, and colleagues, I appreciate this opportunity to testify before the committee to contribute to a more-informed understanding of Mozambique.

My name is Terry Jeggle. For the past 16 years I have worked in overseas emergency relief and development assistance work for CARE. During that period I have had 10 assignments of which six have been in Africa (Uganda twice, Kenya, Liberia, Somalia, Mozambique), four have been related to international emergency disasters, and five have reflected some measure of conflict-induced disruption. Mozambique was my most recent assignment where, as Director of CARE-Mozambique, I was responsible for the initial negotiation, design, and introduction of CARE's program from December 1983 and its subsequent direction and operational management from mid-1984 to February 1987. I am presently on a one-year leave of absence sabbatical from CARE.

As you are aware, for the past 41 years CARE has been known as a reputable and competent non-sectarian, non-governmental, non-profit development and relief assistance organization. CARE currently assists people in 39 countries through the provision of material and technical resources in a manner designed to foster human well-being and to enhance the development of personal and institutional capabilities. We strive to act as a catalyst; we seek to nurture and to provide the opportunity of growth. A collaborative partnership of joint commitment by CARE, a country's institutions, and its people is essential if CARE is to succeed in its purpose. An understanding of that purpose and a dedicated responsiveness is equally necessary from CARE's partners if mutual growth is to be realized.

In Mozambique, CARE was provided an opportunity from early 1984 to participate in a joint effort with the Government of Mozambique to create a new structure to assist the country in addressing some of its numerous problems. Specifically, CARE, with the financial support of donors including the United States Government through the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, was able to provide operational material and technical

assistance to respond more effectively to immediate humanitarian assistance needs of the country. Through this exercise of contributing to the establishment and management of the Logistical Support Unit of the Government's Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities (DPCCN), CARE was engaged in a collaborative capacity to assist in the growth of a viable and responsible indigenous institution. The assignment of competent expatriate technical assistance staff to work alongside, and to train, national staff both in Maputo and in provincial headquarters laid a foundation for the activity. Together with necessary material resources an agency was created under the auspices of DPCCN to receive, warehouse, transport, arrange means of distribution, inventory, and report on donated emergency relief assistance intended for free distribution to victims of displacement and calamity throughout the affected regions of the country.

The Government of Mozambique's request to CARE to engage in this joint endeavour came at a time when there were virtually no previous associations between the Government and PVO s.* A reserved welcome was evident, much as CARE's enthusiasm was to be tempered by a patient understanding of the specific foreign environment. The Government of Mozambique was cautious and took time to learn of the abilities and motivations of PVO s. The Government had to establish the distinction between the engaged involvement of a PVO and the more direct material commitments of donors. Initial operational efforts related to project development in 1984 and early 1985 were indeed tentative, although it is now evident that essential foundations of collaboration were being formed at that time. The CARE activity sought to lead and encourage as much as possible, acting as an honest broker in response to the needs of the international donors on one hand and participant Mozambican institutions and recipients on the other. Practical field conditions and donor-PVO-governmental relationships defined

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*Private Voluntary Organizations.

the environment, as operational imperatives and personal commitments were the motivations. An urgent and capable response to people's needs and the growth, over time, of institutional abilities were the objectives.

During 1986 this developmental process resulted in the Logistical Support Unit of DPCCN handling 125,000 tons of emergency relief valued at more than $30 million comprising 320 consigments from 44 donors that entered the country at 18 different places of entry. Operations were established in the seven affected provinces in the country and a fleet of 186 trucks (now 350) were engaged and managed by the unit working under DPCCN auspices. Radio communication was maintained in more than ten up-country locations. CARE had nine expatriate staff permanently resident in provincial capitals in addition to the ten assigned to Maputo, all working in joint counterpart relationships with designated governmental offices. Operational expenditure and material resources received by the project from numerous international donors exceeded $9 million. All operational local currency expenditures and national staff costs were absorbed by the Government of Mozambique.*

Such a project could not have been initiated, much less achieved, without the serious intention and a forthcoming responsiveness on the part of the Mozambican Government and its officials. Errors of omission and commission have been made, indeed by all participants, but it must be said that from the time of the original expression of intent for the project in March 1984 until my departure in February 1987 the representatives of the Government of Mozambique were steadfast, disciplined, and supportive in the joint effort. During my first visit to Mozambique in December 1983 I was advised that there were two personal and organizational qualities that must

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* Commentary regarding the efficacy of the project may be found in the following sources:

1. USAID, OFDA-sponsored independent Program Evaluation, September 1985.
2. UN/OEOA Report 3/15 "Relations Between OEOA and the Private Sector including NGO's/PVO's and Private Donors", Nov. 1986.

Operational details of the project are contained in the "Annual Report of Operational Activities - 1986" submitted to USAID/OFDA by CARE, December 1986.

be exhibited if one were to be successful in a Mozambican joint venture. They were, simply, competence and sincerity. CARE tried to build these qualities into the program and our experience suggests that the advice was sound. The positive Mozambican responsiveness which this policy engendered, whether in its engaging and polite frankness or in its quiet but sincere compliments, should be acknowledged. Much positive work resulted from the mutual trust and professional relationships established between PVO's and government officials.

A close, working relationship with Government, donors, UN Agencies, PVO's and ordinary people, as victims, provided the opportunity for a more comprehensive and informed understanding of Mozambique's conditions, needs, and torments. Whether through inattention, distance, or pre-disposition it does appear that the country's standing, aspirations, and limitations are poorly understood in the United States. The causes of Mozambique's current problems are certainly complicated and inter-related to the extent that simplifications do not foster understanding. Equally, ideological suppositions are inappropriate measures for analysis as concepts blur and external events exert influences that must be addressed in pragmatic terms. It is anticipated that CARE's experience in Mozambique, and mine personally, can, through the following observations, broaden an understanding of the country and the needs of its people.

Mozambique's problems cannot be explained simply as a dictatorial application of a misguided political philosophy as some commentators would have it. The country has been subjected to multiple historical and economic circumstances, several of which had their origins in the colonial period. It has been widely recognized that the material resources and productive infrastructure of the country at independence were severely limited and were the consequences largely of the requirements of a protected colonial economy. More significantly, very little attention had been devoted to

social welfare or education and skills development for the indigenous population. A concentration of managerial, administrative, and entrepreneurial talents was lost with the abrupt and fearful departure of Portuguese and other emigrès at the time of independence. Inappropriate and misguided economic policies were initially promulgated and they became one of several contributing factors to Mozambique's economic deterioration.

Geographical considerations with their related strategic and political consequences must also be acknowledged as significant. The economic and political leverage of South Africa exerted throughout the southern African region by finance, trade, and transportation dominance is overbearing. Meanwhile the strategic and transportation potential represented by Mozambique's geographical position has emerged as a key element in the political dynamics current in southern Africa. Regional political stresses and relationships between neighboring states contribute to defining the political environment in which Mozambique must seek solutions to its problems.

Finally, the drought and protracted adverse climatic conditions contributed to the frustration of Mozambique's efforts to ameliorate the severity of its economic condition. In addition to drought, Mozambique was also subjected to the effects of typhoon, windstorm, and flood in localized areas of the country.

The consideration of these multiple sources of deterioration, each interacting with the others and many extending beyond the borders of Mozambique, belies any effort to determine a primary motivation to the country's problems. On the contrary, the deliberate and consistent search for viable solutions, such as those methodically embarked upon by the Government of Mozambique since 1984 increasingly demonstrates Mozambique's recognition of economic and political realities faced by a weak and dependent state. Unfortunately, this positive and realistic

process has been impeded by a military campaign of terror, destruction, and destabilization. As such, it must be recognized that Mozambique's condition is defined and determined in a regional context and its problems cannot be addressed in isolation from the economic and political forces in the region. Serious progress cannot be expected in Mozambique unless and until there is a measure of tranquility in the country and that tranquility is heavily dependent upon the resolution of substantive issues in southern Africa.

The current conditions of need facing the country, characterized as emergency relief assistance most immediately engendered by climatic and conflict induced conditions , must be viewed from the twin perspectives of time and geographical distribution of effects. Primary causal factors of the intensification of the disaster also must be taken into account for an informed understanding.

The play of these multiple forces is discernible when one analyzes the contrasting nature and extent of emergency disaster conditions prevailing in Mozambique during the initial period of international response from early 1984 to mid-1985 characterized by drought and the later period from mid-1985 to the present. August-September 1985 designates a period from which there was an increase in emergency conditions predominantly derived from conflict-induced circumstances in areas of the country not previously affected by drought. This enlarged area of concern for emergency relief stretched along the length of the Zambesi River, throughout the populous and productive province of Zambesia, and generally throughout areas contiguous to Malawi from eastern Tete Province to Gurue in north-central Zambesia. A distinction must be made not only in the altered focus and location of need but also in the type of conflict-evident with its significance to the perpetuation and extension of the disaster emergency.

In the initial period of 1984-85, at the time when Mozambique initially sought international emergency drought assistance, predominantly the southern half of the country was reeling from severe and prolonged drought conditions. The areas affected were particularly in the interior rural areas of Gaza,

Inhambane and, to a lesser extent, southern Tete. Security concerns evident at the time were primarily in the occurrence of small-scale, hit-and-run ambushes on roads, trucks, buses, trains of either commercial, public, or relief type and frequently accompanied by brutalities and destruction of cargo. These events occurred primarily in the southern area of the country south of the Save River, including Maputo Province. The agriculturally productive region of Tete Province north of Cahora Bassa Lake and contiguous to Zambia, and Malawi was viewed as being generally inaccessible and highly dangerous because of insurgency. Sofala Province was considered to be heavily penetrated by bandits. Sofala at the time was only partly affected by drought conditions, as was the neighboring province of Manica, so relief penetration was not so critical in the initial stages of emergency response.

Significantly, at this time of a serious need for assistance to respond to a largely climatic-induced, and localized, emergency, the Government did not have viable operational structures or sufficient material, resources, or organized institutional abilities to respond because of the historical and economic reasons described above. Trucks, hard-currency for fuel, broad-based donor support to supply food relief, and a viable management structure were all lacking in sufficient degree for an effective response. However, the immediate emergency response by the Mozambique Government, UN agencies and some PVO's did, by mid-1985, stabilize conditions of food availability in Gaza, Inhambane, and Tete, albeit at only a moderate level. It is noteworthy that during this period Mozambique's major grain-producing and most populous province, Zambesia, was not designated as an affected province by either the Mozambique Government or by the international assistance community. At that time, Zambesia was neither subjected to significant or disruptive insurgent activity nor was it within the drought zone. The rural population was settled and producing, much as were the sugar estate at Luabo and the tea estates in Gurue. While there was a shortage of domestic consumer supplies reflecting problems

in marketing structures, there was adequate food being produced and available for consumption as well as for commercial sale. Similar conditions generally prevailed also in eastern and south-eastern Tete province and in areas adjacent to the district capital towns of Chemba, Caia, Sena, and Marromeu in the Zambesi River valley.

In summary, during the 1984-85 emergency response the affected population was concentrated in the rural interior areas of Gaza, Inhambane, and southern Tete and food shortages were predominantly induced by climatic conditions. Hit-and-run armed bandit attacks accompanied by brutalities were occurring in southern provinces on the means of transportation. Small band terrorist attacks were also perpetrated on villagers. Territory was not controlled by insurgent forces but fear did impede the movement of goods and services. The Government of Mozambique was limited in both its resources and abilities to respond quickly and effectively, but in recognition of that fact it encouraged increased external assistance from a wider range of bilateral donors, UN agencies, and Private Voluntary Organizations. In time, by mid-1985, Government-sponsored institutional abilities and material resources had developed to the extent that budding management and response had stabilized the emergency condition, subject to the continued availability of sustaining food and material assistance. Attention increasingly turned to rehabilitation and development project requirements for the provision of seeds, tools, water supply equipment, etc. It was also at this time that the Government was prepared to experiment with limited free market trade policies representing an additional element of economic rehabilitation.

A second, and distinctly different phase of emergency conditions emerged in later 1985 with the recognition of intensified conflict and civil disturbance in Mozambique's central, productive heartland. This conflict and related disruption initiated in Zambesia province was not only to define, but to create, the focus of the Mozambican emergency disaster from late 1985 to the present. District headquarter

towns and adjacent rural areas in the Zambesia River basin (Chemba, Caia, Sena, Muturara, Inhaminga, Marromeu) were increasingly subjected to attack or isolation and elements of destruction. The earlier attacks on the means of transportation and villagers by the armed bandits predominantly in the southern provinces were being eclipsed by larger territorial strategic objectives increasingly referred to as "the war" in the central Mozambican heartland directed at the population, cultural, and productive throat of the country. Territory was closed , if not held, by military presence or at best it was characterized by an uncertain or indeterminate authority exerted at different times. Rural and productive life, as much as the opportunities for relief transport, were totally disrupted. Thousands of people became internally displaced moving from regions of conflict to secure government-administered areas such as Quelimane, Mocuba, Milange, Muturara, Moatize, and Tete in order to flee conflict and to obtain food and domestic goods that were impossible to grow or obtain under the war-induced conditions. All of the territory contiguous to Malawi ranging from northeastern Tete Province (Ulongwe) down the Zambesi River to the southern tip of Malawi and then through Zambesia Province to the tea etate area of Gurùè and beyond to the Nacala-Cuamba-Lichinga railroad was disrupted to the extent that normal production, access, and the possible movement of goods either ceased, or was subjected to considerable risk. This area subjected to disruption and destabilization throughout 1986 is shown as the cross-hatched region on the map attached. It does not, by any means, constitute 85 percent of the country as other commentators have suggested.

Meanwhile, both emergency and security conditions in the southern third of the country, and in central-to-southern Manica largely improved, with the exception of interior and southern Maputo Province. Late 1986 did witness the continuation of arid conditions in interior Gaza and Inhambane, and parts of southwestern Tete, all areas that are within the annual 600 mm.

rainfall semi-arid zone. The prevailing dry conditions did occasion some displacement of populations in interior Gaza and Inhambane. They generally moved to district headquarters in central Inhambane where emergency provisions were being effectively provided by Government. Neither cultivated crops nor adequate water access were available in their home areas. Emergency relief food supplies, domestic materials and the transportation to deliver them were all available in 1986 and government-sponsored distribution activities were underway throughout the entirety of both Gaza and Inhambane provinces.

During the period, Gaza experienced virtually no security incidents from the end of 1985 to the beginning of 1987 and travel was generally unimpeded except in late 1986 in the vicinity of Massingir adjacent to South Africa. During the year, only one relief truck on two separate occasions was briefly fired on in Gaza and in each instance the truck continued to destination. While it was not as sure as Gaza, Inhambane also demonstrated a relative improvement in security even if persistent problems did remain in Massinga District straddling Route 1 between Inhambane and Vilanculos. There were also periodic small group ambushes every four to five months. Mozambican truck and bus drivers, national and expatriate aid workers travelled most main and some secondary roads in Gaza and Inhambane even if these movements were subject to prudence at a given time or place. Convoy protection for relief shipments was still viewed as a desirable precaution given the element of uncertainty of hit-and-run ambush events.

Elsewhere in the country where relief activities were underway, security conditions and the related aspects of transportation access were more conditional on given circumstances, locations, and times, given the fluid nature of the conflict. In terms relative to 1985, transportation access to interior Manica improved in the southern third of the province and within the central region to Catandica. The northwestern corner of the province could also be approached, but from a Zimbabwean access point. Eastern and northeastern Manica was difficult to penetrate both because of the

difficult topography and because of considerable risk imposed by conflict. Contrary to some assertions, goods movement through the Beira Corridor in both Manica and Sofala provinces and in both directions, by train or road, was largely unimpeded although disruptions or delays of brief duration did occur. Similarly, transportation in southern Tete (below Lake Cahora Bassa) was generally without incident although protective convoying was provided by Government in some areas.

During the entirety of 1986, throughout the six provinces in which the 186 LSU/DPCCN trucks were deployed, 12 were permanently destroyed by hostile action. Of those 12, nine were destroyed in Tete alone in attempts to deliver relief materials to the dangerous districts of Chiuta and Angonia. Of the remaining destroyed trucks, one was attacked in each of three different provinces (Inhambane, Sofala, Manica). Two other trucks were firebombed at night when parked at a UNICEF project in Tete, but their cabs were replaced and the vehicles continued to provide service.

In summary, what is significant about the relief emergency from late 1985 to mid-1987 is that the focus of attention was shifted to the central region of the country into areas previously unaffected, or affected to a lesser extent, by the drought during 1984-85. The proportionately larger number of victims was also predominantly affected by conflict-induced food shortages and the disruption of productive endeavour that in turn occasioned physical dislocation and displacement of populations both within and outside Mozambican boundaries. The continuation and the extent of hardship endured by the rural population since 1985 has clearly been induced primarily by the territorially-based conflict that developed in the central region. Indeed, climatic-induced food shortages did remain in drier and mostly southern regions, but they were being responded to in an able manner by Government, PVO, and UN agencies. The emergency response in the southern region was generally less frustrated by security concerns although the fluid, hit-and-run nature of attack continued to necessitate precautions, and protective means or timetables may well have retarded relative efficiencies.

A comparison of the prevailing nature of Mozambique's emergency disaster in the two phases outlined above, and the opportunities for response in different areas at different times, is necessary to highlight the true impact of the insurgency on the relief effort. To pose a question in the manner of whether perpetrators of armed conflict have impeded an effective response To the emergency is to obscure the point that the perpetuation and extension of the emergency condition, beyond the drought conditions in southern provinces of the country until late 1985, has been precisely because of deliberate destructive and disruptive actions. To suggest that the resources and abilities of the Government and relief agencies are unable to respond effectively to the conditions conflict has created is to overlook the fact that it is the extension of conflict into broader and formerly settled productive areas that continues to stretch the demands and resources of emergency response. In all likelihood there would not now be a disaster emergency condition prevailing in the areas that are most seriously affected were it not for the motivated and externally supported destructive actions that have occurred since late 1985.

throughout the period of international emergency assistance to Mozambique the dominant approach of all United Nations, international, and private voluntary agencies has been to build upon national capabilities and to encourage growth. Considerable efforts and funds have been expended to increase indigenous resources and abilities while the Government of Mozambique has demonstrated seriousness and integrity in its efforts to respond to the needs of both victims and donors. Progress has undeniably been achieved through these positive efforts to build and to create. Humanitarian concerns as well as considerations for the longer termed well-being of the Mozambican people can really only be contemplated through constructive endeavour -- such as that with which CARE has been pleased to have been associated during these past three and a half years.


TANZANIA
LICHINGA
ZAMBIA
MALAWI
TETE
ZIMBABWE
CHIMOIO
BEIRA
QUELIMANE
VILANCULOS
INHAMBANE
SOUTH AFRICA
CHIBUTO
MAPUTO
MOZAMBIQUE
Operational conditions
December 1986
Drought-affected areas
Food scarcity induced by banditry
Concentrations of dislocated people
Populations movements
DPCCN operational location

RESPONSES OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR SIMON

The Situation in Mozambique and U.S. Policy

1. In recent years, the Government of Mozambique has made a concerted effort to improve relations with the West. To what do you attribute this development?

A: In the years following Mozambique's independence in 1975, the GPRM attempted to implement "socialist" economic and social policies and opted for a close relationship with the Soviet Union internationally. By 1983, faced with economic collapse a suffocating and unproductive link to Moscow, and a growing insurgency, Mozambican leaders made a fundamental decision to reorient their country's foreign and domestic policies. Under the leadership of late President Machel, the GPRM began to change drastically its economic policies, reduce its dependence on Moscow, reassert its independence and nonalignment, and reach out to the West. Under President Chissano, Mozambique's leaders have continued and further strenthened this approach, which they believe will best enable them to deal with the country's problems and facilitate its economic development.

2. What has been the Soviet Union's reaction to Mozambique's so-called "opening to the West"?

A: There is considerable evidence of Soviet dissatisfaction with many elements of Mozambique's foreign and domestic policies since 1983. The Soviets were openly critical of Mozambique's decision to sign the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in 1984. Soviet-inspired disinformation efforts have tried to impede the improvement of U.S.-Mozambican relations by alleging the existence of secret U.S. contacts with RENAMO. The Soviets and their Afghan puppets have tried unsuccessfully to persuade the GPRM to vote with Moscow on the Afghanistan question in the UN. At a time when the GPRM is faced with the RENAMO insurgency, the trend of Soviet arms deliveries in recent years has been down. This trend is in sharp contrast to

a steadily increasing flow of Soviet arms to Angola during the same period.

3. Q: What is the current state of Mozambique's relations with the Soviet Union? How much military and economic aid does the Soviet Union provide to Mozambique?

Answer: [Classified]

4. Q: What Western European governments are providing assistance to Mozambique? In what forms? Are any Western governments other than Great Britain training Mozambican soldiers or contemplating any kind of military assistance to Mozambique?

A: According to the OECD, 12 Western European countries provide economic assistance to Mozambique. They include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The British and Portuguese governments have also provided some military assistance. We are not at present aware of any countries, other than Britain, which are planning to provide military training.

5. Q: How does U.S. bilateral assistance to Mozambique compare with that provided by Britain and our other European allies?

A: In 1985 U.S. bilateral assistance to Mozambique constituted 22 percent of total bilateral assistance equaling $219 million. With the exception of $5.7 million provided by Australia and Japan, Western European countries contributed the rest. In earlier years (1983 and 1984), however, U.S. assistance accounted for only 8 percent of the total.

6. What is your assessment of President Chissano? Do you expect that he will continue the economic and foreign policies that he inherited from Machel?

A: President Chissano has moved forcefully and skillfully to strenthen Mozambique's economic reform efforts and its turn toward the West in foreign policy. Under President Chissano, Mozambique has moved forward with its economic restructuring program with the assistance of the IMF and World Bank. President Chissano has reaffirmed Mozambique's commitment to

the Nkomati Accord with South Africa and has continued its cooperation with the U.S. in the search for regional peace and stability. President Chissano's first European trip -- to the U.K., Italy, and the Vatican in May 1987 -- was universally regarded as an impressive success. We believe that President Chissano is committed to the policy course he has set, and we intend to continue to work with and support the Government of Mozambique.

7. Does Chissano have full support within FRELIMO? What, if any, opposition is there to the policies that he has inherited from Machel?

A: President Chissano appears to have strong support for his leadership within the Mozambican leadership. There are, of course, a range of views among Mozambican leaders on policy issues. President Chissano has demonstrated clearly that he has the support of the Mozambique leadership for the broad strategy of economic reform and improvement of relations with the West begun by President Machel and continued since his death.

8. Some have argued that it is not possible to secure the Beira Corridor against terrorist attacks. Do you agree?

A: The Beira Corridor consists of road, rail, and petroleum pipeline links between the Mozambican Indian Ocean port of Beira and the Western terminus of the corridor at Mutare, Zimbabwe. Insurgents have demonstrated the ability to conduct attacks at various points along the corridor, but these attacks have not resulted in sustained interdiction of any of its vital transport links. Insurgent attacks are likely to continue, but we do not anticipate any fundamental change in the security of ongoing transport operations in the Beira Corridor.

9. What is the nature of private investment in the Beira Corridor?

A. At the moment, all funds dedicated to rehabilitation

projects in the Beira Corridor (railroad, road, and port facilities) are government-to-government economic assistance grants or loans. The pipeline which transports petroleum products to Zimbabwe includes investment by Lonrho, a UK-based private firm. The Beira Corridor Authority, an entity of the Mozambique Government, coordinates donor contributions to the rehabilitation projects. The Beira Corridor Group, based in Zimbabwe, has been formed by a group of private investors and is intended to attract private investment from and to SADCC member business interests. Finally, the company IBG A/S, registered in Oslo, has been founded to interest international private companies in investment in the corridor. These last two bodies are still at the early stages of development.

10. Q: What is the nature of investment by the Nordic and Western European nations in the Beira Corridor and other transportation routes in Mozambique? How does this compare with U.S. assistance to SADCC's transportation sector?

A: According to the latest SADCC Report (Feb. 1987), total funding requirements for Beira Corridor Transport System Projects = $613.9 million, of which $101.6 million has been secured through a mix of foreign and local courses. Nordic funding is "under negotiation" and therefore not included in the $101.6 million. Total Nordic portfolio = $35 million, major components as follows:

Title	Source	USD Million
Project Coordination	Nordic Countries	1.2
Dev. of Town of Beira	FINNIDA	0.5
Tech. Asst. to Port	Netherlands	7.5
Oil Terminal	NORAD	8.1
Service Port Facilities	FINNIDA	11.0
Tug boats	DANIDA	3.5
		35.0

Western European funding secured = $18.5 million. Major component as follows:

Track Upgrading	Italy	18.5

Western European funding under negotiation = $54.2 million. Major components as follows:

Manpower Dev. Plan	EEC	1.2
Container Handling Term	EEC	40.0
Track Rehab.	UK	12.4
Workshop Extension	UK	54.2

U.S. projects (funded in FY 85) in the Beira corridor = $4.6 million. Major components as follows:

Tech. Asst. to CFM	USAID	0.2
Track Upgrading	USAID	1.0
Loco Rehab.	USAID	2.7
Workshop Rehab.	USAID	0.7

Other donors to the Beira Corridor Transport System Projects are ADB and OPEC.

With respect to the other transportation routes in Mozambique (Nacala and Maputo), needs have been identified in the amount of $949.9 million of which $395 million has been secured from foreign and local sources. The U.S. has not contributed to these development activities.

11. Has the Soviet Union or its Eastern European allies provided any assistance to rehabilitate the transportation facilities in Mozambique?

A. We have no evidence that the USSR or its allies are participating directly in the Beira corridor rehabilitation. A document signed on March 11 as a result of the Soviet-Mozambican mixed commission meeting "envisages" Soviet participation in parts of Mozambique's economic rehabilitation program, including the Beira-Moatize railroad, but does not appear to actually commit any Soviet funds. Part of the Beira-Moatize line is included in the Beira Corridor Authority's planned Beira-Malawi line. However, the line is currently closed due to RENAMO activity. The remainder of the line to Moatize is not part of any Beira corridor project planning. We do not know whether the "envisaged" Soviet participation would include any of the Beira-Malawi line. Other than this plan, we are not aware of any Soviet bloc involvement in Beira Corridor rehabilitation.

12. Q: In what ways is South Africa violating the Nkomati Accord?

A: The Nkomati Accord specifically forbids the signatory countries to undertake sabotage operations, to mass military forces in the border areas, or assist any state or group of

states aligned against the other signatory. Neither signatory, according to the accord, is to allow its territory to be used or transited by military forces, organizations or individuals intending to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the other.

South Africa has violated the accord through its support of RENAMO and by the involvement of its forces in attacks against ANC facilities in Mozambique which have resulted in the death of innocent civilians. The ANC maintains a presence in Maputo, but it is not, to our knowledge, a military one.

13. Q: What are the prospects of either the Government or RENAMO achieving a military victory in Mozambique?

A: It is very unlikely that either the Mozambique government or RENAMO will attain an outright military victory in the next several years at least.

14. What are RENAMO's objectives in waging a guerilla war against the Government of Mozambique?

A: RENAMO's guerrilla war against Mozambique's economic infrastructure and transport routes appears directed at exacerbating the political, economic, and social challenges facing the GPRM. RENAMO attacks in rural areas and towns outside Maputo seek to undermine GPRM influence, enhance the perception of insurgent strength, and intimidate existing and potential RENAMO opponents in contested areas. The long-term RENAMO objective appears to be the demoralization of the government in Maputo, forcing either its collapse or agreement to negotiations on terms favorable to RENAMO. While RENAMO has been successful in sustaining guerilla warfare in many areas of Mozambique, it is not in a position to achieve a military victory.

15. What are the prospects for a peaceful settlement to the war in Mozambique?

A: It is the policy of the United States to use whatever influence is available to us to encourage an end to hostilities

and peaceful solutions in Mozambique, as we do elsewhere in southern Africa. For example, the U.S. encouraged contacts between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO following the conclusion of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique. Neither party has ruled out the possibility of such contacts in the future. Although Mozambicans themselves must be the principal architects of peace in their country, the U.S. will not hesitate to encourage prospects for a peace and national reconciliation.

16. Does RENAMO have a well-defined political platform? If so, what is it?

A: RENAMO has not articulated a well-defined political program, nor has its sought to establish its own system of local government or administration. In rural areas, RENAMO has sought to align itself with and exploit tribal and other traditional authorities. At the level of its national leadership, RENAMO has issued statements asserting its anti-communism and commitment to democracy. There is, however, no concrete evidence of democratic practices in either RENAMO's internal structure or its conduct in areas of Mozambique where it has influence. RENAMO appears to be primarily a military organization preoccupied with mounting an insurgency against the Government in Maputo.

17. Where does RENAMO get its financial support? Is there any evidence that private individuals or organizations in the United States provide RENAMO with support?

A: There is evidence of a continuing pattern of South African support for and communication with RENAMO. Although RENAMO has almost certainly received financial support from other external sources, the available information on this questions is sketchy. We have no evidence on whether private individuals or organizations in the United States provide RENAMO with financial support.

18. Why did RENAMO walk out of the South African brokered talks with the Government of Mozambique in 1984? Is there any indication that the Government of Mozambique would again enter into talks with RENAMO?

A: The motivation behind RENAMO's 1984 walkout from negotiations is not entirely clear, although there were reports at the time that RENAMO's external supporters pressured it in that direction. The Government of Mozambique has not ruled out talks with RENAMO at some future point. It has already moved toward reconciliation with other individuals and groups that have disagreed with government policy. The GPRM has, for instance, taken important steps in its relations with the Catholic Church, which has led to a marked improvement in Church-State relations.

19. Who purports to speak for RENAMO in the United States? If the United States had "official contact" with RENAMO, with whom would it talk?

A: The Mozambique Information Office in Washington purports to speak for RENAMO in the United States. RENAMO's external wing has been beset by divisions and appears to lack reliable links to the RENAMO leadership inside Mozambique. The fractiousness and unreliability of RENAMO's representation outside Mozambique raise serious questions about the utility of "official contacts" with such external representatives.

20. Q: Are there ethnic and/or political divisions within FRELIMO? If so, what is their nature? What is FRELIMO's political composition?

Answer: [Classified]

21. Was Marcelino Dos Santos a viable contender for the presidency after Machel's death? What are Dos Santos' politics? Is his current position as President of the People's Assembly a position of power?

A: Marcelino Dos Santos was among the potential contenders for the Presidency. However, the decision that President Chissano would succeed President Machel appears to have been taken on the basis of a broad consensus of the Mozambican

leadership. Although reputedly an advocate of close relations with the Soviet Union, Dos Santos has not publicly opposed President Chissano's initiatives for internal reform and improvement of relations with the West. Although the Presidency of the People's Assembly is, in itself, not a key policy-making position, Dos Santos remains an important member of the FRELIMO leadership.

RESPONSES OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HELMS

State Department Interference with Radio Marti

1. Q: Did you or members of your staff cause to be cancelled a Radio Marti trip to Angola?

2. Q: Did you or members of your staff cause to be cancelled a Radio Marti trip to Mozambique?

3. Q: Please provide a chronology of all contacts by you or staff of the Africa Bureau with officials of Radio Marti concerning trips to these countries during 1987.

4. Q: Are you aware that Public Law 94-350 requires independence in the news coverage produced by Radio Marti?

5. Q: Are you aware that your actions (and those of the Africa Bureau) may be a violation of Public Law 94-350?

6. Q: Are you aware that Radio Marti regards the Africa Bureau's actions as a violation of Public Law 94-350? Are you familiar with the attached letter on these charges from Radio Marti? How do you respond to these charges?

7. Q: Will you assure the Committee that neither you nor members of the Africa Bureau will attempt to interfere with Radio Marti's coverage of events in Angola or Mozambique in the future?

A: In response to the committee's questions alleging State Department interference with Radio Marti, the Department of State is well aware of the independent status of Radio Marti under the VOA charter. The State Department has neither the authority nor the desire to censor or influence Radio Marti's press coverage.

Under an informal arrangement, both VOA and Radio Marti routinely consult with USIA about their correspondents' foreign travel. Prior consultation about such travel is in the interest of both Radio Marti and the State Department,

especially when trips involve countries where sensitive policy concerns or questions of personal security arise.

Relations between the State Department and Radio Marti are cordial and cooperative. Contact is maintained on a regular and continuing basis. Most recently, on June 26, Assistant Secretary Crocker met with Radio Marti Director Ernesto Betancourt and with VOA Deputy Director Robert Barry.

The Committee can be assured that the Africa Bureau will seek to reinforce this mutually beneficial relationship.

Advisory Board for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba

June 4, 1987

Dear Mr. President:

Radio Marti's coverage of events in Angola is an important part of it's Congressional mandate to inform the Cuban people of events of interest to them. Over the past 12 years more than 400,000 Cuban troops have served in Angola. At any one time there are between 35,000 and 45,000 troops there. When compared to the U.S. population, this is more than twice the number of U.S. soldiers serving in Vietnam during the peak of U.S. involvement. Yet the Cuban people are told virtually nothing about events in Angola by the Cuban government. One of the most valid and justifiable services that Radio Marti can perform is to let the people of Cuba know what is happening to their family members and fellow countrymen in Angola.

However, Radio Marti has met with opposition from the State Department in its attempts to cover this important subject. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Chester Crocker has systematically opposed Radio Marti's efforts to cover Angola, maintaining that Africa is outside the scope of coverage of Radio Marti.

Specifically, Chester Crocker blocked a trip to Angola on March 4, 1987 by Radio Marti's news director hours before he was scheduled to leave. The news director was finally able to make the trip in May 1987. Only because he was already on his way to Angola was the State Department unable to cancel the trip. Nevertheless, once the State Department was aware of the news director's presence in Africa, the Africa Bureau forced Radio Marti to cancel its trip to Mozambique where news stories of interest to Cuban listeners were breaking, including the death of a Cuban lieutenant ambushed by guerrillas.

The members of the Presidential Advisory Board on Broadcasting to Cuba unanimously view this as unjustifiable interference in the legitimate journalistic mission of Radio Marti. As Chairman of the Board, I was instructed to convey to you the Board's concern over this situation. In a broader context, the journalistic integrity of the Voice of America of which Radio Marti is a part, is also at issue. The VOA Charter, (Public Law 94-350) requires a clear distinction between news coverage and presentation of the policies of the U.S. Government. By forcing the cancellation of Radio Marti's trip to Mozambique and its earlier cancellation of the African trip altogether, the State Department censored and dictated Radio Marti's news coverage. We view this action as a violation of Public Law 94-350.

Radio Marti would like to be able to visit Angola every three months to report on the latest developments. Interference by the State Department will preclude or seriously curtail its ability to keep up with events there and provide the Cuban people with essential news stories. The Board requests your support for this important aspect of Radio Marti's job.

Sincerely,

Jorge Mas
Chairman

Economic Situation: the Beira Corridor

1. Q: You state (p. 7) that the Mozambique government "has returned large tracts of land from state farms to private farmers." What is your definition of "private farmers?" Isn't it also true that large tracts of land continue to be in collectivist state farms? Isn't this going to impede economic revitalization in Mozambique?

A: "Private farmers" are either traditional peasant, family farmers or small-scale commercial farmers. Some land has remained in state farms. However, even at its high point, state farms occupied no more than 3 percent of the arable land in Mozambique. The Government of Mozambique's active efforts to return arable land to private farmers will facilitate, not impede, economic revitalization in Mozambique.

2. Which countries have the greatest private sector investment in Mozambique? Please provide an estimate of such investment, by country.

A. The countries with the greatest private sector investment (including bank loans) in Mozambique, in descending order, are:

Country	Amount (in US$1,000's)
USA	$61,000
UK	4,850
Switzerland	5,000
Portugal	2,000
South Africa	1,225
Italy	1,000
Holland	38

3. Q: Which countries have provided economic assistance to Mozambique? Please provide an estimate of each country's contribution.

A: According to official OECD data 16 countries provided assistance to Mozambique in 1985, the last year for which information is available, for a total of $216.9 million. The breakdown is as follows:

	($millions)
Australia	1.4
Austria	2.9
Belgium	1.3
Canada	4.8
Denmark	6.1
Finland	3.2
France	20.3
Germany, Fed. Rep.	4.8
Italy	28.6
Japan	4.3
Netherlands	24.8
Norway	21.2
Sweden	34.0
Switzerland	3.5
United Kingdom	10.9
United States	47.0
TOTAL 16	219.0

4. Which companies have the greatest investment in Mozambique? What is the estimated value of these investments?

A. The companies with the greatest investment in Mozambique, and the estimated value of those investments are:

Company	Value (in US$1,000)
Equator Bank (USA)	$36,100
Edlow Resources (USA)	25,000
Intabex (Switzerland)	5,000
Lonrho (UK)	3,280
Amilcar Martins (Portugal)	2,000
Echodelta (UK)	1,570
Louw Enterprise (South Africa)	1,225
D. Giambattista (Italy)	1,000
DHL (Holland)	38

5. Q: The State Department has stated that the U.S. has "no evidence that the U.S.S.R. has pledged its assistance to rehabilitate the Beira corridor?" Yet you have acknowledged that the March 11, 1987 protocol between Mozambique and the Soviets covered, according to Mozambican media reports, "Soviet participation in rehabilitation of the Beira transport corridor." Which is the case?

A: We have no evidence that the USSR is participating directly in the Beira corridor rehabilitation. The document signed on March 11 as a result of the Soviet-Mozambican mixed commission meeting "envisages" Soviet participation in parts of Mozambique's economic rehabilitation program, including the Beira-Moatize railroad, but does not appear to actually commit any Soviet funds. Part of the Beira-Moatize line is included in the Beira Corridor Authority's planned Beira-Malawi line. However, the line is currently closed due to RENAMO activity. The remainder of the line to Moatize is not part of any Beira corridor project planning. We do not know whether the "envisaged" Soviet participation would include any of the Beira-Malawi line.

6. Q: What is the latest estimate of pledges, by country, for Beira Corridor rehabilitation?

A: Pledges by country for the Beira Corridor are:

Country	$Millions
European Community	50.0
Sweden	27.0
Norway	14.0
Finland	12.0
Denmark	17.0
Italy	50.0
African Development Bank	30.0
United States (FY 1985)	5.4
France	5.0
Austria	2.0
Portugal	1.5
Belgium	1.0
Greece	1.0
Total	215.9

7. Q: What percentage of the volume of trade from SADCC countries, by country, is projected to be shipped over the Beira transportation route?

A. Historically, approximately 17% of total SADCC trade volume was shipped over the Beira corridor (1981: 18%; 1984: 17%).

SATCC projects that this figure will rise to 24% of total SADCC volume by 1990. SADCC estimates that total SADCC trade shipped through non-South African ports in 1990 will be 17.4 million tons. Of this total, 4.1 million tons will move through Beira, of which Malawi will ship 0.2 million tons, Mozambique 3.1 million tons, and Zimbabwe 0.8 million tons.

8. Q: What economic benefits accrue to Zimbabwe from the Beira-Mutare oil pipeline? Who owns or controls this pipeline? What percentage of Zimbabwe's oil comes through this pipeline? Which countries are the source of the oil?

A. The economic benefits of the Beira-Mutare pipeline are considerable, since Zimbabwe receives approximately 90% of its refined petroleum products by this route. The pipeline is owned by Lonrho, a U.K.-based multinational corporation. For the most part, the product comes from Kuwait.

9. Q: Do you agree with AID Administrator McPherson that the Administration has no need for U.S. funds to develop the transport route running from Zimbabwe to Beira because "other donors are already providing sufficient money" (Washington Times, 2.5.87)? Would not SADCC funding to Beira primarily benefit Zimbabwe, a country with which the U.S. terminated economic assistance in light of human rights violations, increased hostility towards the U.S., and closer ties to Warsaw Pact countries?

A. Those projects identified by SADCC for the Beira corridor (Phase I) have been funded by donors other than the U.S. Therefore, Mr. McPherson is correct that the United States need not at present consider funding Beira corridor projects.

SADCC itself does not fund projects or operations on the Beira Corridor, but functions merely as a coordinating body to discuss regional development strategy and draw up lists of projects approved under the overall strategy. Donor countries and organizations then make individual agreements with regional governments or enterprises to fund project elements. While it is true to say Zimbabwe is a major beneficiary of work to improve the Beira Corridor (Mozambique being the other), the funding for various elements is provided by individual donors.

10. Q: Do you support the provision of the supplemental appropriations bill that prohibits U.S. aid through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) from being used in Mozambique?

A: No. Banning supplemental assistance to Mozambique is a mistake. It hurts our efforts to encourage Mozambique to move away from the Soviets and toward the West. It can, and probably will, be seen in Mozambique as a rebuff in spite of the significant change in policy - both political and economic - favorable to the West.

11. Q: What is the latest estimate of pledges, by country, for the rehabilitation of other transportation corridors in Mozambique?

A: In addition to the Beira Corridor, pledges by country (non-Africa) for the Maputo Port Transport system and the Nacala system are as follows:

Country	Maputo Port Transport System ($millions)
Italy	9.9
U.K.	16.3
China	18.0
Canada	6.3
Denmark	4.5
EEC	54.5
Sweden	20.2
Total	129.7

Country	Nacala Port Transport System ($millions)
Finland	12.0
Canada	12.0
France	57.6
Portugal	40.0
Total	121.6

RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

1. The State Department has made much over Mozambique's "improved" positions in the United Nations. The attached chart, derived from State Department reports, indicates that Mozambique has not supported the U.S. position on even one of 30 major issues during the past three years. Is your contention that abstention is "improvement"? At this rate, how long will it take before Mozambique is actually voting for a U.S. position?

A: As we have noted on a number of occasions, the Government of Mozambique now abstains on votes concerning Afghanistan and Cambodia in the UN, rather than voting with the

Soviet Union. Since Moscow attaches great importance to these votes, Mozambique's decision to break with the Soviet voting line is a significant step by the GPRM. At the same time, we have never characterized Mozambique's overall UN voting record as positive or compatible with positions taken by the U.S. We continue at every opportunity to press the GPRM to improve its voting record in the UN and other international organizations.

2. Please outline Mozambique's voting record on issues regarding Israel, compared with the U.S. votes on that subject during the past several years.

A. During the past four years, the Department of State has reported to the Congress the voting records of countries at the United Nations General Assembly, designating forty key votes. Nine of these key votes have been about issues concerning Israel. On six of nine votes, Mozambique voted on the side opposite the United States. On three votes, the votes on accepting Israeli credentials in 1984, 1985, and 1986, Mozambique abstained or was absent. We are encouraged by this modest positive trend and continue to urge that the GPRM improve its voting record on Israel-related issues in the UN.

MOZAMBIQUE U.N. VOTING

	39th Gen.Assembly (Sept.-Dec. '84)	40th Gen.Assembly (Sept.-Dec.'85)	41st Gen.Assembly (Sept.-Dec.'86)
10 Key Votes Yes/No/Absent-Abstain	0-5-5	0-4-6	0-5-5
Total % Coincidence voting with U.S.	3.90	5.90	7.20
No. of Countries in Africa w/ Lower Coincidence w/ U.S.	0	2 (Algeria, Angola)	2 (Angola, Libya)
No. of Countries in U.N. w/ Lower Coincidence w/ U.S.	0	3 (Algeria/ Angola/Yemen)	6 (Angola/Libya/Laos Vietnam/Cuba/Albania

3. Has the United States encouraged the government of Mozambique to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican, South Korea, or Israel? If not, does the State Department support such actions.

A: The U.S. favors improvement of relations and contacts of all kinds between the Government of Mozambique and the Vatican, South Korea, and Israel. We have encouraged this process. We are especially gratified that positive developments in relations between the GPRM and the Catholic Church in Mozambique have led to improvement in relations between the GPRM and the Vatican. President Chissano met with Pope John Paul II in Rome in May 1987, and the Pope has accepted President Chissano's invitation to visit Mozambique.

4. Has the United States discussed with other countries the idea of providing military training to the FRELIMO government?

A: The U.K. has kept us apprised of its decisions to expand the military training programs it conducts for the Mozambican Army. We have encouraged this and other efforts by our allies and friends to provide appropriate security assistance to the Government of Mozambique.

5. You state (p. 4) that "Today the number of Western advisors in Mozambique actually exceeds that of advisors from the Soviet Union and its allies". While that statement was contained in paragraph with regard to military support, I do not believe your statement is accurate if applied with respect to military advisers. Please provide a breakdown on the number, by country, of civilian advisers in Mozambique as well as a list, by country of the military advisers in the country.

A: Our estimates of foreign civilian and military advisors in Mozambique are as follows.

Civilian Advisors

Western	
Canada	25
Denmark	40
France	12
Italy	97
Netherlands	112
Norway	12

Civilian advisors, continued

Portugal	1,500
Sweden	360
Switzerland	17
Total	2,175

Soviet Bloc/Cuban

East Bloc/Cuban	750
Soviet	475
Total	1225

Other

People's Republic of China	50

Note: In addition to the countries listed above, Angola, Australia, Botswana, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, North Korea, Spain, Swaziland, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe all have small numbers of civilian advisors in Mozambique, although specific numbers are not known.

Military Advisors

Western

United Kingdom	5

Soviet Bloc/Cuban

Cuba	600
Czechoslovakia	50
North Korea	50
USSR	850
Total	1,550

Other

Tanzania 150

Zimbabwe 500-1,000

(Note: the estimates for Tanzania and Zimbabwe are for military advisors only; they do not include combat troops.)

6. Q: Are you aware of the findings of the South African investigation of the Machel plane crash or of the international investigation conducted in Moscow? Please summarize the findings of both reports. Do the findings differ? Has either investigation produced evidence of sabotage?

A: The investigation conducted in Moscow was adjunct to the overall investigating commission based in South Africa. South Africa, as the country of occurrence of the crash, has responsibility under international aviation law for preparing an investigative report. The work done in Moscow was technical, and related to deciphering the plane's "black boxes" and cockpit voice recorders. The Soviets have consistently claimed that President Machel's aircraft was lured off course by a false navigation beacon planted in South Africa by the government of that country. The Margo Commission Report produced in South Africa concluded that the aircraft crash was caused by improper crew procedures, including the crew's fatal decision to ignore the plane's ground proximity alarm.

Neither investigation alleged sabotage per se, although the Soviets do hold to the above-mentioned false beacon theory. No firm evidence has been presented, however, to support this allegation.

7. If sabotage is ruled out by the investigations, will the United States press the government of Mozambique to apologize to South Africa for statements attributing the crash to sabotage by South Africa?

A: The U.S. is not formally a party to the official investigations of the Machel air crash. We have counselled restraint by all parties in making premature public statements concerning the crash and the investigation. All the parties to the investigation have nevertheless made such statements, and

we have no reason to believe that additional U.S. efforts to referee this dispute would be appropriate or successful.

8. Q: What is the difference between the party-to-party agreements between FRELIMO and the Soviet communist party versus a country-to-country agreement between Mozambique and the Soviet Union?

A: A party-to-party agreement between the Soviet Union and a country like Mozambique is less binding than a government-to-government agreement. Mozambique's party-to-party agreements with the Soviet Union and other countries are vague documents affirming "cooperation" and "friendship" between the two parties. They are one way to define the state of relations between the two parties/governments at the time they are signed. State-to-state agreements, on the other hand, deal with formal governmental issues and commitments.

9. Officials of Mozambique describe the government as "Marxist-Leninist". Does the State Department consider Mozambique to have a "Marxist-Leninist" government?

A: We are, of course, aware of the GPRM's self-designation as a "Marxist-Leninist" government. U.S. policy must also take account of the actions of governments. The Government of Mozambique has taken concrete actions on a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues to distance itself from socialist policies domestically and Soviet positions internationally. The GPRM has also demonstrated its readiness to work with the U.S. and other Western countries on many questions, including efforts to promote peace and stability in southern Africa. By virtue of its concrete actions, the Government of Mozambique has demonstrated that it merits U.S. support.

MOZAMBICAN/ZIMBABWEAN RELATIONS

1. State Department officials do not travel in RENAMO controlled areas of Mozambique. Is that correct?

A: U.S. government officials, including resident Embassy staff and visiting officers, travel wherever security conditions permit in Mozambique. That includes travel to all ten

provinces during the last year, and to areas within those provinces affected by civil strife.

2. State Department officials estimate the number of Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique to be 6,000-7,000; is that correct?

A: For the last year and a half the number of Zimbabwean troops has generally been around 6,000 to 7,000.

3. How can the State Department make such a radically different estimate of Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique when the respected Jane's Defence Weekly estimates between 15,000-20,000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique. Even The Washington Post reports that there are 12,000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique. How can you make such assertions without even being in RENAMO-contested areas of the country? What is the basis of these estimates of Zimbabwean troop strength?

A: Standard strength has ranged upwards of 5,000. Troop strength has risen occasionally during special sweep operations or when unit rotations have taken place. According to our sources, it is generally about 6-7,000.

4. Does the State Department regard the presence of Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique as improper or destabilizing? If so, what diplomatic efforts has the United States government made to express our opposition to the presence of Zimbabwean troops?

A: We do not regard the presence of Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique as improper or destabilizing. They are there, along with troops from Tanzania and Malawi, at the invitation of the Government of Mozambique to defend transportation facilities which are of great importance to Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and other countries of the region.

5. The State Department has opposed the introduction of Cuban troops into Angola. Why do you not take a similar position with regard to foreign troops in Mozambique?

A: The circumstances in Mozambique are entirely different from Angola. In Angola, Cuban combat personnel were, and are, instrumental in installing and maintaining the MPLA regime in power in Luanda by military force following the departure of

the Portuguese colonial government. In Mozambique, the Portuguese handed over power to the FRELIMO government in a peaceful, universally recognized transition. The government of Mozambique's subsequent agreement with its neighbors to help it defend it and their interests against externally supported destabilization bears no resemblance to the massive Soviet bloc/Cuban intervention in Angola.

6. What is the U.S. assessment of the Zimbabwean troops? Is it true that significant numbers have defected to RENAMO?

A: Zimbabwean troops are among the best in Southern Africa. It is not true that significant numbers have defected to RENAMO.

7. Does the FRELIMO regime need foreign occupying forces, such as the Zimbabweans, or Soviet bloc military adivsers to survive?

A: We would not characterize them as occupying forces. Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzania have deployed their forces to Mozambique in order to defend transport routes that are vital to the economics of all three countries. The military forces of these countries are in Mozambique at the request of the GPRM.

8. What effect would Zimbabwe's acquisition of sophisticated supersonic aircraft -- Soviet MIGs -- have on the civil war in Mozambique? Does the United States oppose the use of such aircraft in Mozambique's civil war?

A: If Zimbabwe were to acquire sophisticated aircraft from the Soviet Union (both MIG-23's and MIG-29's have been mentioned in reports), this would have little effect on the civil war in Mozambique. Neither aircraft is designed for ground attack which would presumably be its use in Mozambique. They are interceptor fighters, and are most effectively used in a defensive role. Additionally, it should be noted it is by no means certain that Zimbabwe will make such a purchase.

9. I am told that discussions have occurred during the past year in Zimbabwe, particularly in the legislature, regarding the possible annexation by Zimbabwe of parts of Mozambique -- to form a consolidated area of "Mozambabwe." Are you familiar with such reports? Would you consider such discussions destabilizing to the region? Do you oppose such an annexation? What is Mozambique's reaction to such discussions?

A: We are not aware of reports that Zimbabwe has discussed the possibility of annexing parts of Mozambique. Zimbabwe and Mozambique are both members of the Organization of African Unity, one of whose founding principles is the inviolability of international borders. The United States fully supports that principle and would oppose any effort to undermine the independence or territorial integrity of Mozambique.

CHARGE THAT RENAMO IS SOUTH AFRICAN-BACKED

1. The State Department has charged at various times that RENAMO is a "South-African supported insurgent movement". You have repeated that charge (p 12) by stating that "There is credible evidence that South Africa remains a reliable supplier of high-priority items that RENAMO is not able to acquire on its own." Please provide what evidence you have to substantiate these descriptions.

A: South Africa took over responsibility for training and arming RENAMO, a Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization creation, in 1980 following Zimbabwe's independence. South African officials made little effort to disguise their country's actions as part of an effort to put pressure on the Mozambique government. The U.S. continues to collect and analyse information on RENAMO's relationship with South Africa from all available sources, including sensitive intelligence sources. The evidence clearly indicates a continuing relationship of communication with and support for RENAMO from the Government of South Africa.

2. Specifically, are you aware of any financial support which South Africa currently supplies?

A: The U.S. Government continues to collect and analyse information from all available sources, including sensitive intelligence sources, on RENAMO's relationship with South

Africa. The evidence clearly indicates a continuing pattern of communication with and support for RENAMO from South Africa.

3. Other State Department characterizations have included that RENAMO "has been taken over essentially by the South African military" and, on another occasion, that RENAMO has "received training and arms from South Africa." Please provide detailed evidence to substantiate these charges.

A: The USG has compiled and analysed information from all available sources, including sensitive intelligence sources. This information indicates clearly that there is an extensive pattern of communication and support between the South African Government and RENAMO.

4. I want to be clear that it is your contention that the government of South Africa is doing these things, not just private citizens. Do you claim that this is current South African government policy?

A: Yes.

5. On the one hand, the State Department claims that RENAMO is South African-backed. However, it has also been pointed out that South Africa and Mozambique signed an agreement recently concerning South African assistance to rehabilitate Maputo harbor and, as I understand it, that there are other South Africa/Mozambique development agreements. Do you believe South Africa is financing both the Government of Mozambique and the opposition (RENAMO)?

A. The South African government appears to be following a two-track policy and the two tracks complement rather than contradict each other. By maintaining its links with and support for RENAMO, the SAG controls an insturment with which to pressure the Government of Mozambique. At the same time, the SAG provides positive incentives, such as economic assistance, to the GPRM. The SAG's objective is to create negative and positive incentives to influence Mozambican behavior in directions favorable to South African interests.

6. Are you aware that the termination of South African support for RENAMO, through the Nkomati accord, is a source of continuing disagreement in South Africa?

A: We are aware that there continue to be differing views

within the South African government concerning relations with Mozambique and aid to RENAMO. This may be one reason why elements of the South African government maintain covert communications with and material support for RENAMO even while the South African government's official position is one of support for the Nkomati Accord.

7. If, as you claim, RENAMO is supported by the government of South Africa, is that of concern to the United States government? Why?

A: The fact that the South African government continues to provide material assistance to RENAMO in violation of the Nkomati Accord is of concern to the Administration because it signals an unwillingness to honor commitments designed to reduce tensions between South Africa and Mozambique and to reduce cross-border violence--including that directed against South Africa. South African cooperation is essential if efforts to break the current cycle of violence in southern Africa are to succeed.

RENAMO

1. The State Department has indicated, "It is the Administration's policy not to have official contacts with RENAMO". Who, specifically, has enunciated this policy? Has the President of the United States ever publicly stated his support for this policy?

A: The Administration's policy toward Mozambique is the President's policy, and he has stated his support for that policy, publically and privately, on numerous occasions, as have his senior foreign policy advisors.

2. The State Department has reported that Patrick Buchanan, then White House Communications Director, met with Arturo Da Fonseca of RENAMO in August 1986, and that this meeting became the subject of "an apparent Soviet disinformation effort in southern Africa". How did the Soviets become aware of this meeting? The State Department indicated that the NSC staff and State Department were not aware of this meeting until the disinformation effort began. Are you certain that no members of NSC or the State Department were informed or knew of this meeting prior to the disinformation effort? Please describe the disinformation effort that took place.

A: I am not absolutely certain that no NSC staff members or State Department officials were informed, but the meeting did

not come to my attention until afterward. It is not clear how the Soviets became aware of the meeting. The disinformation effort involved distribution of photographs taken at the Buchanan/Da Fonseca meeting, along with a word-of-mouth campaign implying that the U.S. government was secretly backing RENAMO while denying this to the government of Mozambique.

3. If, as you contend, RENAMO does not have any real popular support, why does the FRELIMO government have to rely on additional troops from Zimbabwe , Tanzania, and now Malawi in order to control its territory?

A: Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe are contributing to Mozambique's defense because they believe that Mozambique's security, particularly the security of transportation networks on which the health of their economies depends, is vital to their interests. The fact that RENAMO targets and carries out attacks on Mozambique's economic infrastructure does not demonstrate that it has popular support in Mozambique. If anything, the damage that RENAMO does and the suffering that results undermines whatever efforts RENAMO might wish to make to obtain popular support.

4. Also, if there is so little support, why does FRELIMO have 4,000 to 5,000 RENAMO detainees in jail? Does not that large a number, in itself, suggest considerable popular support?

A: It is clear that RENAMO has a considerable number of personnel engaged in insurgency operations against the Government and people of Mozambique. The USG has made clear to the Government of Mozambique its strong concern that the fundamental human rights of all Mozambicans, including those suspected of RENAMO sympathies, be respected. Ambassador Designate Wells has stated that upon her arrival in Mozambique, she will request permission to visit these detainees.

5. You state (on p. 11) that one of the "myths" about Mozambique is that "RENAMO is a democratic alternative to the Government of Mozambique". However, what follows in your written testimony did not address RENAMO's political principles or platform, but rather its history. Do you know of any <u>specific</u> aspect(s) of RENAMO's platform or policies that would not be characterized as "democratic"?

6. Do you know of any specific aspect(s) of RENAMO's platform or policies that would not be characterized as "pro-Western"?

7. Do you have any reason to believe that RENAMO would not subscribe to free and fair elections if RENAMO came to power in Mozambique?

A: RENAMO professes support for democratic pro-Western values, including free elections, but it has not implemented these values in its conduct. There is no concrete evidence of democratic practice either in RENAMO's internal organizational life or in its actions in areas of Mozambique where it has influence. RENAMO is organized as a military hierarchy, employing highly centralized, authoritarian lines of command. In the countryside, RENAMO seeks to align itself with and exploit tribal and other traditional forms of governance and administration. It has not, however, made any systematic attempt to introduce democratic principles or to implement any detailed political program. Moreover, there are credible reports of brutal RENAMO attacks against civilians that are inconsistent with RENAMO's professed commitment to democracy and protection of the human rights of individual Mozambicans.

8. You refer (p. 12) to "credible reports of RENAMO atrocities". Please outline specific instances of these atrocities and the source of such reports linking the actions to RENAMO.

A: Precise figures on killings and other atrocities are unavailable, and both sides exaggerate accusations against each other. However, it appears that the insurgents have been brutally violent, mutilating, killing, maiming and kidnaping their victims.

-- According to reliable western sources, a heavily-armed RENAMO band killed between 11 and 14 Zimbabwean civilians June 21 near the Marymount Roman Catholic Mission in extreme northeastern Zimbabwe. At least five of the victims were children under the age of 10.

-- According to a report in the Johannesburg Star on June 24, 1987, a RENAMO representative was quoted as admitting

that the MNR may have been responsible for killing of at least 11 Zimbabwean villagers in mid-June.

-- A U.S. physician who worked in Mozambique described a number of RENAMO atrocities in a letter printed in the Los Angeles Times April 9, 1987. These included children machine-gunned at point blank range, a schoolteacher whose ears had been cut off by RENAMO, and a young woman shot through both breasts at close range by RENAMO.

9. You indicated during the hearing that on previous occasions, people purporting to speak for RENAMO had approached you and you had been "asked for money". Please describe each of these episodes.

A: Shortly after an American citizen and six other foreigners were kidnapped in Mozambique May 13, a person purporting to represent RENAMO came to the American Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, and provided a tape recording which stated that RENAMO was holding the seven. The representative demanded a plane ticket to Geneva to discuss release of the seven with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters, a large sum of money, and a supply of medicines for the RENAMO personnel holding the seven. When he was told the U.S. government would not accede to his demands, but would work for the hostages' release through the ICRC, he said he would inform the ICRC that RENAMO would not work with them in freeing the American hostage because of our refusal to meet his demands. He contacted the Embassy sporadically thereafter, but did not engage in substantive discussion regarding release of the kidnap victims.

10. If a RENAMO government came to power in Mozambique, would the U.S. support that government?

A: Since the U.S. government recognizes countries, not governments, the question of recognition of a new government does not arise. If a new government came to power in Mozambique, our relationship with that government would depend on the policies it implemented.

11. During Mr. McPherson's testimony before the Committee on March 10 he suggested that rather than having the United State contact RENAMO directly, we would rely on the efforts of a U.N. food coordinator. Now that one has been appointed, has he met with RENAMO about food relief efforts? If not, does the State Department think he should? Has any U.N. food coordinator or other U.,N. representative met with RENAMO about getting food relief to RENAMO-controlled areas? If not, does the State Department believe such contacts should be made?

A: At the request of the U.S. government, the United Nations, and all other donors participating in the relief effort, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has agreed to arrange food shipments in conflict areas of Mozambique, and the ICRC's food delivery program is proceeding. ICRC personnel have been in touch with RENAMO representatives as part of this process.

12. Has U.S. food aid been provided to people in areas of Mozambique controlled by RENAMO? Will it be?

A: It is by no means clear what RENAMO "controls" in Mozambique, aside from scattered bases and a few towns. In any event, as indicated in the answer to question 11 we are working with the ICRC to see that food reaches persons in need throughout Mozambique. In addition, an AID special assessment team which visited Mozambique in February will return to southern Africa in the near future to review developments and obtain additional information on Mozambique's food situation. The group will travel to Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi as well as to Mozambique, and is prepared to accept information from all knowledgeable relief agencies and individuals, including refugees, regardless of political affiliation.

13. Is the State Department prepared to insist upon its refusal to meet with RENAMO even if that refusal contributes to deaths and starvation in significant areas of Mozambique controlled by RENAMO?

A: As indicated in the answer to question 12, the AID special assessment team will be prepared to accept information from all knowledgeable relief agencies and individuals, including refugees, regardless of political affiliation.

14. Is it possible that Zimbabwean or other foreign occupation forces, or military personnel of the FRELIMO government, receive any of the U.S.-donated food? What steps are being undertaken to ensure that this does not happen?

A: We have seen no evidence that Zimbabwean, Tanzanian, or Malawian troops in Mozambique receive any U.S. donated food, nor that any has been used for the Mozambican Armed Forces. Transport and delivery of U.S.-provided food is carefully monitored by USAID employees and employees of private voluntary agencies who assist in distribution of the food. This monitoring is carried out both in Maputo, where among other things relief is coordinated with the Emergency Operations Committee of all donors, and in the countryside through discussions with local officials and the recipients as well as visits to local warehouses.

15. What is your estimate of RENAMO's troop strength? What is the basis for this estimate?

A: RENAMO's military strength is approximately 22,000, according to our best estimate. This estimate is based on analysis of information available to us from all classified and unclassified sources.

16. Has RENAMO announced a decision not to attack nonmilitary installations? If so, to what do you attribute this decision?

A: We are unaware of any RENAMO decision not to attack nonmilitary installations. On the contrary, attacks have continued on civilian infrastructure. In addition, RENAMO'S Washington office has distributed a "Notice to all Participants in the Beira Corridor Project and other Investments in Mozambique" on Renamo stationary containing veiled threats against foreign investment in Mozambique, except in areas "liberated" by RENAMO.

17. Is it true that State Department officials have met with representatives of the African National Congress on over 59 separate occasions? Please provide a chronology of all State Department contacts with the ANC as well as a chronology of similar meetings with RENAMO.

A: THE STATE DEPARTMENT MAINTAINS REGULAR CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AS PART OF OUR POLICY OF MEETING WITH ALL THE KEY GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA. IN THE PAST YEAR WE HAVE RAISED THE LEVEL AND FREQUENCY OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION, INCLUDING--AMONG OTHERS--THE ANC. SECRETARY SHULTZ MET WITH ANC PRESIDENT OLIVER TAMBO ON JANUARY 28, 1987. THE PRIMARY, BUT NOT EXCLUSIVE, CHANNEL FOR CONTACT WITH THE ANC IS THROUGH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA, WHICH IS THE HEADQUARTERS FOR THE ANC.

18. Please elaborate on what you see as the "distinctions" between RENAMO and ANC that cause you to shun even meeting with the former while meeting frequently with the latter.

A: THE ANC IS ONE OF SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL SUPPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA, PARTICULARLY BUT NOT ONLY AMONG BLACKS. IT IS A POLITICALLY DIVERSE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING A RANGE OF VIEWS. THE ANC IS OVER 75 YEARS OLD AND IS THE OLDEST AFRICAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT IT IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL EQUATION AND ONE THAT HAS TO BE INVOLVED IF THERE IS TO BE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS. IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE ANC AS WELL AS WITH OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WE STRIVE TO ADVANCE THE OBJECTIVE OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. WE USE THESE MEETINGS TO MAKE CLEAR WHAT THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IS ON KEY ISSUES AND TO HEAR AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS ON THESE ISSUES FROM THE OTHER PARTIES.

BY CONTRAST, RENAMO'S NATIONALIST CREDENTIALS ARE SUSPECT DUE TO ITS CREATION BY THE FORMER RHODESIAN SPECIAL SERVICES AND THE CONTINUING PATTERN OF COMMUNICATION AND SUPPORT BETWEEN RENAMO AND SOUTH AFRICA. WHILE WE DO NOT HAVE OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH RENAMO, APPROPRIATE STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL HAVE MET WITH RENAMO REPRESENTATIVES IN ORDER TO RECEIVE INFORMATION ON

PRACTICAL, HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE, SUCH AS THE ABDUCTION OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN BY RENAMO IN MAY 1987.

19. Has the presence of Janet Mondlane, the wife of a FRELIMO founder, as the Secretary General of the Red Cross in Mozambique, had an impact on the ability of the Red Cross to act as a neutral third party in Mozambique? Do her presence and activities cause RENAMO to distrust the impartial nature of relief efforts?

A: Whatever Mrs. Mondlane's beliefs and activities are, the Mozambican Red Cross (the Red Cross national society in that country) is not involved in the distribution of food provided by the international community for relief efforts in Mozambique. Rather, it is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a Swiss organization whose delegates are all Swiss citizens, which is arranging food deliveries in conflict areas of Mozambique. If RENAMO distrusts the impartial nature of relief efforts because of Mrs. Mondlane's involvement in the Mozambican Red Cross, then RENAMO has a fundamental misunderstanding of the international community's efforts to provide food to needy persons in all parts of Mozambique.

20. Who is Mr. Jimo Phiri? Has the United States met with or otherwise established contact with Mr. Phiri?

A: Jimo Phiri is reputedly a RENAMO representative in Malawi. He has also been reported to be an important commander of RENAMO forces in Central Mozambique. To the best of my knowledge, U.S. Government officials have not met with or established contact with Phiri.

21. Does the State Department recognize any opposition to the FRELIMO regime as legitimate? If so, which groups or organizations?

A: The Administration believes that in Mozambique, as in the rest of the world, there should be avenues for the expression of criticism or opposition to the government and its policies, and we have made our concerns known to the government of Mozambique as part of our ongoing dialogue on human rights matters. The identity of the individuals or groups which

express opposition should not be a material factor; what matters is that they should be allowed to make their views known.

22. Is there any organization in Mozambique that opposes the Marxist-Leninist government of FRELIMO with whom the State Department would agree to meet?

A: The United States recognizes the GPRM as the legitimate government of Mozambique and conducts normal diplomatic relations with it. Consistent with that policy, the State Department and the U.S. embassy in Maputo have contacts with a wide variety of Mozambicans in and out of the government, including those who disagree with policies of the government. U.S. officials will continue such contacts in the course of carrying out the President's policy and advancing American interests in Mozambique.

Assessment of the Military Situation in Mozambique

1. The 1987 assessment states "...RENAMO is a serious threat to the survival of the regime". Do you share this assessment?

A: RENAMO threatens the government's control in many areas of the country, but does not pose an immediate threat to its survival. RENAMO does have the demonstrated military capacity to mount highly damaging attacks on Mozambique's economic and administrative infrastructure. We continue to believe, however, that neither RENAMO nor FRELIMO is in a position to achieve a military victory over its adversary.

2. Do you concede that the Soviets have made relatively large arms deliveries to the Maputo regime?

A: The Soviets have made relatively large arms deliveries to Mozambique over the last decade, although considerably less than to Ethiopia and Angola.

3. Do you concede that there are 850 or more Soviet military advisers in Mozambique?

A: We believe there are between 800 and 850 Soviet military personnel in Mozambique, the bulk of whom have been shifted from advising Mozambican commanders to training Mozambican soldiers.

4. Do you believe that the Mozambique Armed Forces were much less effective in 1986 against RENAMO?

A: RENAMO made considerable gains in late 1986 in the central provinces that were largely reversed by a joint Zimbabwean-Mozambican offensive in early 1987. Battlefield fortunes will continue to fluctuate although the Mozambican army does suffer some serious deficiencies.

5. Do you believe the Soviets would demand air naval basing rights in Mozambique?

A: While the Soviets might like to have regularized air and naval access they do not have such access and we have no indications that they have pressed for formal basing rights.

6. Would the United States support such a demand? Would the United States view such a demand with alarm as a further penetration of Soviet influence in southern Africa?

A: No, the United States would not support a Soviet demand for air and naval basing rights in Mozambique. Yes, the United States would be alarmed by such a demand. There is, however, absolutely no evidence to suggest that the Government of Mozambique would agree to such a Soviet demand.

7. You indicate (p.4) that "the trend line of Soviet arms transfers to Mozambique has been down". What has been value of the Soviet arms transfers to Mozambique, by year, over the past several years?

Answer: [Classified]

8. Is it accurate, for example, that approximately $145 million is estimated to have been spent by the Soviets in 1986?

A: Approximately. See above.

9. Do you concur with the Defense Department assessment that as much as $1 billion may have been spent by the Soviets in the past five years (1981-1986)?

A: Yes.

10. You indicate (p.4) that there are no "Soviet or Cuban combat troops" in Mozambique. Yet the Defense Department describes a "major Cuban presence" in Mozambique. How many Soviet or Cuban "military advisers" or other military personnel do you estimate to be there?

Answer: [Classified]

11. You admit (p.6) that Malawi has deployed forces along the Nacala rail line. How many Malawian "forces" do you estimate to be in Mozambique?

A: There are about 600 Malawi soldiers in Mozambique.

12. What other countries have military troops or "advisers" in Mozambique? At what levels?

Answer: [Classified]

13. You state (p. 5) that Mozambique "has complied with its commitments" under the Nkomati Accord. While you state that Mozambique is complying with the agreement, press reports indicated that one to four (of the four) houses attacked on May 29 were, indeed, being used by the African National Congress. Isn't this ANC activity in Mozambique a violation of the agreement?

A: No. The Nkomati Accord enjoins the Mozambican and South African governments not to allow their territories to be used for planning or preparation for "acts of violence, terrorism or aggression". The Mozambican and South African governments agreed that the ANC could maintain an office in Mozambique as long as it did not engage or assist in such acts. The United

States Charge d'Affaires visited the places attacked on May 29 and found no evidence of ANC activities in violation of the Nkomati Accord. Two of the four house which were attacked had nothing to do with the ANC; the others were the ANC office and an ANC residence.

14. You state, as fact, (p. 5) that the South Africans staged the raid in Maputo on May 29. What evidence does the United States government have to support this assertion?

A: The USG determination concerning South African involvement in the Maputo raid was based on a careful assessment of all available information. This included considerable circumstantial evidence concerning the methods and equipment employed in the attack, the apparent targets of the raid, and the prior threats made by the SAG to carry out such raids against neighboring states. In addition, data from sensitive intelligence sources corroborated this judgement.

15. You refer (p. 6) to a "South African-inspired destabilization effort" against Mozambique. Please elaborate and describe this destabilization effort.

A: The primary instrument of South Africa's destabilization efforts in Mozambique has been the insurgent movement RENAMO. RENAMO was created by the Rhodesian secret services in 1977 to punish Mozambique for that country's assistance to Zimbabwean liberation movements. With Zimbabwean independence in 1980, sponsorship of RENAMO was taken over by the South African Defense Force. South African direct support for RENAMO diminished after the Nkomati accord and as RENAMO capture of weapons inside Mozambique reduced its requirements for South African hardware. However, there remains credible evidence of South African communication with and support for RENAMO, including through provision of high priority military items that RENAMO is not able to acquire on its own.

16. One recent news article reported that Mozambique has attempted to acquire Soviet MIG aircraft. Is this accurate, according to U.S. government information? If so, does it not significantly change one of the factors with regard to U.S. policy toward Mozambique -- i.e., the State Department contention that a Soviet military presence has not been attained?

A: Mozambique first acquired MIG aircraft from the Soviet Union in 1977. The transfer of Soviet-origin aircraft to the Government of Mozambique does not indicate that the GPRM has accorded base nights at military facilities to Soviet air or naval forces.

17. Please outline your understanding of the Soviet Union's arms pact with Mozambique that reportedly includes provision of T-62 tanks and MIG-23 jet fighters.

A: We have no knowledge of any formal arms pact. Mozambican military needs appear to be negotiated on an ad hoc basis.

18. Please outline your understanding of any Soviet air force or naval activities in Mozambique. For example, does the Soviet Union operate Soviet submarines or other ships from ports in Mozambique? What, if any aircraft, does the Soviet Union operate from Mozambique?

A: The Soviet Union has no permanent naval or air force presence in Mozambique. Soviet transport aircraft regularly fly to Mozambique and Soviet naval ships have visited Maputo.

19. The Reverend Mr. Peter Hammond, a missionary of a Christian evangelical group called Frontline Fellowship, reported in late 1986 of extensive FRELIMO atrocities in Mozambique, including the massacre of practicing Christians in Zambezia province, the seizure of children as young as twelve years old for the government's armed forces, and the systematic elimination of villages which support the resistance. His charges have been brought to the attention of the State Department. Has the State Department investigated these charges? What is your assessment of the accuracy of his report?

A. We are unaware of Mr. Hammond and any report he may have made to the State Department. The Department requested from its Embassy in Maputo any information available on the charges referred in the question above. The Embassy has no information concerning massacres of practicing Christians in Zambezia Province. It is also not aware of any seizure of children as

young as twelve years old for the Mozambican Armed Forces, although there have recently been reports that RENAMO has seized children fifteen years of age and younger and has trained them for military activity. Further, there is no information that the government has systematically eliminated villages which support RENAMO. The 1986 Report to the Congress on Human Rights Practices in Mozambique noted that violence against civilians has been perpetrated by both sides in the conflict. The Embassy regularly undertakes investigation of reports of human rights violations.

Catholic Bishops' Call for Negotiations

1. Isn't it accurate that the full context of the dos Santos comments, which you selectively cited, was that the nine bishops who signed a pastoral letter advocated negotiations between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO?

A: The Mozambican bishops advocated dialogue and steps toward peaceful reconciliation by all Mozambicans, including the leaderships of the government and RENAMO. The reference to Archbishop dos Santos clearly identified him as a prominent Mozambican not associated with the government, who was interested in ending the fighting. The quote demonstrates that even advocates of dialogue with RENAMO recognize the difficulty of identifying RENAMO's leaders and establishing effective communication with them.

MOZAMBIQUE

Maputo Archbishop Discusses Peace Appeal
MB011651 London BBC World Service in English 1515 GMT 1 Jun 87

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Relations between the government in Mozambique and the Roman Catholic Church could become a little tricky following a recent impassioned appeal by the Catholic bishops for talks between the Frelimo government and Renamo rebels to end the 10 years of fighting. Nine bishops signed a pastoral letter calling for negotiations. In Mozambique, our East Africa correspondent, Mike Wooldridge, asked the archbishop of Maputo, Jose Maria dos Santos, if the bishops had heard anything from the government about their appeal:

[Begin recording] [Dos Santos] So far I have heard nothing about it.

[Wooldridge] Since there hasn't been a response, do you think then that your appeal was really unrealistic in the present circumstances?

[Dos Santos] We feel it our duty to denounce this situation, of injustice, of suffering, of killing, but I don't know (?for real) if they will accept it. But if they are Africans, the Africans used to solved their problems by dialogue. And we think they will also accept this because they are Africans.

[Wooldridge] But the government have said consistently, haven't they, that they will not talk to people who they regard as bandits.

[Dos Santos] They say that, yes, we know that. But how do we finish this war? How do we come to an end with this?

[Wooldridge] You don't think it is possible that the government could win militarily, particularly with the support they are now getting from countries like Zimbabwe and Tanzania? And they have had more success in recent months in Zambezia, haven't they, which is the place where the war has actually been fiercest? Do you not think that there might have been a turning point on the battlefield?

[Dos Santos] I would like to know how long we have been in this situation? How long? Many years. And more and more are coming. I don't know how they can finish it because it is long we have supported this situation.

[Wooldridge] So you don't think it is really going the government's way?

[Dos Santos] I don't know if, really, there is a possibility of defeating, destroying a guerrilla war. This is very difficult (?today) because they are in the bush. How can you finish them?

[Wooldridge] Do you intend following up the appeal in practical terms? Would you consider going and talking to Renamo's leaders, for example, you or any of your fellow bishops?

[Dos Santos] We don't know who are the leaders of Renamo and we don't know how to contact them. It is very difficult; we have no relationship with these people.

[Wooldridge] But if you don't, isn't the same true for the government? Isn't it easy for President Chissano to say: Okay, you're telling me to talk to Renamo, but who do I talk to?

[Dos Santos] We think you must talk with those who you're fighting against. They are fighting against somebody, and that one can come together with them to talk. [end recording]

2. Please provide the text of the pastoral letter calling for negotiations.

A. Following is a informal translation of the pastoral letter:

The Peace That the People Want

Introduction

Celebrating and living the joy of Christ's Easter, we want to greet you with the words of the risen Lord to his disciples: "The Peace be with you" (John 20:21a)

The peace that the people desire:

1. Meeting in plenary assembly, we concentrated our attention, once again, on the very serious problem of the war and the violence that continues to devastate our country. The armed conflict and, consequently, the suffering of the people grows daily. And peace is every day farther away.

2. The true and lasting peace that our people desire and look for is that which preserves the national independence and territorial integrity of our country, that preserves the dignity and identity of the Mozambican people, and that ensures happiness to each and every Mozambican. Therefore, if any one of these is missing, peace will be illusory.

3. The peace and progress that all of us want and are seeking for our country is not compatible with the destruction of lives and property. Nor with the loss of our national independence or with the loss of our dignity and freedom. Because of this, it is our duty to declare once again to all of those who are involved in this war that in no case is it licit to use unjust

or criminal means, even to achieve legitimate ends. The ends do not justify the means.

4. If we want peace in this way, it is necessary to opt for the life to which the Mozambican people have the right, (to opt) for the values which serve as the foundation for and ensure it, to opt for the unity of all Mozambicans, (to opt) for the practice of truth and justice, and (to opt) for dialogue and national reconciliation. Pope Paul VI said in his World Peace Day message in 1971 that: "True peace must be based in truth and justice, in the respect of inviolable human dignity, in the recognition of the happy equality among men, and in the basic principle of human brotherhood, which means the respect and the love due to each man because he is a man."

Those responsible for peace

5. The peace of our country depends, in the first place, upon the FRELIMO Party, upon the national government, and upon RENAMO, because they are all directly involved in this conflict and have the power to decide about it. All of those who finance, feed, and directly assist the war in Mozambique are equally responsible. Peace also depends upon the sincere and firm will of all Mozambicans, inside and outside the national territory, to exit from this situation of war and suffering which divides, humiliates and threatens the nation's future. Also responsible are the organizations and governments which are friends of Mozambique and which spend considerable amounts of money in aid that, many times, ends up being used to continue and to aggravate this war.

The suffering of the people

6. The suffering of the people is a fact throughout the country and is becoming worse and worse. Indeed, the war, the

hunger, the nakedness, the diseases, the arbitrariness, the murders, the assassinations, the atrocities, the massacres, the humiliations, the mistreatments, the pillage, the corruption, the irresponsibility, the hatred, the vengence, the fear, the injustices, the oppression weigh heavily and directly upon our people. In the fact of this, the people are moaning, wounded to death.

7. On the other hand, the war and violence are continuing to increase in our country without any prospects of a quick and immediate end. The recourse to arms is increasing, involving more and more men and costs to the country.

8. The escalation of the war and violence does not only aggravate the misery and suffering of the people, but also makes us seriously fear for the future of our country as a free nation. National unity is gravely broken; territorial integrity is threatened; national independence is in danger; our freedom and disnity as a people are not respected.

9. Innumerable war crimes are being committed with such cruelty that they make us think that Mozambicans are losing control of this struggle and also (losing) their moral and cultural identity. We realize that as this conflict becomes more internationalized there is a major risk to our sovereignty, and control of the war becomes more difficult. It is unjust to submit our people to such cruel and devastating suffering such as this for the triumph of selfish interests and groups, for political disagreements, for partisan ideas or systems, or for hegemonies, instead of seeking the real welfare for the people.

<u>The only way to peace</u>

10. In this dramatic hour in which we are searching for

solutions to this conflict, political dialogue and national reconciliation appear as the only way to achieve peace with dignity and honor. This is the thought and feeling of the Mozambican people and of men of good will who care about the happiness of our people. We must have courage to put the welfare of our people over personal opinions and special interests, whether of individuals or groups.

11. This dialogue does not imply capitulation nor abdication of the truth, as is thought, but it shows the desire to confront other truths or possible errors in order to make the truth clearer and more evident to all. This is because in our culture he who thinks he is in the right shows more receptivity to dialogue with the others. To dialogue is to exercise the duty and the right to construct and defend the peace.

12. We want to acknowledge and to express our appreciation to the efforts of those Mozambicans and non-Mozambicans, inside and outside, who are engaged in promoting and defending Mozambican unity in peaceful order through dialogue and national reconciliation.

13. Because it is our people's deep desire that the war end as soon as possible, we are appealing to our government and to the chiefs of RENAMO to put into action the proper mechanisms to bring this about. Create a climate favorable to national reconciliation; this could be done through a ceasefire and ending the war of words.

14. We are appealing to all men, organizations, and governments to help the country to achieve peace through peaceful means, above all through political dialogue and

national reconciliation, and to assist our people to build a prosperous and fraternal society. This support for peace is most urgent and necessary, and is the condition for making other aid effective in the resolution of the people's problems. In fact, the hunger, the nakedness, in effect the misery of the people, will not end while there is a war in the country.

The obligation of the Christian communities

15. To our Christian communities we want, once again, to recall that "Christ is our peace" and that "He came to announce the peace to those near and far." Because of this, you must feel yourselves truthfully responsible for reconciliation and peace, to which all our people aspire and have the right to. Because of this, you must do everything that is possible in deep solidarity with all Mozambican believers and with all men in an effort to build a society in which justice, brotherhood, and abundant peace will flourish. Finally, the Mozambican Church feels the obligation to continue to work for peace and national reconciliation.

16. We put this intention, with faithful confidence, in the heart of Mary, mediator of all the graces of the Queen of Peace, in the month of May and during the whole year of Mary that will begin on the next Pentecost Sunday.

The nine Roman Catholic Bishops of Mozambique

3. How has the Government of Mozambique responded to the bishops' plan?

A. The Government of Mozambique has not formally responded to the bishops' letter. Following publication of the letter, however, government officials publicly stated that the government would not talk with the "armed bandits," referring to RENAMO. There have been some articles in the

government-influenced media indirectly attacking the bishops for their call for "dialogue and reconciliation," but no effort has been made to restrict the Church from stating its views, including regular reading of the letter and homilies calling for peace at masses throughout the country.

4. How has RENAMO responded to the bishops' plan?

A. We are not aware of any RENAMO response to the bishops' letter.

5. Is it the position of the United States government that negotiations should be encouraged between FRELIMO and RENAMO?

A: It is the policy of the United States to use whatever influence is available to us, as we do everywhere in southern Africa, to encourage an end to hostilities and peaceful solutions of conflicts. The U.S. has in the past, when circumstances were propitious for doing so, promoted contact between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO. We did so in connection with negotiations between them that followed the conclusion of the Nkomati accord between Mozambique and South Africa. Should further opportunities arise for us to play a similar role in ending hostilities between the government and the insurgents, we will not hesitate to undertake that role.

6. Will the United States support the initiative being suggested by the Catholic bishops?

A: The United States is convinced that military conflict cannot solve Mozambique's problems and will do everything in its power to encourage an end to hostilities. At the same time, Mozambicans themselves must be the primary architects of a peaceful future for their country. The U.S. will support and encourgage any initiative for peaceful resolution of Mozambique's problems that is acceptable to the parties to the conflict in that country.

7. Will the United States serve a role in bringing the two sides together to achieve reconciliation in Mozambique?

A: The United States strongly supports an end to Mozambique's civil strife and will do everything in its power to help bring about that objective. The U.S. has in the past, when circumstances were propitious, promoted contacts between the contending parties in Mozambique. Should further such opportunities arise, the U.S. would not hesitate to undertake that role again.

RESPONSES OF THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR SIMON

1. What is the relationship between the FRELIMO government and the FRELIMO party? Isn't it true that the party's politburo is the major decision-making body setting domestic and foreign policies?

2. a) What provinces of Mozambique are the most agriculturally productive?

b) In what province is the war most intense?

3. Do you see any connection between the intensity of the war and the spread of famine? Isn't it true that the farmers are not producing because they are driven off their land by the war?

1. As in other communist countries, the prominent party members also hold important posts in government as well. The Council of Ministers in Mozambique functions as a government cabinet and is formed from top FRELIMO members, many of whom have been, or are, in the Poliburo. The distinction is signficant. The Council of Ministers, or the government, can carry out policies set by the Poliburo of the Central Committee. Failure of the policies can reside with the government and less so with the party. Just as in other communist systems, the purity of the party can be maintained while the government and its ministers are at fault. One of FRELIMO's principal problems is the weakness of party organizations on the local level.

2. During colonial times famine on the scale of the FRELIMO period was unknown. With some exceptions, Mozambique's provinces were capable of feeding their own population. This had to be the case because reliable transport for widespread distribution of foodstuffs was lacking. Local villages fed their population as well as "exporting" to nearby urban centers. FRELIMO policies of collectivized agriculture and state farms caused the famine as well as generated rural insecurity and opposition. Together with religious and political persecution these policies caused the formation of organized opposition. The Rhodesian military and police then took advantage of this opposition and trained and armed the rebels. Thus it was FRELIMO policies which lie at the root of the opposition and the famine. Droughts coming soon after independence in 1975 were a further problem.

Many areas in Mozambique are productive but the FRELIMO policies before the appearance of the RENAMO guerrillas caused a food shortage. Even today, the Limpopo River axis, the so-called Bread Basket of Mozambique, is not a region most heavily impacted by the war. Yet, this area has not returned to the pre-independence level of production because of FRELIMO's socialistic policies which denied incentives to farmers to produce and sell their output in free market which would allow for a fair return on their labor.

Although fighting against the FRELIMO regime is countrywide, some of the most intense warfare has taken place in the central region of the country.

3. The war has made life hard for African tillers. In any civil war those caught in the middle of the fighting suffer. African tillers, however, are hit by both sides. Independent reports acknowledge that rural folk living within RENAMO controlled zones are planting and harvesting.

RESPONSES OF THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HELMS

1. An independent observer, Paul L. Moorcraft, wrote an article, "The Savage, Silent Civil War" for the professional journal Army (April 1987), in which he estimated from his trip within Mozambique that there were 12,000 Zimbabwean troops inside the People's Republic of Mozambique. This figure squares with other estimates, and I conclude that it is a reasonable assessment.

2. Foreign troops have been involved in the internal affairs of many African states. During theses ocassion they have been both a destabilizing or a stabilizing element. In regard to the desperate position that the FRELIMO government finds itself, the Zimbabwean troops are a vital prop to its survival. On the other hand, Zimbabwean troops commit offenses, like all such foreign forces, which can provoke retaliation and add to the chaos and uncertainty of civil war. The Zimbabwean army's heterogeneous composition has also added to its morale problems.

3. The addition of Soviet MIGs to the Zimbabwean capabilities will further internationalize the conflict in Mozambique. These aircraft will in some missions increase the Zimbabwean ability to attack RENAMO forces. In some instances, however, jet aircraft are unsuited for antiguerrilla warfare. The real concern is the further escalation of Soviet material support for FRELIMO and what this does to the political equation in southern Africa as a whole. This is something the United States should monitor carefully and express its concern to the Soviets.

4. Yes, the FRELIMO government has lost the support and gained the enmity of large numbers of its citizens. It cannot endure without the presence of large numbers of foreign forces and Soviet bloc advisors.

1. In my judgment Mozambique has not and cannot moderate its Marxist-Leninist ideology. It has allowed for a somewhat more market mechanism to encourage agriculture production around the capital city. It has dropped its opposition to Western loans and investments, inded it has sought out both. But despite these "pragmatic" policy changes, FRELIMO remains committed to Marxist-Lininism for its blueprint and foundation of its belief-system. To abandon Marxism-Leninism, FRELIMO would suffer a profound loss of faith.

2. In my opinion, the United States would do well to use its good offices and positive influence to end the bloodshed in Mozambique and to return a region to peace, provided that democracy would have some chance in Mozambique.

3. Allowing for the fact that there are rarely two countries or two political situations identically parallel, the situations in Mozambique and Angola have many obvious parallels. Both countries have Marxist-Leninist regimes, failed economic policies, oppressive controls, a lack of individual freedoms or freedom of the press. These policies have generated strong opposition leading to conflict and virtual civil war. The opposition movements look to the West for political inspiration and material support.

4. While Mozambique has allowed farms near major urban areas to sell produce and permitted individuals to engage in individual acts of selling items, there is no general commitment to private enterprise. Collectivization in Mozambique as in other communist countries does impede economic growth.

1. The State Department estimates that there are 6,000-7,000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique. Yet the respected Janes Defence Weekly estimates that between 15,000-20,000 Zimbabwean troops are in Mozambique. Even the Washington Post reports that there are 12,000 Zimbabwean soldiers in Mozambique. What is your assessment on the true level of Zimbabwean troops?

2. Is the presence of these troops in Mozambique improper or destabilizing?

3. What effect would Zimbabwe's acquisition of sophisticated supersonice aircraft -- Soviet MIGs -- have on the civil war in Mozambique?

4. Does the FRELIMO regime need foreign occupying forces or Soviet bloc military advisors to survive?

1. You have followed events in Mozambique for quite some time. In your professional judgment is Mozambique "moderating" its Marxist-Leninist ideology?

2. Do you see any disadvantage to the United States facilitating a negotiation between RENAMO and FRELIMO?

3. Do you see the differences between Angola and Mozambique that Secretary Crocker does? Or are these parallel situations with opposite State Department responses?

4. Mr. Crocker, and others, have suggested that Mozambique has "reversed" its socialist/collectivist agricultural policies. What is your assessment of the economic situation? Isn't it true that large tracts of land still continue to be operated as collectivist farms? Isn't this going to impede economic revitalization?

RESPONSES OF STEVEN METZ TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR SIMON

1. How would you characterize RENAMO? Does RENAMO have a defined political platform? If so, what is it? Does RENAMO have significant popular support?

2. What is RENAMO's military strategy? Has it been effective? How does RENAMO operate in the countryside?

3. RENAMO claims that it controls 85 percent of Mozambique. Is this true? What areas does the Government control?

4. Does the Government of South Africa continue to support RENAMO? If so, how? In what way does RENAMO promote South Africa's policies in the region?

5. What are the prospects of either the Government of Mozambique or RENAMO winning the war on the ground?

6. Is there any evidence that either RENAMO or the Government of Mozambique would be willing to adopt a ceasefire and end the war through a negotiated settlement?

1. I would characterize RENAMO as a brigand organization with superficial political motivations and objectives. There have been two attempts to create a political platform on the part of the group, once in the early 1980s soon after South Africa assumed control and again in the mid-1980s when Pretoria's policy of regional destabilization was under mounting pressure and the Reagan administration's support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA created hopes of a similar relationship with RENAMO. On both occasions the political platform was an

extremely vague promise of democracy and a strong element of anti-communism. Since nothing in the background of identifiable RENAMO leaders indicates a dedication to democracy, it is very likely that this political program was aimed at Western audiences. Even reports supportive of RENAMO such as those in the 4 April 1987 Johannesburg Star and the April 1987 issue of Army have noted the absence of a political ideology within RENAMO. In addition, the internal fragmentation of RENAMO--there is no single political and military leader parallel to Savimbi--makes it difficult to discern any coherent political program.

The survival of RENAMO for nearly ten years makes it clear that some degree of popular support exists, but it is difficult to ascertain where support ends and simple intimidation begins. The popular support that does exist is derived from two factors. One of these is ethnic. When Rhodesian security forces created RENAMO, they relied primarily on Ndau-speakers; this group continues to hold most of the leadership positions. This gives RENAMO some support in central Mozambique. The second factor is disillusionment with FRELIMO policies, particularly economic programs such as the collectivization of agriculture. This type of support is at best tepid as local citizens quickly discover that RENAMO is even less interested in economic development than the FRELIMO regime, and has been partially blunted by more serious attention to "hearts and minds" mobilization by the government.

2. RENAMO's primarily military tactics are economic disruption and terrorism. All targets of economic value, especially those linked to foreign development assistance and to attempts to lessen Mozambique's economic dependence on South Africa, are attacked. Many remote parts of the country are totally cut off by RENAMO raids, and food supplies sent in response to drought and famine are often interdicted and confiscated. Much of the country is thus suffering from a famine manufactured for political reasons similar to those in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and China in the 1950s. With the exception of occasional raids by FRELIMO forces on RENAMO bases, large-scale firefights with government troops are avoided, and fluid hit-and-run raids are most commonly used. In addition to economic disruption, RENAMO relies on terrorist tactics, including the mutilation of local government representatives, in order to intimidate peasants and potential FRELIMO supporters.

Give the fact that RENAMO's objectives appear to be simply disruption, it must be concluded that these tactics have worked.

3. While RENAMO has at one time or the other operated in 85% of Mozambique, it actually controls very little of the country in the usual meaning of the word. In most of the operational area there is little or no effort to create an alternative administrative system as Savimbi has done in Angola, but rather to simply prevent the government from administering and controlling a

given area. Even the 85% figure is debatable: a March 1987 report estimated that RENAMO has unrestricted movement in 10-15% of Mozambique, particularly upper Zambezia, northern Tete, and northern Sofala. During the past decade the main region of RENAMO operation has shifted according to parallel movements in its basing area. During the period of Rhodesian control (pre-1979) the areas bordering Mozambique and Rhodesia were RENAMO's area of operation; during the period of open South African sponsorship (pre-1984) operations shifted slightly to the south. Since 1984 RENAMO has increasingly relied on bases in Malawi, and thus focuses efforts in the northwestern sections of Mozambique. One constant is the Beira transportation corridor which has remained a primary target.

4. The government of South Africa officially denies support for RENAMO, but has been forced to admit in the face of incontrovertible evidence that supplies did continue to flow after they were proscribed by 1984 Nkomati Accord. Pretoria attributes some of the continued flow of supplies to private efforts by South Africans and has hinted that the breeches of the Nkomati Accord were due to zealous members of the South African security forces operating without authorization. Every other nation of southern Africa (and the U.S. State Department) discredits these claims of innocence. Two factors indicate that Pretoria continues to supply RENAMO. One is the simple fact that the group is armed with Soviet-made weapons, which were probably captured in Namibia or Angola. There simply is no other obvious source from which RENAMO could receive this materiel. The other factor consists of frequent reports of air and sea supply drops within Mozambique. RENAMO itself does not have the capability to infiltrate supplies. Since these have to come from somewhere, and South Africa is the only nation with the means and the motive to provide them, it is very likely--but not fully provable--that Pretoria continue to arm RENAMO.

RENAMO's disruptive activities contribute to South Africa's policy of regional destabilization. This has three objectives. First, by constraining the economic development of Mozambique and attempts by the nations of the region to develop transportation systems which do not pass through South Africa, Pretoria perpetuates the economic weakness and dependence of Mozambique; this translates into political leverage. Second, the FRELIMO-RENAMO war is used by Pretoria as "evidence" that majority rule in southern Africa invariably means instability. This is directed at both opponents of apartheid within South Africa and at the West. Third, the war with RENAMO forces the FRELIMO government to continue its military relationship with the Soviet Union, and this, in turn, is used by Pretoria to blunt potential pressure from the West.

5. Give the terrain of Mozambique, the external support for both the government and the insurgents, the inherent complexities of guerrilla war, and the economic weakness of the government, it is unlikely that either side

can win the war on the ground in the short run. The only factors that could change this are those outside of Mozambique such as an end to South African support for RENAMO or a large-scale commitment of military assistance by the Soviets. In lieu of this, the military stalemate is likely to persist, with occasional ebbs and flows in the strength of the two protagonists.

6. Until 1984 there appeared to be little effort on the part of either FRELIMO or RENAMO to seek a negotiated solution to their war. For the government, this would have created a perception that the conflict involved genuine political differences and thus given the insurgents a degree of political legitimacy which they otherwise lacked. For RENAMO, a negotiated solution would not have served the needs of their Rhodesian or South African masters. With the 1984 Nkomati Accord, however, this changed somewhat. Pretoria appeared to feel that destabilization had created an adequate degree of supplication in the regional states, and thus served no further purpose. Thus in 1984 South Africa sponsored negotiations between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO which resulted in an apparent agreement called the "Pretoria Declaration." Within a week RENAMO backed out of this, probably because Portuguese businessmen who had lost holdings following the independence of Mozambique pressured their faction with RENAMO to oppose the agreement until they could be assured that their former property would be returned. Since then internal fragmentation in RENAMO has caused great uncertainty concerning negotiations. At times RENAMO spokesmen appear amenable toward negotiations, at other times they reject them completely and endorse only full military victory.

It can be concluded, however, that efforts by the United States to broker an arrangement between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO--if the government agrees--could be fruitful. Such a negotiated settlement would at least split RENAMO between those who seek power-sharing and those who will settle for nothing short of complete victory, and would make it easier for the United States to bring pressure on Pretoria if it could be conclusively shown that the re-supply of RENAMO continued.

RESPONSES OF STEVEN METZ TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HELMS

1. The State Department estimates that there are 6,000-7,000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique. Yet the respected Janes Defence Weekly estimates that between 15,000-20,000 Zimbabwean troops are in Mozambique. Even the Washington Post reports that there are 12,000 Zimbabwean soldiers in Mozambique. What is your assessment on the true level of Zimbabwean troops?

2. Is the presence of these troops in Mozambique improper or destabilizing?

3. What effect would Zimbabwe's acquisition of sophisticated supersonice aircraft -- Soviet MIGs -- have on the civil war in Mozambique?

4. Does the FRELIMO regime need foreign occupying forces or Soviet bloc military advisors to survive?

5. I am told that discussion have occurred recently in the Zimbabwean legislature concerning possible annexation of parts of Mozambique -- to form a consolidated area of "Mozambabwe". Are you familiar with such reports? Would you consider such action to be destabilizing to the region?

1) For figures on Zimbabwean troops currently stationed in Mozambique I have had to rely on published sources, and thus have no way of cross-checking disparate numbers. The most common figure from my sources is 12,000. The discrepancy is probably due to regular troop rotations, and to the fact that new units are often sent to confront specific threats. I have no evidence that there has been a deliberate escalation of the number of Zimbabwean troops, or that these troops have been used to influence Mozambican policy. In fact, as the morale and operational capability of the Mozambican forces improves, I would expect a diminution of the number of Zimbabwean troops. Thus I would conclude that the discrepancies between the Janes figure and the others is of little significance for American policy in the region.

2) I feel that these presence of Zimbabwean troops is in no way improper or destabilizing. They entered Mozambique at the request of the government and with the support of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the other Front Line States; there is no evidence that their presence is opposed by any segment of the Mozambican government or polity. Their presence greatly assists regional efforts to keep the Beira transportation corridor open, which, in turn, contributes to the economic development of the region (especially of Zimbabwe and Mozambique,

which are recipients of American developmental assistance) and to efforts to lessen economic dependence on South Africa. In general, a lessening of the Front Line States' economic dependence on South Africa would assist in limiting the spread of South Africa's domestic problems to the southern Africa region as a whole. In addition, the fact that the Front Line States have attempted to solve their security problems themselves--i.e. without resort to greater Soviet involvement--is a positive sign.

3) Since sophisticated supersonic aircraft are not designed for ground attack, Zimbabwe's acquisition of them would have little direct impact on the war between Renamo and the FRELIMO regime. The presence of such aircraft would hamper South African efforts to resupply Renamo, but since Pretoria claims that this is not taking place anyway, this should not be a major factor. The regional impact of such aircraft would, however, diminish South Africa's ability to launch strikes against targets in the Front Line States, and serve as symbol's of the Front Line States' growing ability to oppose regional destabilization by Pretoria. For obvious reasons the U.S. should encourage Zimbabwe to acquire defensive military equipment from the West, but in lieu of this, the acquisition of MIGs would not seriously endanger American interests in the region.

4) It is likely that the FRELIMO regime does not need outside military advisers to survive in the limited sense of the word, but it does need assistance to keep the Beira transportation corridor open, and thus to make serious efforts to develop economically and re-assert control of the regions of the country currently destabilized by Renamo. The desire of Mozambique to gain military assistance from other African nations rather than the Soviet Union is a positive development which reflects: A) the long-standing policy of the FRELIMO government to avoid dependence on either superpower; and, B) the fact that Soviet military advice rendered in the late 1970s and early 1980s proved inapplicable to the type of guerrilla insurgency which Mozambique faces. On a semantic note, the Zimbabwean troops cannot be considered "occupying forces" by any standard definition of that term any more than U.S. forces in West Germany could be. Because of the economic costs to Zimbabwe and the fierce nationalism of all African nations, it is certain that the Zimbabwean troops would be withdrawn if the threat from Renamo diminished.

5) I am aware of sporadic reports of discussion of Zimbabwean annexation of Mozambican territory, but feel that: A) it is very

unlikely to take place given the tremendous opposition to any redrawing of borders by African states; and, B) even in the unlikely event that this should occur, it would have little impact on the balance of power in southern Africa, or on American interests there since it would represent the transfer of non-strategic territory from a state at least moderately affiliated with the Soviet Union to one with deep suspicion and occasion outright hostility toward Moscow. In general I see no evidence that Zimbabwe aspires to regional hegemony in the fashion of Vietnam.

RESPONSES OF THOMAS O. BRENNAN TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR SIMON

1. What is the severity of Mozambique's refugee situation?

Mozambique's refugee crisis is among the worst in the world.

In mid-1987, approximately 477,000 Mozambicans--about three and one-half percent of the total population--are in refuge outside their country. Within Mozambique, nearly three million civilians--more than 20 percent of the population--have been displaced from their homes and their villages. The brutalities that have precipitated these population movements have undoubtedly had traumatic and far-reaching effects on the social and psychological well-being of countless Mozambicans. Although impossible to define and quantify at this time, these effects will clearly influence the development of Mozambique for many years to come

More immediately, massive displacements of rural populations in Mozambique have had widespread and disastrous effects on the economy of that nation--most directly on its ability to feed itself. As peasants and farmers have been forced by conflict to abandon their farms, they have been unable to grow food even for themselves, much less for urban dwellers. The result is a shortfall of approximately 729,000 MT of cereals--to feed 5.7 million Mozambicans--in calendar year 1987.

2. What can be done to resolve the refugee situation?

Resolution of the refugee crisis in Mozambique is, unfortunately, predicated on resolution of the conflict in that nation. While it is doubtful that RENAMO possesses any widespread political support within Mozambique, its military forces have established themselves to such an extent that the FRELIMO government has little hope of defeating them in the foreseeable future. The apparent strategies of FRELIMO and RENAMO are both long-term in nature, and the military help they receive--from the Soviet Union and South Africa, respectively--is unlikely to cease for quite some time. Thus, the prospects for peace in Mozambique, at least for the moment, are discouragingly dim.

The problems which plague southern Africa--refugees, apartheid, civil wars, hunger, and oppressive regimes--are interrelated issues, each has important regional aspects, and none is amenable to

solutions which ignore the related issues or which focus on any single country. There is no question that justice in the region is the prerequisite for peace on the broad scale, but saving the lives of the innocent--one by one--must become a clearer priority.

3. What happens to the refugees when they leave Mozambique?

The situation of refugees fleeing Mozambique greatly depends on where they seek asylum.

In Zimbabwe, many of the 65,000 Mozambican refugees live with extended families and ethnic clan members in the eastern highlands, near the border area with Mozambique. UNHCR--assisted by World Vision, Oxfam/UK, the International Red Cross, and Christian Care--has also established four settlements for Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe. The settlements are reportedly well run, with adequate shelter, water, and food supplies. In March, the Zimbabwe government announced plans to open a fifth settlement in southeastern Zimbabwe to accomodate approximately 15,000 Mozambicans living in that area.

Some 37,000 Mozambican refugees in Zambia are also being assisted by UNHCR--for the moment in three temporary refugee settlements along the Mozambican border. The government of Zambia is understandably concerned about having large numbers of refugees on its border and, along with UNHCR, is establishing a more permanent settlement at Ukwimi, some distance from the border, to accommodate up to 25,000 of these refugees. The government of Zambia has stated that all refugees who arrived in Zambia after September 1985 must relocate to the settlement at Ukwimi or face forced repatriation to Mozambique.

In Malawi, approximately 200,000 refugees have sought safety from the conflict that rages in Mozambique. The government of Malawi is attempting to treat the influx as a temporary, emergency situation, and has refused to consider establishing organized settlements for the refugees. About one-half of the refugees are, nevertheless, in camp-like settings, while the remainder are scattered along the Mozambique border, often living with Malawian relatives or clan members. The large and sudden influx of Mozambicans--virtually all have arrived since October 1986--is creating great difficulties for Malawi. Hospitals and clinics are, on average, operating at 150 to 180 percent capacity; some have more than double their normal patient load. The administration of refugees in the temporary camps is overwhelming the relatively small Malawian bureaucracy, and maintaining Mozambican relatives outside the camps is also becoming extremely burdensome for many Malawi citizens.

South Africa is the only nation in the region that is actively seeking to prevent Mozambican refugee influxes. The South African authorities have erected an electrified fence, stretching from Kruger National Park to Swaziland, that has killed several would-be refugees and has caused others to lose their fingers, hands, or feet. South Africa also forcibly repatriates to Mozambique about 1,200 refugees each month, but we do not have information on the fate of these asylum-seekers once back in Mozambique.

The South African government estimates that there are about 310,000 Mozambicans in South Africa. But Mozambicans have a long history of both temporary and permanent migration to South Africa in search of employment, and it is uncertain how many of the Mozambicans in South Africa are actually refugees. Some 85,000 Mozambicans--mainly women, children, and the elderly--have settled

in the "homelands" of Gazankulu, Lebowa, KaNgawane, and KwaZulu, and these are clearly genuine refugees seeking to escape the violence in Mozambique. Their status varies from location to location, but they do not appear to be in immediate danger of being repatriated. Refugees in South Africa's "homelands" generally live with local residents with whom they share clan ties, and they receive modest assistance from Operation Hunger, World Vision, and, occassionally, from the South African authorities.

Most of the remainder of the Mozambicans in South Africa have made their way to mining and industrial areas around Johannesburg, where they seek out--and apparently find--illegal employment. When caught by the South African authorities, these Mozambicans are forcibly repatriated, or--according to some reports--are coerced into joining RENAMO, and then undergo military training in South Africa before being infiltrated back into Mozambique.

There are also relatively small numbers of Mozambican refugees in Swaziland (about 9,000), and in Tanzania (about 15,000). Approximately half of the Mozambicans in Swaziland live in a settlement originally established by UNHCR for ethnic Swazis who have left South Africa, while the remainder have self-settled along the border with Mozambique. The influx of Mozambicans into Tanzania is fairly recent, and there is presently no information on their status or situation. Given Tanzania's long tradition of generosity toward refugees from many countries, however, it is likely that Mozambicans are not facing unusual difficulties in that country.

RESPONSES OF THOMAS O. BRENNAN TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HELMS

1. What impact does the fact that the FRELIMO government is currently operating 16 concentration camps, also known as "Centres for Mental Decolonization", have on the refugee situation?

During the nine-month transitional government which preceded complete independence in 1975, FRELIMO made clear its intolerance of dissent, arresting and imprisoning the leadership of all opposition groups. Within a few months after independence, FRELIMO was reported to have established its own secret police to replace those of the Portuguese, and to have arrested several thousand more purported opponents, most of whom were sent to the camps to which you have referred. Throughout the late 1970s, the population imprisoned in the camps at any one time was estimated at up to 10,000 individuals.

While a number of dissidents, and others who feared they might be regarded as dissidents, fled Mozambique--mainly to Portugal, Southern Rhodesia, Brazil, and South Africa--to avoid possible incarceration during the late 1970s, they represent a very small portion of the present refugee population. More generally, however, continued violations of human rights by both sides in Mozambique--symbolized, in the case of the FRELIMO government, by the continued existence of these camps--clearly contributes substantially to refugee flows from that country.

2. What is your reaction to the statement that Mozambican refugees in Malawi and neighboring states are assisting RENAMO?

The statement does not appear to be accurate. Although there

may be a small number of refugees in Malawi who actually do assist RENAMO, the overwhelming majority of these refugees probably support neither side in the conflict, and many claim they have entered Malawi to escape RENAMO atrocities. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, refugees are even more vocal in their denunciation of RENAMO brutalities. There are, however, reports that Mozambicans captured after illegally entering South Africa are threatened with deportation unless the young men in refugee families agree to join RENAMO.

3. The Reverend Peter Hammond, a missionary in Mozambique of a Christian Evangelical group called Frontline Fellowship, reported in late 1986 of extensive FRELIMO atrocities, including the massacre of practicing Christians in Zambezia province, the seizure of children as young as twelve years old for the government armed forces, and the systematic elimination of villages which support the resistance. What is the effect on the native population of government atrocities such as these?

I can not react directly to the Reverend Hammond's specific allegations, but there is no doubt that FRELIMO forces are guilty of atrocities against civilian populations in Mozambique. However, reports from Mozambican refugees in South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi indicate that RENAMO is guilty of the most blatant and indiscriminate brutalities against civilian populations and is responsible for most of the refugee exodus from Mozambique.

4. What is your reaction to the report that refugees in the government areas are coerced by government intimidation to blame RENAMO for government atrocities?

Mozambicans under the control of either side in the conflict probably feel pressure to report favorably about the forces that control them and negatively about the opposing side. I believe that reports deriving from unmonitored interviews with refugees--who have successfully escaped the control of either side--most reliably attribute blame for atrocities in Mozambique. These reports attribute most, but not all, blame to RENAMO.

5. To what extent has the FRELIMO government policy of collectivizing agriculture by seizing private farms, driven farmers off their land?

In the late 1970s, socialization of the agricultural sector, followed by heavy emphasis on state farms and neglect of cooperatives, contributed to a significant decline in both subsistence and cash-crop production. After 1980, FRELIMO came slowly to recognize its failure in this respect and then-president Machel's increasing pragmatism resulted in the evolution of a more popular mixed economy of state, collective, and private sectors.

For many in Mozambique, however, the government's new emphasis on private farming came too late, as poor rains and mismanagement continued to restrict growth in the rural areas. As drought crippled the already disrupted rural economy, peasants were more easily recruited into RENAMO, if only for the sake of food.

RESPONSES OF JOSE A. FRANCISCO TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR SIMON

1. You said you are a former member of FRELIMO. Were you a soldier? If not, what?

2. When did you leave Mozambique? Have you ever returned since then?

3. Are you a member of RENAMO? If so, when did you become a member? Did you ever fight with RENAMO? If so, how long and when?

4. You testified that some executions which you witnessed were ordered personally by individuals who now hold important positions in the Mozambican Government, including President Chissano. How do you know that these executions were ordered by them?

5. You testified that you met Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of RENAMO, in West Germay in 1983. Most press reports suggest that Mr. Dhlakama has never been outside of Mozambique. Could you please provide details of the circumstances under which you met Mr. Dhlakama?

6. You have testified that RENAMO has the support of the majority of Mozambicans and that it controls the majority of the country. On what evidence are your conclusions based? Is this first-hand evidence?

1. I was an army officer with FRELIMO between 1967 and 1969. I was based and trained in Tanzania and operated in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa.

2. I left Mozambique after witnessing the numerous terrorist acts and atrocities committed by FRELIMO. It became clear to me that this was becoming standard military proceedure for FRELIMO. I was hospitalized in Dar es Salaam with typhoid when a FRELIMO friend of mine, Mr. Bernardo Nyautshi, returned from training in the Soviet Union. He told me that he and a number of others had received information that they would be executed by FRELIMO when they returned to the front because they had been identified as being "untrustworthy" by their Soviet trainers. He was making immediate plans to escape from Tanzania and I decided to do the same. I have not returned to Mozambique since then for obvious reasons.

3. I am not a member of RENAMO's National Council, however I maintain close contact with RENAMO's Representative in the United States as do many other Mozambicans living here who identify with RENAMO's cause. I have not fought with RENAMO.

4. As a platoon commander in the northern provinces, I personally received letters signed by Chissano, then Chief of Security, giving instructions that certain "collaborators", including civil populations, must be executed.

5. In 1983, President Dhlakama issued an invitation to Mozambicans in exile to meet him in Kiel, West Germany. Amongst those invitied was myself. I was with him for a period of three days in which time some important decisions were made in my presence.

6 All news reports, including the state controlled FRELIMO p.ess, indicate that RENAMO is operational in all ten provinces. Journalists who have travelled the RENAMO liberated zones

indicate the same, as do American defense and intelligence sources. Furthermore, anyone knowlegdeable of guerrilla operations know that guerrillas need support of the local population in order to be successful. Indeed, activity against the population is counterproductive to the existence of the guerrillas themselves. It therefore stands to logic that RENAMO operates in 85% of the country, including in the suburbs of Maputo, because it has the support of the population. In theory and reality this holds true. I also receive reports (couriered via the Catholic Church) from friends still living in Mozambique which corraborate the same.

RESPONSES OF JOSE A. FRANCISCO TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HELMS

1. The State Department estimates that there are 6,000-7,000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique. Yet the respected Janes Defence Weekly estimates that between 15,000-20,000 Zimbabwean troops are in Mozambique. Even the Washington Post reports that there are 12,000 Zimbabwean soldiers in Mozambique. What is your assessment on the true level of Zimbabwean troops?

2. Is the presence of these troops in Mozambique improper or destabilizing?

3. What effect would Zimbabwe's acquisition of sophisticated supersonice aircraft -- Soviet MIGs -- have on the civil war in Mozambique?

4. Does the FRELIMO regime need foreign occupying forces or Soviet bloc military advisors to survive?

5. I am told that discussion have occurred recently in the Zimbabwean legislature concerning possible annexation of parts of Mozambique -- to form a consolidated area of "Mozambabwe". Are you familiar with such reports? Would you consider such action to be destabilizing to the region?

1. Between 1985 and 1986, the number of Zimbabweans mercenaries inside Mozambique jumped from 7,000 to 12,000. Today the figure ranges between 15,000 and 20,000 depending on operations and intensity of the conflict. Zimbabwean dictator, Robert Mugabe, has stated that his military committment to FRELIMO "is total". He has also stated that the survival of the FRELIMO regime is linked to his own.

2. The presence of Zimbabwean mercenaries is a destabilizing one. By propping up the unelected communist elite of FRELIMO, the Zimbabweans are preventing the establishment of peace in Mozambique by preventing the internal process of political legitimacy amongst Mozambicans themselves.

Numerous documented reports also indicate that Zimbabwe has increasing difficulty obtaining cooperation of the FRELIMO army in their operations against RENAMO. High level sources within the FRELIMO military are in sympathy with RENAMO and regularly leak information on Zimbabwean operations to the RENAMO command. Tensions between FRELIMO and Zimbabwe has erupting in fighting several times in the past year. Most recently, on July 4, a battle between the two allies left four Zimbabweans dead including their commander, John Dhlovu. Zimbabwean forces are also responsible for numerous atrocities against the civilian population apparently in retaliation for the support given to RENAMO by the locals.

In terms of regional stability, Zimbabwe and FRELIMO conspired actively to overthrow the Malawian government of President Kamuza Banda. In documents recovered from the wreckage of Samora Machel's aircraft, a meeting between the Zimbabwean military delegation led by the Minister of State Security and Samora Machel detailed plans and motives for the overthrow.

Clearly, the presence of Zimbabwean mercenaries is the major obstacle to achieving peace and stability in Mozambique.

3. The acquisition of sophisticated aircraft by Zimbabwe can only be viewed as an attempt to prolong the civil war in Mozambique and increase bloodshed. MIGS and helicopter gunships are used extensively against RENAMO and against the civilian population. RENAMO does not have an airforce nor an effective anti-aircraft capability. Therefore enemy aircraft present the greatest obstacle for RENAMO when facing conventional forces particularly the final assault on Maputo. The Zimbabwe military recognize this fact and their efforts to procure more and sophisticated aircraft can be interpreted in that context.

4. If FRELIMO had popular support, they would not require 15,000 mercenaries from Zimbabwe, 3,000 from Tanzania, 3,000 from Zambia, and 10,000 from various East-bloc countries. Most military observers agree that FRELIMO would collapse without foreign intervention.

5. Zimbabwean territorial aspirations were clearly articulated in the Zimbabwean parliamentary debates of July 1986. The proposed annexation is being called "Mozamabwe". More recently a federation of unity between FRELIMO and Zimbabwe, called "Zambezia", has been discussed with Chissano being under considerable pressure and obligation to do so in exchange for Zimbabwe's "guarantee" for his survival. A Zimbabwean initiative is presently underway (following closely the British campaign in Malaya) to colonize the Beira Corridor region by moving Zimbabwean settlers to take over farms and businesses while sequestering the local population into "protected villages" to deny local support for RENAMO. Naturally, Mozambican nationalists consider these designs to be "treason of Chissano" "imperialism of Mugabe".

RESPONSES OF EDWARD L. SAIERS TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR SIMON

NEED FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC REFORM

Mr. Simon: In your testimony, you mentioned a number of economic reforms taken by the Government of Mozambique (GPRM). What further steps need to be taken to revitalize Mozambique's economy?

Answer: The GPRM has made a good start in stabilizing the Mozambican economy. More needs to be done to achieve the Government's goal of revitalizing the economy, particularly the agricultural sector. The GPRM will need to redouble its efforts in a broad range of policies including the following:

a. a flexible exchange rate policy, possibly entailing further devaluations in 1987, in order to encourage production of exports and import substitutes;

b. a flexible interest rate policy, with positive "real" interest rates, in order more efficiently to allocate investment funds and encourage savings;

c. further liberalization of exchange and trade regimes, in order to remove barriers to trade and investment;

d. market-determined pricing of producer and consumer goods, in order to provide an efficient incentives structure;

e. reduced central administration and regulation of the economy, coupled with privatization and, as necessary, closure of loss-making

parastatals, in order to minimize barriers to economic revitalization and subsidies to inefficient productive enterprises;

f. greater competition in agricultural marketing and transport, in order to allow profit margins from higher food prices to be passed through to farmers;

g. improved governmental accountability, through clearer definition of the functions and accounts of the central banking system, reform of the system for managing state industrial enterprises, and better planning, policy-making, and budgeting.

These measures in fact form the bulk of the structural adjustment program agreed between the GPRM and donors in 1987. Their effective implementation will go a long way toward laying the foundation for sustained economic growth.

EFFECT OF CIVIL CONFLICT ON RECOVERY

Mr. Simon: Is it realistic to expect substantial improvements in Mozambique's economy as long as the civil war continues?

Answer: Clearly it is not possible to answer this question without making some assumptions about the course of the insurgency. Donors anticipate a substantial response to the Government's agricultural pricing and marketing reforms, but this assumes that the security situation will not deteriorate further. This response would be reflected by increases in output of domestic food crops as well as traditional export crops such as cashews, copra and cotton.

The reasoning behind this scenario is basically that, although the insurgency is a major factor contributing to Mozambique's economic decline and deterring its recovery, it is by no means the only one. The old policies of fixing prices by decree, granting monopsonies in marketing and transport to government parastatals, and effectively taxing farmers heavily in order to subsidize urban consumers actually pre-dated the insurgency, as did the decline in agricultural production.

Agricultural production has fallen to about 75 percent of 1981 levels, necessitating imports of food. It is estimated that 90 percent of marketed grain requirements currently must be met by imports. The anomaly is that imported grain, brought in by rail and truck, is greatly at risk due to guerrilla attacks on the transportation network. If Mozambican farmers are offered sufficient incentives to increase domestic food production, and eventually to achieve grain self-sufficiency, the economy's vulnerability to guerrilla attacks will be reduced.

There is evidence to support this contention. Until recently, most agricultural prices were fixed by government -- at levels that discouraged production. A free market in fruits and vegetables was established for the first time in May 1985, resulting in large increases in supply in the central markets of major cities, despite stepped-up guerrilla destabilization efforts in that year. Allowing prices of food grains and staples to be set by market forces, rather than by decree, will

provide increased incentives for farmers to produce such commodities.

It is fair to ask whether substantial improvements in Mozambique's economy can be expected if the security situation deteriorates. The insurgency has been most intense and disruptive in Zambezia province, the heart of the country's breadbasket. If the guerrillas succeed in intensifying the insurgency significantly, Mozambique's liberalization program may not produce a dramatic economic turnaround. On the other hand, if the GPRM were to revert to the inappropriate policies of the past, whether or not the insurgency intensified, the Mozambican economy would begin rapidly to unravel.

FOOD PRICE DECONTROL

Mr. Simon: What are the prospects of the Government of Mozambique decontrolling other prices, such as those on rice, corn and flour?

Answer: I certainly don't want to speculate on what the Government of Mozambique will or won't do.

The Mozambique Government has, however, already made many important reforms, including a significant devaluation, turning land over to private sector farmers and lifting price controls on fruits, vegetables and some poultry products. In June and July, it announced higher prices for several food commodities, including rice, corn, corn meal, wheat flour, beef, pork, chicken, eggs and brown sugar. It might be reasonable to expect further decontrol of prices on key food items such as rice, corn and flour.

AGRICULTURE AND PRIVATE SECTOR

Mr. Simon: What is the status of the agricultural sector in Mozambique? To what extent has it been privatized?

Answer: The overwhelming majority of farmers and farmland in Mozambique have always been in the private, sector. About 95 percent of the area cultivated in Mozambique is in family and private commercial farms. Likewise, Mozambique's major agricultural export, cashews, is produced solely by private farmers. Nonetheless, until four years ago, the Government of Mozambique had largely ignored family farms and private commercial farms as well. Irrigated land, agricultural inputs and farm machinery were available almost exclusively to state farms.

This neglect of private farming has been overturned by reforms in recent years. The Government has proclaimed the family farmer to be the "principal axle" of the its recovery program. Underutilized land from state farms, including prime irrigated land, has been turned over to private farmers. In some cases, state farms have been abolished altogether to make way for more efficeint private enterprises. Agricultural inputs, machinery and extension services are now being made available to private farmers. Moreover, private companies are now allowed to market agricultural produce and, for many commodities, let the market set the price. The recently agreed structural adjustment program will further the privatization in agriculture.

ICRC PROGRAM IN MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. Simon: I understand that the Administration is working with the International Committee of the Red Cross to work out an arrangement by which emergency food aid can be delivered in the most severely affected provinces, which are the areas of heaviest fighting. Could you expand on this please?

Answer: The ICRC is now operating in all the provinces of central Mozambique. Their plan is to visit regularly all the districts affected by conflict in these provinces. Both sides are informed in advance of the ICRC's schedule of visits and have pledged their cooperation. The visits are made by teams composed of medical personnel and nutritional monitors. The U.S. Government has made available 1,500 MT of emergency food in Mozambique to the ICRC which it can airlift into any severe pockets of need identified by their monitors. The United States has also pledged an initial $500,000 to cover other costs of the ICRC program and is considering further assistance.

The ICRC program is just getting underway and its visits are presently limited to district towns. As the program develops, it will expand its medical services and nutritional monitoring into rural zones throughout conflict areas in Mozambique.

RENAMO AND EMERGENCY FOOD AID DELIVERY

Mr. Simon: RENAMO denies that it has prevented the delivery of emergency food aid and has stated its willingness to cooperate in the delivery of food stuffs. Have Administration officials discussed this matter with RENAMO representatives?

Answer: We have not discussed food aid deliveries directly with RENAMO representatives. However, in conjunction with the rest of the international donor community, we have asked the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to arrange food deliveries in conflict areas through discussions with both sides. The ICRC's food delivery program is proceeding. In addition, an AID special assessment team which visited Mozambique in February will return to southern Africa in the near future to review developments and obtain additional information on Mozambique's food situation. The group will travel to Zimbabwe and Malawi as well as to Mozambique, and is prepared to accept information from all knowledgeable relief agencies and individuals, including refugees, regardless of political affiliation.

GRPM RESPONSE TO FAMINE

Mr. Simon: Has the Government of Mozambique made an effective response to the famine?

Answer: The government of Mozambique has been very effective and cooperative in its relief program. Its Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities (DPCCN) has been the principal relief organization assisting victims of drought and civil strife. Because of Mozambique's shortage of skilled and trained personnel, the DPCCN has relied heavily on CARE to assist in managing the relief program. Collaboration between CARE and the DPCCN has been excellent. International and private voluntary organizations participating in the relief effort have also found the Government of Mozambique very willing and responsive in assisting their relief operations.

TRANSPORTATION REHABILITATION: MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. Simon: What is the attitude of the Western European nations toward the question of rehabilitating transportation routes in Mozambique? How much assistance have these nations provided? How much has the United States provided?

Answer: The European donors generally agree with SADCC that the rehabilitation of transport routes through Mozambique is the highest priority within the transportation sector in southern Africa.

The latest SADCC report shows the following financing secured for Mozambique transport systems:

	Total Cost	External Financing Required	Funding Secured	Gap
Beira Transport System	$613.9	538.4	101.6	436.8
Nacala Transport System	265.0	223.2	163.4	59.8
Maputo Transport System	680.9	567.0	231.1	335.9

For the three major transport systems in Mozambique, approximately $500 million has been secured from and Western donor nations. Additional pledges have been made by Western donors for which agreements have not yet been finalized. The U.S. provided $5.6 million in FY 1986 for rehabilitation of locomotives and rails on the Beira Corridor.

WESTERN INVESTMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. Simon: When did Western investors begin to look seriously at Mozambique? Could you please expand on the level and nature of Western European and U.S. investment in Mozambique?

Answer: Western investments in Mozambique increased substantially after 1983 when Mozambique, itself, began a concerted effort to move away from its

reliance on Eastern Bloc economic models and financial assistance. The signing of the Nkomati Accord with South Africa, the visit of the late Samora Machel to the U.S., the enactment of a liberalized investment code in 1984, and the opening up of private sector initiatives have given Western companies and donors a more positive view toward investment in Mozambique.

Approximately $500 million is currently invested in the rehabilitation of Mozambique's transport sector by the donor community. In addition, some $75 million has been invested or pledged by private investors in transport infrastructure. Other private companies have invested in large scale agricultural plantations and gold and titanium mining. The Mozambicans have offered very favorable terms to potential American investors. American firms are presently investigating possible ventures in mining, fishing, manufacturing and tourism.

RESPONSES OF TERRY JEGGLE TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR SIMON

The following responses are given with respect to direct knowledge gained in the course of CARE's work in Mozambique through my assignment during the period March 1984 - February 1987. I cannot provide authoritative comment on events or conditions after that date of my departure from the country.

1. Q. You were in Mozambique for nearly three years as Director of CARE-Mozambique. How would you characterize RENAMO? Does RENAMO have a defined political program? If so, what is it? Does RENAMO have significant popular support?

A. In my testimony I pointedly refrained from any direct reference to RENAMO precisely because there is insignificant evidence of the existence of a bona fide organization in structural and political terms to warrant the use of an identifying name. No doubt, destructive and disruptive actions and military activities attributed to and claimed by groups of armed insurgents generally believed to receive external support have been evident in Mozambique. A spokesman delivers external public statements in Lisbon and reports are made in Washington that refer to such an organization's opposition to the government of Mozambique and reference is made to the organization's self-proclaimed "president", but otherwise basic organizational, structural, administrative, or civil forms or political policies

have not been publicized or made evident to my knowledge. The destructive capacity of a force at work in Mozambique is painfully apparent, but any credibility in terms of RENAMO representing positive political substance is severely lacking. It is ironic that there appears to be a greater presumption of credibility in organizational or political terms of this putative organization in Washington D.C. than among those people living and working in Mozambique.

I am unaware of any willful popular support for RENAMO or its activities in Mozambique, an opinion widely shared throughout the international foreign assistance community resident in Mozambique.

2. Q. RENAMO claims that it controls 85 percent of Mozambique. Is this true? What areas does the government control?

A. The origin and reason for the frequent repetition of this claim of 85 percent control of the country is a mystery and absolutely without foundation. From our working perspective in relief activity the Government had demonstrated authority and/or access within all areas of the country with the sometimes (and changing) exceptions of:

the southern third of Maputo Province,
the northern quarters of Sofala and Manica Provinces,
some parts of the Zambesi River valley (excluding Muturara),
much of Zambesi Province (excluding areas around Quelimane, Mocuba, Chinde, and Pabane),
northern and north-eastern Tete Province above Lake Cahora Bassa.

While attacks or armed incidents had a wider distribution, in and of themselves they should not be construed as demonstrating "control". The fluid nature of the conflict with fleeting attacks makes the meaning of control open to wide interpretation. The exercize of Government authority may be most accurately determined by noting the number of constituencies throughout the country in which election procedures were conducted during 1986.

3. Q. There have been numerous reports that RENAMO has attacked civilians, mutilated and killed them. Is there any validity to these reports? Have Government forces engaged in attacks on civilians, as RENAMO charges?

A. Sufficient direct and anecdotal, first- and second-hand, information has been learned by the exposure of CARE staff, from individual private Mozambican acquaintances, or shared by fellow international relief agency workers to conclude that reports of civilians being attacked, mutilated, and/or killed by insurgent groups, not of the immediate locale, are true. By way of direct example, two CARE staff personally visited a village in Manica that was sacked and burned and spoke to the surviving villagers while the ashes still smouldered. A close associate of another agency personally visited the survivors of an ax and machete attack that occurred while they were harvesting cashews in Inhambane. There is sufficient eyewitness observation, in some cases documented by filmed evidence of the results to believe in the authenticity of reported brutalities. While the "armed bandit gangs" do not fly regimental colors, villagers and survivors are often explicit as to their belief, perception, and understanding that the attackers are mercenary insurgents wanton in destruction and attributed as RENAMO groups euphemistically referred to as "armed bandits", rather than otherwise identifiable known or local elements. Furthermore, the attacks, ambushes, or offensives with attendant brutalities witnessed on the ground are frequently claimed as RENAMO's work by their own spokesmen as in the case of road ambushes near Maputo in 1984 and later in the temporary occupations of Caia, Chemba, Marromeu, Luabo Sugar Plantation, etc. I, and other CARE staff personally have talked with survivors or visitors of these areas.

Our professional experience in Mozambique has not provided any direct exposure or awareness of Government forces engaged in regular or systematic attacks on civilians.

4. Q. What areas are most affected by the famine? What are the primary causes of the famine? Is Mozambique's emergency food need being met satisfactorily by the international community?

A. Prior to late-1985 food shortages among the rural population were most evident in the interior areas of Gaza, Inhambane, and Tete

Provinces. These shortages at that time were predominantly induced by climatic conditions of reduced rainfall that adversely affected an already fragile and poorly supported rural agricultural, marketing, and infrastructural base. The effects of this natural phenomenon were exacerbated by limited reserve food and seed stocks, initially insufficient government response mechanisms, and sporadic armed attacks on the means of transportation in the affected areas. It should be noted that during this same period there was full production of staple foodstuffs and adequate food availability in the country north of the Zambesi River.

From late-1985 until the beginning of 1987 (the end of the period of my direct familiarity) pockets of food shortages caused by drought did continue to exist in the interior northern and eastern regions of Gaza, the western and northern areas of Inhambane, and in parts of southwestern Tete - all areas within the historical 600 mm. rainfall zone. Elsewhere in the country the residual after-effects of the drought, short supplies of seed stocks, tools, and marketing opportunities impeded a rapid return to respectable levels of production in the southern half of the country.

A much more serious food shortage developed in Mozambique after late-1985 in the central region of the country within the Zambesi River valley and throughout the previously productive provinces of Zambesia, Nampula, and Niassa. This severe and widespread food shortage was a direct consequence of intensified military conflict and insurgent activity in the region following insurgent initiatives in the traditional grain-basket region contiguous to Malawi. There was widespread disruption of the countryside by the actions of the "armed bandits" and extensive dislocation and internal migration of the rural population. Despite reasonable rainfall, settled agricultural practice became impossible as fields remained unplanted when the population fled destruction and war. At the beginning of 1987 there was no question but that the continued, and intensified, food shortage affecting Mozambique was a direct consequence of expanded insurgent activity in the agricultural heartland of the country, which was previously unaffected by drought conditions.

Earlier there was moderate, if not fully adequate, international response to Mozambique's food needs, but following greater awareness and promotion of the circumstances perpetuating the country's needs in late-1986 and early-1987 there appears to be a more serious commitment of resources. An enhanced international response to Mozambique's food needs should include the sustained support for transportation, logistical, and related management requirements in addition to the timely fulfillment of food pledges. It should be noted that international support will continue to be required until such time as the prevailing rural conditions allow for a settled and productive existence of the peasantry. Unlike earlier assumptions, Mozambique's food needs are not determined now by the standard crop cycles, and longer-termed, strategically-conceived, rehabilitative assistance will have to be provided if "the emergency" is to be defeated.

5. Q. Has RENAMO deliberately attacked convoys bringing food into the rural areas? If so, what is the nature of these attacks and how frequent are they? How many trucks did CARE lose?

A. Trucks operated under the auspices of the government Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities (DPCCN) with CARE technical assistance and engaged in the delivery of relief supplies to rural areas have been attacked by insurgent elements. Between mid-1985 and the end of 1986 twelve trucks engaged in relief activities were permanently lost due to attack, as below:

- 1 truck ambushed on road to Inhambane town - carrying relief department and other government workers. 14 killed, 23 injured.
- 1 truck carrying relief supplies ambushed in Sofala Province.
- 1 truck carrying relief supplies ambushed in Manica Province.
- 9 trucks carrying relief supplies ambushed in Tete Province, of which three hit mines and the other six were shot and/or burned in four or five separate instances, in all cases while trying to proceed to northern districts of Tete Province.

In addition two trucks were burned while parked overnight at a UNICEF project site when it was attacked. They were repaired with the installation of new cabins and returned to service. Other incidents

of attack included trucks being fired upon by automatic rifle fire or hitting mines without permanent damage resulting. Records of "near misses" were not maintained and events were not concentrated in either locations or particular times, but a reasonable estimate of occurrence would be 20 to 25 separate events over the 18 month period preceding January 1987. Prudence frequently dictated that trucks not be sent into areas of recent or repeated breaches of security and drivers also expressed understandable reluctance to proceed into certain high risk areas. Certainly attacks on other vehicles contributed to an assessment of uncertainty and insecurity which further constrained the use of relief trucks in problematic areas. It is difficult to know when an unsafe road becomes safe once again - except by trial and error.

6. Q. The Government of Mozambique has undertaken some important economic reforms. In your view, what has been the impact of these measures? Are additional measures likely to be taken in the future? What is the major factor prohibiting economic recovery?
A. By personal observation I can confirm that there was a complete turnaround in the public availability of horticultural produce and artisinal fishing products after the liberalization of free-market pricing structures in May 1985. As documented elsewhere, the previously empty public markets became full of produce and economically active despite the high prices quoted. The more significant economic policy revisions undertaken in conjunction with international financial institutions in 1987 have occurred since my departure from Mozambique and I am unable to provide informed comment other than to note that the policy revisions did follow almost two years of government assurances of the need to alter prevailing policies that had proven to be inadequate.

7. Q. Does the Government of Mozambique have much popular support? What groups or in what areas are the disaffected people found?
A. From the time I spent in Mozambique I am not aware of any body, group, organization, or institution that has as much, or more, popular support than the Government. It must also be acknowledged that economic conditions have been harsh in the country for many years and the rural insecurity evident in some areas has created a degree of disaffection perhaps best described as a malaise. One is however struck by a strong collective sense of forebearance and resolve among the population and a willingness to continue to contribute. The national as well as the private response to the death of former President Machel was sincere and deeply-felt throughout the country, suggesting a degree of collective identification with government authority, leadership, and standing. From a working standpoint, it was abundantly clear that when conflict erupted or insurgents attacked, the people who could chose to flee <u>toward</u> areas of Government authority, control, and assistance and away from the areas of insurgent dominance. Displaced populations in Zambesia fled toward government-controlled areas of Chinde, Quelimane, Pabane, or first to Milange before fleeing again to Muturara, and once again to Moatize in Tete. Disrupted rural populations in northern Sofala fled to government-protected Muturara. Inhabitants of northeastern Tete moved toward stable Moatize and Tete City while the population displaced by insurgent activity in northeastern Manica Province moved toward Changara, Tete. Refugees who have fled into Malawi have returned in small numbers or have expressed the interest in returning to Mozambique if their security can be provided. I am not aware of any single instance of willful population movement toward areas of insurgent activity or dominant influence. These indirect indicators would suggest that the measure of popular support for the Government is greater than any identified alternative.

8. Q. What role is being played by the Zimbabwean, Tanzanian, and Malawian troops in Mozambique? Have you heard any reports of trouble between the Zimbabwean and Mozambican troops? Is there any indication that the Government of Zimbabwe would like to withdraw its troops?
A. During the period of my assignment in the country, Zimbabwean forces were providing effective convoying security measures along the Beira Corridor and through the Tete trunk route. This service was beneficial to the movement of relief goods and staff. Apparently Tanzanian and Malawian forces have arrived in Mozambique after my departure. I have no other direct personal knowledge of the activities of any of these forces, alleged troubles between them, or intentions of the Government of Zimbabwe regarding them.